YĀMUNA’S ĀGAMA PRĀMĀṆYAM

OR

TREATISE ON THE VALIDITY OF PAṆCARĀTRA

Sanskrit Text and English Translation

BY

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RAMANUJA RESEARCH SOCIETY

MADRAS-17
Our Research Society has been formed to publish in English all the works of our Alwars and Acharyas—Yamuna, Ramanuja and Vedanta Desika. Several North Indian Scholars and American Students are now researching in various aspects of Visistadvaita Philosophy.

Last year December we published an English Edition of Thirupavai with eighty pages of introduction and eighty pages of Swapadesam by the late M. B. Srinivasa Iyengar. Five other books of this series of Nityanusandhanam will be published very soon.

Though Nathamuni is our Prathama Acharya, none of his works is now available. Yamuna is our Next Acharya, whose books formed the basis on which Ramanuja later on built up our Siddhanta which was perfected by Vedanta Desika, two centuries afterwards.

The first book of Yamuna to be published was Githarthasamgraha in English by the late Dewan Bahadur V. K. Ramanujachariar. Some years later Prof. M. R. Rajagopala Iyengar translated the Stotraratna and Chathusloki in English. In the Annamalai University Series Prof. R. Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasachari got the English translation of all the three Siddhantas published some years ago.

The only other work of Yamuna that has not so far been published in English was 'Agamapramanyam.'
Our good friend Dr. van Buitenen, Prof. of Sanskrit, Chicago University, sent us a translation of the text and an introduction in English of the Agamapramanyam. Though we started printing the books more than three years ago due to the serious illness of our Honorary Secretary it was delayed, and we are happy that we are able to publish it at least now. Our Readers are aware that Dr. van Buitenen has already published ‘Vedarthasamgraham’ and ‘Gita Bhashya’ of Ramanuja in English, and is a well-known authority on Visistadvaita Philosophy.

Our good friend Dr. K. C. Varadachari who read the manuscript, undertook to write a scholarly Preface in his own inimitable style. But he passed away before the printing was completed. So we requested Prof. R. Ramanujaachari who had mastered all the works of Yamuna, and has acceded to our request and has written a Preface.

We are heavily indebted to Sri D. S. Krishnachar of Prabha Printing House, Bangalore, who has undertaken the arduous task of printing the book faultlessly from the typed manuscript. But for his hearty cooperation we could not have published this book at all.

V. SRINIVASA RAGHAVAN
Honorary Secretary
Ramanuja Research Society
PREFACE TO ĀGAMAPRĀMĀṆYAM

The works of Yamuna are of special importance to students of vedanta not only because they are the earliest available visistadvaita classics, but also because they present an authentic account of this system of thought and belief, having been inspired and shaped by the rich contributions of previous acharyas including Nathamuni transmitted to him through an unbroken tradition. Āgama-prāmāṇyam is one of the most important among his writings; and, strangely enough, there has been till now no critical edition of the text. In this context, my esteemed friend, Dr. van Buitenen has rendered invaluable service by bringing out a critical edition of this masterpiece with a scholarly introduction and English translation, eminently readable and faithful to the original. This timely publication has achieved a twofold purpose, that of giving the text, fast becoming scarce, further lease of life, and of making the thought imbedded in this treatise available even to those unacquainted with Sanskrit. An orientalist of great repute, he has made the field of vedanta, especially visistadvaita vedanta, his own. Already he has earned the gratitude of all interested in our cultural heritage by his excellent publications, such as Ramanuja’s Vedarthasamgraha and Ramanuja on Bhagovat Gita. A warm welcome awaits this excellent publication.

Yamuna, more properly known as Alavandar, occupies a central place among the illustrious visista-
dvaita acharyas who, reformed and revivified this ancient system of thought and belief. Nathamuni set visistadvaita vedanta on a new and glorious phase of its career; Yamuna strengthened it considerably by his writings; and Ramanuja systematised and fortified it. Kuresa pays reverential homage to the illustrious hierarchy of acharyas commencing from Lakshminatha (Supreme God, the Consort of Lakshmi) and ending with his own preceptor, Ramanuja, with Sage Natha and Yamuna at the centre:

Lakshminatha samārambhām
Nāthayāmuna madhyamām ।
asmadācārya paryantām vande
guruparamparām ।

The grandson and spiritual successor of Nathamuni, Yamuna had the unique privilege of inheriting his grandsire’s immeasurable spiritual wealth and of passing on that legacy to Ramanuja, having enriched it by his own invaluable contributions. At an early age, he achieved great distinction and fame for his erudition and dialectical skill. He easily defeated a court poet, Akkialvan, who was a terror to all learned men, far and near; and, in recognition of this victory he was hailed as Alavandar (Man come to save, rule) and granted the gift of a territory. He ruled over this principality and led a life of pomp and luxury, forgetting the high traditions of his grandfather, until he was won over to the higher life, thanks to the great efforts of Ramamisra, the chosen disciple of Pundarī-

1 ...stotyāmi nah kuladhanam kuladaīvatam tat
Pādāravindamaravinda vilocanasya ॥

Stotraratna, St. 6
kāksa who was himself the foremost among the disciples of Nathamuni, charged with the duty of instructing his grandson in the sacred lore. When the awakening came, Yamuna realised the futility of the life he had been leading, became a sannyasin, settled down at the holy spot of Srirangam, the great centre of Vaisnava thought and devoted the rest of his life to disseminating the truths handed to him by Ramamisra and writing treatises and in unremitting and one-pointed devotion to the Lord.

In his exposition of visistadvaitic thought, Yamuna follows the lead of the ancient masters like Bodhayana, Tanka and Dramida and Nathamuni, whose masterpiece, Nyayatattva greatly influenced his own writings. He follows in the footsteps of Nathamuni so closely that Vedanta Desika describes Atmasiddhi of Yamuna as a brief version of Nyayatattva. (Nyayatattva prakaranam hi Atmasiddhi.)

Though steeped in tradition, he was no blind follower. The following stanza shows how he insisted on high standards of thought and discussion:

Hanta! brahmopadesosyam  
śraddadhaṇesu śobhate  
vayamaśraddadhānāh smo  
ye yuktim prārthayāmahe||  

_Samvitsiddhi_, p. 191

"Well, all this dogmatic teaching may carry conviction with (blind) believers; we are lacking in such faith, and we search for logical reasons to convince us."
Endowed with a sharp intellect and piercing logic, he could easily see through sophistry, and was averse to using crooked ways of thinking (nirastajimhagaspaste, Vetinajasatati, St. 8). He presented his views with precision and clarity and in a manner that would compel assent. A sparkling sense of humour is discernible in his discourses. To cite one illustration while refuting the doctrine of absolute identity based on the upanishadic text—ekam evadhityam Brahma—Yamuna says in his Samritsiddhi: “The statement ‘the permanent ruler of the Cola country now reigning is without a second in this world’ is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him. It does not deny the existence of servants, sons, consort, and so on.”

The learned editor designates Yamuna as a “temple priest” (vide infra, p. 6) and includes Ramanuja in the class of “theologians and officiating priests” (Vedārtha-samgraha, p. 83) and suggests that the inspiration came to them from religion and theology. The appellations ‘temple priest’ and ‘theologian’, taken literally, do not imply any derision, and may not be inappropriate designations of these eminent thinkers and ardent devotees who considered service to God and god-lovers as the supreme goal of life; but ‘temple priest’ is suggestive of one making a living by temple service, one who cares merely for outward, formal routine of worship. Likewise, ‘theologian’ has veiled association with dogmatic, uncritical acceptance of beliefs. This suspicion gets somewhat strengthened when we read the learned editor saying “What Pancaratra signifies for him (Yamuna) is dikṣā and the other sacraments; ārādhana and the various aspects of the ritual of
worship of the God; puja...” In point of fact, they were not temple priests, but eminent sannyasins and accredited leaders and exponents of visistadvaitic thought and vaisnava religion, who set great store by logic and sought convincing evidence before accepting any belief. It is therefore necessary to consider if these are fair and factual descriptions.

In his learned introduction Dr. van Buitenen refers to a number of problems that challenge attention and call for further study. One of these is ‘the reticence of the illustrious vaisnava philosopher, Ramanuja, about the Pancaratra system.’ “Ramanuja remains” he says, “wholly silent about the element, both of doctrine and of religious practice of Pancaratra.” In his earlier publication, Ramanuja’s Vedartha-samgraha, Dr. van Buitenen says, that although the orthodoxy of the Pancaratra had been established, “it is not utilised as a source of knowledge in its own right to corroborate Ramanuja’s system of vedanta.” There is reference again to “Ramanuja’s evident indifference towards Pancaratra.” He has himself suggested a plausible reason for Ramanuja’s not quoting even a single pada from the veritable ocean of the Pancaratra. A master of dialectics, to win support for his interpretation of vedic teachings, form vedantins of all shades of opinion, he would take his stand only on sruti and universally accepted smrti; he would not like to jeopardise a good case by quoting from what may be dubbed sectarian. For an identical reason, he studiously avoided all reference to the Divyaprabandha, though it has been one of the shaping forces of his thought.
As regards Ramanuja remaining "wholly silent about the elements both of doctrine and of religious practice of the Pancaratra," it may be said that he presented a synthetic account of vedanta incorporating into it the vedic, agamic and prabandha contributions. The genealogy of the specific items was not indicated because most of them are found in all the scriptures. Ramanuja looked upon the varied scriptures as setting forth identical doctrines, though their language and idiom vary.

It is certainly not difficult to identify the agamic elements in Ramanuja's teaching. In the first place, the prapatti doctrine, though ancient and based on the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavat Gita, gets special elaboration in the Pancaratra. The credit for having stressed its importance as a self-sufficient and independent means to mokṣa and of explaining its angas (steps) goes to the Pancaratra. As this path is accessible to all irrespective of caste or rank, it has a universal appeal. That everyone, whatever his station in life, is entitled to mokṣa, and that it may be attained in this very birth is a characteristic Pancaratra teaching. Ramanuja utilised this doctrine and incorporated this in his exposition of the viśistadvaita. Though he makes a passing mention of it in the Sri Bhasya and the Vedarthasamgraha, he emphasises it in the Gita Bhasya especially in commenting on the Carama sloka. More than all, in his Gadyatraya which is a confession of his faith, he presents saranagati as hita par excellence.

Another feature of the Pancaratra which Ramanuja has utilised is its insistence on an austere life. In
Nityagrantha it is prescribed as part of the daily routine throughout life. The day is divided into five periods, each to be devoted to an appropriate duty. The first is abhigamana, when one is to approach God as soon as daily ablutions and puja are over. The second is called upādāna, a period to be spent in earning a livelihood in legitimate and appropriate ways. Then follows iṣya (literally, sacrifices), referring not to vedic sacrifices but to *pancamahā yagna*, which include among others, noonday prayer, offering unto God the food prepared and even partaking of meal, which is regarded as a religious act. What pleases the Lord is not the sacrifice which entails much material and effort, but sincere, unselfish and devout approach. True worship is something inward, involving mental purity, earnestness and steadfast faith. Next comes the path of *svādhyāya* or study. It is a duty cast on every householder to study our sacred lore and to teach the same to others (pravacana) where possible. The concluding part of the day is devoted to quiet concentration (yoga). One is to retire to bed with thoughts of God uppermost in one’s mind. Without bisecting life into the sacred and the secular and thereby making either valueless, the Pancaratra invests all our acts with sanctity. Everything that man does, eating and sleeping not excepted, are worship of the Divine. In a word, man’s life is to be a God-centred life, all day long and all through life. Life should be characterised by this pervasive note.

Yet another fruitful idea which Ramanuja selects from the Pancaratra for elaboration is the concept of disinterested action. Action performed without
thought of personal gain and in the spirit of dedication to God leads progressively to self-knowledge, self-realisation and knowledge of God, which leads to meditation on God and flowers into live of, and surrender to God and final beatitude. “Sātvikatyaṅga pūrvaka karma yogyena karmana” is a typical Pancaratra formula. In the Gita Bhasya Ramanuja explains the full implications of this concept while commenting on St. 15, Ch. IV of the Bhagavat Gita. “Such a person sees non-action in action; and action in non-action. He is the man of wisdom, worthily engaged; and he is the performer of all actions.”

Yamuna composed eight works, and they are: Ātma-siddhi, Isvara-siddhi, Samvit-siddhi, Gitarthasamgraha, Purusanirnaya, Stotraratna, Catussloki and Āgamapramanya. The first three are usually referred to by the collective name, Siddhitraya. A good part of each of these three siddhis has been lost due to neglect and the ravages of time; but even the little that remains gives us a clear idea of the author’s views on important philosophical problems and of the masterly way in which he expounds them. Ramanuja quotes profusely from these splendid manuals in his Sri Bhasya.

Gitarthasamgraha is a marvel of epitomising effort. The inspiration for this undertaking came from Ramamisra who initiated Yamuna into the inmost secret of the Bhagavad Gita. In thirty-two stanzas, it sums up the teaching of the Lord’s Song as understood by the school which he represented and indicates how the teaching is developed logically and step by step and how the Gitasastra is a consistent
exposition of the doctrine that it is only through bhakti (loving devotion) brought on by karma and jnana (svadharma jnana vairagya sādhya bhaktyaka gocarah) that the Lord could be reached. This work served as a ground-plan, as it were, for Ramanuja’s luminous exposition of the Gita.

*Purusanirmaya* is designed to show the supremacy of Lord Visnu. The book is not extant now.

**STOTRARATNA AND CATUSLOKI**

Stotra-ratna and Catussloki are hymns in praise of Lord Visnu and Goddess Lakshmi respectively. They are held in high esteem as portraying the author’s fervent religious feelings and inmost longing for Divine communion and as expounding in an easily intelligible form the central philosophical doctrines of Viśiṣṭadvaita regarding *tattva* (God, man and nature), *kīta* (the way) and *puruṣartha* (the nature of the supreme goal). This poem, as Vedanta Desika says, is the spontaneous overflow of the author’s ecstatic religious experiences brought on by constant meditation on Divya Prabandha, especially the Tiruvoimozhi of Saint Satakopa. To him the Alwar was father, mother, consort, children, wealth, in a word, everything.

*Mātāpita yuvatayah tanayā vibhuti
sarvam yadeva niyamena matanvayānām |
ādhyasya nah kulapateh vakulā-bhiramam
srimad tadanghri yugalam pranamāmi mūrdhnā ||

Stotraratna, St. 6

One could see that the stotra is replete with the ideas culled from Tiruvoimozhi; and some of the stanzas seem to be Sanskrit renderings of the Tamil
hymns. The key-note of the stotra is that prapatti is the only effective means of attaining transcendental felicity. Vedanta Desika has written a commentary bringing out the treasures imbedded in it; and he wrote a brochure on one of its stanzas under the heading Anjalivaibhava. Ramanuja felt moved as he heard Stotraratna recited; and he got there from the cue for his Vaikuntagadya.

**Catusloki**

*Catusloki* is an exceedingly brief poem singing the glories of Goddess Lakshmi. The four stanzas comprising it attribute to Sri the qualities of the Lord elaborately set forth in the four chapters of the Brahmasutras. The first stanza refers to the vibhutis of Goddess Lakshmi and shows that they are beyond praise; the second states that Her greatness is incomprehensible even to Her omniscient Consort, even as He cannot comprehend His own greatness; the third speaks of the saving power of Her grace; and the last describes how Her resplendent forms are inseparable from, and co-existent with, those of the Lord.

**Agamaprāmāṇyaṃ**

Āgama pramāṇya is devoted to vindicating the authority of the Pancaratra tantras. The extensive Pancaratra works called agamas or tantras or samhitas and also Bhagavat Sastra, for the reason that Sriman Narayana is believed to have promulgated them Himself, have always been considered canonical; but detractors have not been wanting, who challenged their authority. Hence Yamuna felt the need for this
defence of the Pancaratra. The main adversaries against whom he had to contend are the Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa and the Prabhākara school, the Advaitins and the Naiyāyikas. From their respective standpoints they directed their attacks on the Pancaratra tantras. With the aid of reason and scripture, Yamuna meets this many-pronged attack and establishes that the tantras are authoritative. In Āgama-pramāṇa, more than in Siddhātṛaya, we see Yamuna at his best. A master dialectician, he exposes the fallacies in the arguments of his rivals and demonstrates the correctness of his own views, with a wealth of incontrovertible evidence. In the course of the discussion, Yamuna indicates his views on a wide range of problems including those of linguistics, psychology, epistemology and exegesis.

Yamuna discusses at length the proper interpretation that is to be put on the Utpatyaadhikarana of the Brahmasutra, as this section has been taken by Sankara to be a refutation of the Pancaratra. With surprising unanimity all commentators have taken Brahmasutra II–ii, 39–22 as dealing with the Pancaratra although there is no word or expression directly or remotely specifying this theme. They differ however, in their interpretation of these aphorisms. Sankara interprets the four sutras as adducing four reasons for rejecting the Pancaratra; but Yamuna takes the first two as stating the prima facie case against it, and the last two as establishing conclusively the validity of the Pancaratra after exposing the hollowness of the prima facie view. The location of this adhikarana in a pada devoted to the refutation of rival systems, namely, those
of Kapila, Kanada, Sangaba, (Arhata) and Pasupata, which are either outside the pale of, or opposed to veda seems to lend support to Sankara’s view that the Sutrakara meant to reject the Pancaratra along with the others. Against this view, it is mentioned that with the rejection of the Pasupata agama the impression may be created that the Pancaratra also is devoid of authority; to allay this apprehension the Sutrakara specifically raises the question of the Pancaratra to clinch the argument.

Sankara’s interpretation of the sutras:—

(i) utpattyasambhavat: “On account of the impossibility of origination (the system that subscribes to the view that soul originates, i.e. the Pancaratra is unacceptable).” “There occurs in the Pancaratra the statement, “From Vasudeva there originates the Jiva known as Sankarśana;...” This is an instance where the Pancaratra is opposed to the vedic teaching that the soul is neither born, nor does it die. Hence it is to be rejected.

(ii) na ca kartuh karanam: “Besides, the instrument cannot originate from the agent (hence the Pancaratra which accepts such a doctrine is to be discarded)”. There is the Pancaratra statement... from the individual soul called Sankarśana manas, known as, Pradyumna originates; from Pradyumna originates Ahamkāra known as Aniruddha.” The Jiva who is an agent engages in his activity only with the aid of manas; when that is so, how can the Jiva be said to give rise to manas? Moreover, the vedas declare that manas and the like proceed from Brahman alone. Hence the Pancaratra is to be rejected.
(iii) vijnanadibhava vaa tadaprasedhah:

"Should it be said that they are only Brahman, the objection, namely, impossibility of origination is not got over." That is, even if it be said that Sankarśana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are not Jiva, manas and Ahankara respectively, but really Brahman, since they are all alike Brahman there cannot be the causal relation among them; no one of them could give rise to the next in the series. It is everywhere observed that the cause and its effect differ from each other in some of their characteristics.

(iv) vipratisedhah: "And because of contradiction (the Pancaratra lacks authority)." As the Pancaratra is self-discrepant and as it contradicts the vedic teachings, it is liable to be rejected. For example, the Pancaratra maintains that jnana is at once guna and guni. Bhagavan is of the essence of jnana for His attribute. Further, the Pancaratra denounces the veda. It is well-known, Sandilya declares, that failing to find the highest felicity in the veda, he learnt the Pancaratra and attained thereby what he could not get from the veda. Hence the Pancaratra contradicts itself and speaks disparagingly of the veda, it is to be rejected.

Yamuna's interpretation:

Yamuna, and, following his lead, Ramanuja, argue that this adhikarana establishes precisely the opposite conclusion, namely, the validity of the Pancaratra. While there is substantial agreement between Sankara and Yamuna in their interpretation of the first two sutras, Yamuna takes the third and the fourth sutras as meeting the objections
that may be urged against the Pancaratra. The expression *va* occurring in the third sutra is indicative of a change in the direction of the argument, as in many an instance where this expression occurs.

(iii) *Vijnānabhāve va tadapratisedhah*:

“Or if they are of the nature of jñāna and cause, i.e., Brahman, the authority of the Pancaratra is unassailed, i.e., there can be no valid objection to the Pancaratra.” Either the Vyuhas (Vasudeva, Sankaršana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha) are independent sovereigns or they are the four-fold forms, chosen out of His own free-will by the Supreme Lord out of compassion for purposes of protecting the world. The first alternative is ruled out, as the Pancaratra does not admit of a plurality of God, but is an uncompromising monotheism. On the other alternative of a single Deity in fourfold forms, the question of origination does not arise. Sankarśana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are really the highest Brahman; they are not jivas, manas and ahamkara respectively. If they are so called, it is because they control these factors from within. Thus, in truth the Pancaratra does not, as it is alleged, countenance the view that the soul has an origin. Whoever says it does advocate the non-vedic doctrine of the origination of the soul is really ignorant of the Pancaratra teaching.

(iv) *Vipratiṣṭhāt*:

“Moreover, on account of contradiction (the authority of the Pancaratra cannot be assailed).” The Pancaratra agamas actually deny origination to the soul and assert its eternity. Thus the objections raised against them are not tenable. The allegation that
there is denunciation of the veda, is baseless, because
the statement is not to be construed as meaning that
the veda is no guide to transcendental felicity, but
only as signifying the inability of Sandilya to ascertain
the profound truths of veda and the Pancaratra helping
him to comprehend easily the vedic teachings. Far
from belittling the veda, it proclaims the greatness of
Bhagavat Sastra and suggests that while the veda and
the agamas contain an identical teaching, the latter are
easier of comprehension.

Yamuna presents quite a number of alternative
interpretations of the third and fourth sutras, all alike
strengthening the conviction that the authority of the
Pancaratra cannot be gainsaid.

It passes one's understanding how Badarayana
(Vyasa) foremost among those proficient in the veda
who loudly proclaimed the glories of the Bhagavat
Sastra in his Mahabharata could be taken as having
denied it any authority in his Brahmasutra the most
authentic exposition of vedantic teachings.

Thus with unparalleled dialectical skill and with
a wealth of convincing arguments Yamuna turns the
table against his opponents and establishes conclusively
the orthodoxy of the Pancaratra.

R Ramanujachari
PREFACE

The present study was undertaken to increase the materials for a historical study of Vedānta thought. Yāmuna's treatise on the scriptural validity of Pañcarātra introduces a very significant chapter in Vedāntamīmāṃsā, both because of its author, who was the predecessor of the famous Rāmānuja, and in certain essentials anticipated the latter's fully worked-out system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, and because of the intrinsic interest of the work itself, which in effect makes a plea for other and new authority beside the traditionally acknowledged authoritative scriptures.

The translation of this relatively brief Prakaraṇa proved to be difficult, for its language as well as its subject matter. No commentaries seemed to exist, nor has the text been translated before. I have used as my basis the edition of Rama Miśra Ṣastri, reprinted from the Pandit at Benares, 1937. I was unable to consult original manuscripts of the work, so that my dependence of the printed text was complete. The edition is good, with not too many misprints, though it is somewhat unreliable in its punctuation. There are a number of obvious corruptions, whose restoration was easy and a few not so obvious ones, the emendation of which must remain doubtful. The accompanying Sanskrit Text is based upon the Pandit edition as well as a text in Telugu character, and includes my emendations which have been noted in the annotations when it was a less than obvious case of correction.
The work is written in a mixture of ślokas and prose, but the kārikā portions form such a complete unity with the prose passages that, with accompanying Sanskrit Text, it seemed pointless to distinguish them in the translation. More useful may prove my division into paragraphs for more convenient reference, which has been carried through in both text and translation.

I have tried to keep the English readable, as far as the concise and highly technical style of the author allowed. Although the reading of the work will remain difficult, I hope that thus this interesting treatise will be more accessible to scholars and laymen who lack the knowledge or the leisure to read the Sanskrit. To many of them it will prove to be rewarding. The historian of Indian thought, and especially of Vedānta at the start of its medieval development will find here a lucid exposition of the scope of the scriptural authority accepted by the tremendously influential sects of southern Vaiśṇavism. The cultural anthropologist alert to the historical role of the sects as vehicles of social and cultural change will be interested in the manner in which a leading exponent of Vaiśṇavism defines his sectarian position within the orthodox tradition of the Vedas and Śrītis. The historian of religions will be arrested by the exceedingly well-reasoned apologia for a valid scriptural basis of “Tantric” religious experience and practice.

But for the enlightened sponsorship and most obliging patience of Mr. V. S. Raghavan of Park Town, Madras, the publication of this study would
have been long delayed, if it could have taken place at all. Mr. Raghavan has looked upon his venture as an act of Kāmākārya, of selfless service to his Guru, and it is in a kindred spirit that I have continued the study, which was originally begun in India, during my stay at the University of Chicago. Illuminated support of studies in the history of the Indian Culture is urgently needed if a great tradition of scholarship, both in India and the West, is to continue and to meet the challenges of a new world. Mr. Raghavan's example of generosity in promoting serious studies in the classical works of Vaiṣṇavism is a hopeful sign that such support will continue to be forthcoming.

Chicago

J. A. B. van Buitenen
INTRODUCTION

1. NÄTHAMUNI AND YÄMUNA: The almost total disappearance of prior works which gave a systematic exposition of the theology of Vaiśṇavism within the framework of Vedānta makes Yämuna the first Vaiśṇava Vedāntin, about whose views we are informed to a significant degree. Though we may not be as well informed as we could wish—his most important work, the Ātmāsiddhi, is now incomplete—he works allow us to form a good impression of this author, whose significance has long been overshadowed by that of his pupil Mahāpūrṇa’s great pupil Rāmanuja. The extent to which Yämuna’s works have been neglected is measured by the fact that his most important collection, the Siddhitraya, has been permitted to be truncated and that at least two of his treatises, the Puruṣanirṇaya and the Kāsmīrāgamsprāmāṇya, now appear to be lost. Modern research has largely bypassed him, and only quite recently English translations have become available of his Siddhitraya and Stotraratna.

Tradition has it that Yämuna was the grandson of Nāthamuni with whom the line of Alagiyas or Ācāryas begins. At the conclusion of his Āgamanpurāṇa Yämuna devotes a stanza to his predecessor, and follows it with a stanza, closing the treatise, which extols the greatness of those scriptures “whose spirit has been increased by the glorious Nāthamunindra.” The addition of these laudatory strophes would indeed seem most appropriate at the end of a treatise which expounds the scriptural validity of Pañcarātra Āgama;
for in writing this exposition Yāmuna was acting very closely in Nāthamuni’s spirit. Just as Yāmuna was to claim authority for a class of texts which had not before been given official recognition as part of the Vedānta literature, so Nāthamuni before him claimed authority for the collection of Tamil hymns known as the Prabandha. Within a few generations the canon of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta was thus increased enormously and it may be useful to enlarge on the implications.

As so often, it would seem that the Vaiṣṇava hagiographers, for all the pious and at times miraculous detail they were moved to add, translated into legend a core of historical fact, which remains recognizable. It is told that Nāthamuni, after a pilgrimage to the hallowed places of the North—Mathurā, Vṛndāvana, Haridvārā, Dvārakā and Purī—, became aware of the ritual use that had been given to the Tamil hymns of the Ālvārs. The Prapannāmyta, written one generation after Rāmānuja, or five generations after Nāthamuni, notes that at Kumbhakoṇam the study of these hymns was considered damaging to Vedic orthodoxy, and that the offending texts had even been thrown in the Tāmraparṇī river. There are several, and not always consistent, accounts of the manner in which the scriptures were saved. It is said that Madhura-kaviy ālvār, a pupil of Namm-ālvār’s, was instrumental in transmitting his master’s work the Tiruvāimoli to Nāthamuni, or the latter received it directly from Namm-ālvār’s hands. Perhaps the most interesting fact is that when Nāthamuni wanted a second hearing of the text for purposes of study, he was referred to a local artisan who (“by Namm-ālvār’s
inspiration”) revealed the work to him. If we may regard the details of the miraculous recovery as edifying embroidery, the fact stands out that Nāthamuni had to go to the common people in order to collect the hymns of the Ālvārs that had been rejected by the orthodox authorities. Although the Tamil scriptures had not received official sanction for use in high temple worship, they were current among the people, and certainly also in use at their devotional worship. What Nāthamuni in effect did was to incorporate these scriptures, henceforth known as the Draviḍa Veda, in the temple worship at Srirangam.

P. N. Srinivasachari remarks that “this innovation effected a silent revolution in temple worship, as it raised the status of the Prabandha to the level of the Veda, and liberalized the meaning of Revelation.” It is important to recall that it was the bhakti movement which produced the Ālvārs and made their perservid exultation in the God live among the people. By incorporating the Tamil Prabandha among the sacred scriptures that served in temple worship orthodox tradition was enabled to ally itself to the popular movements which had a tendency to break away from Brahmaṇism, and to be itself revivified by them. For a long time to come Vaiṣṇavism in the South looked for its spiritual leadership to Srīrangam.

Nāthamuni lived to the ripe old age of 96 and died in 920. He was succeeded at Srīrangam by Puṇḍarīkākṣa Uyyakkoṇḍār and then by Rāmamiśra Maṇakkāl-nambi. Rāmamiśra was Yāmuna’s teacher. Legend has embroidered his early life with many
details, not all of them consistent. As so frequently in the hagiographies of great saints, Yāmuna showed early signs of great knowledge and at the age of twelve defeated in debate the learned Ākkiālvān of the Cola court. He was rewarded with ‘half the kingdom’ and led a life of great luxury, until a new encounter with his old teacher Rāmamiśra, who handed over to him his grandfather’s legacy of the shrine of Srirangam, opened his eyes to his spiritual obligations.

Like his distinguished successor Rāmānuja, Yāmuna too is supposed to have lived to the age of one hundred and twenty years. From this pontificate at Srirangam must date a comparatively small oeuvre of theological and philosophical treatises. They comprise several small devotional poems, the Stotraratna and the Catuḥślokī (both commented upon by Venkaṭa­nātha in his Rahasyarakṣā in which he seeks to define the theology of Lakṣmī on the basis of the Catuḥślokī), a very brief summary in stanzas of the Bhagavadgītā Gitārthasaṁgraha (which became the programme for Rāmānuja’s Gītābhāṣya and was further enlarged upon in Venkaṭanātha’s Gitārthasaṁgraharākṣā), and a series of expositions in mixed kārikā and prose style, the Atmasiddhi, Iśvarasiddhi and Saṃvidsiddhi, usually bundled together under the title Siddhitraya; a lost work Puruṣāṇirṇaya “Argumentation for a Personal God”; and finally two disquisitions on the authority of Agama, the Agamaprāmāṇya and the Kāśmirāgama­prāmāṇya.

Precisely what we have to understand by Kāśmir­āgama is not clear, but Yāmuna’s use of Agama in the other work is abundantly evident. In this treatise,
Yāmuna sets out to prove by scripture and logic that the texts of Pañcarātra Āgama have an authority equal to that of the Vedas, because they are God's direct revelation. He argues this validity not so much to a particular school of philosophical or theological thought as against established orthodox opinion which reserves exclusive authority for the Vedas and the accepted Traditions that derive from them. Striking even more than in the Almasiddhi is Yāmuna's polemical tone and argumentative manner. Throughout his works the impression which he creates is that of a high temple priest who is not content routinely to continue the temple services as they had grown in Srīrāngam, but is apostolic in his fervour to persuade orthodoxy not only of the existence, but also of the truth, of a complete Vaiśṇava philosophy and theology. He may rightly be called the first apologist of a Vaiśṇava theology.

Like his predecessor Nāthamuni, who had made room for the Tamil Veda in the temple worship, Yāmuna too effected a silent revolution. Not in temple worship, to be sure, since the contents of typical Pañcarātra texts abundantly demonstrate that they had grown out of temple service and recorded practices that had been observed since long. The revolution which he effected was in Vedānta tradition, and it has proved to be a crucial one. After Śankara who continued an orthodox tradition of monism, and Bhāskara who continued a not less orthodox tradition of dualism-monism, traditions both which based themselves principally on the Upaniṣads, Yāmuna gave Vedānta a completely new scope. Not only did he argue a
theistic Vedānta—as others had done before,—he argued it with texts that so far had had no place in the tradition of uttaramīmāṃsā. The significance does not lie principally in the fact that he accepted as canonical a certain class of sectarian Vaiṣṇava texts, but that he argued it within the upaniṣada tradition. Several schools had arisen which, while paying lip service to the Vedic scriptures, in practice ignored them in favour of more accessible and more popular texts. The interest and the importance of the Āgama-prāmāṇya lie in the author’s intention of bringing within the Vedānta tradition, and thus in a way subjecting to this tradition, a body of religious literature that often had been denied to be part of it.

The motivation of this attempt was in part surely to restore to Vedānta thought the religious inspiration that, one cannot help but feel, was threatened by the philosophical acrobatics of the monistic schools. This religious inspiration was for Yāmuna that of the religion of worship and devotion that had swept Southern India. As a temple priest, he saw this religion guided and contained in the temple worship which itself was guided by Pañcarātra tradition. From this point of view the Āgama-prāmāṇya was a plea for the emancipation of popular religion.

2. EARLY PAÑCARĀTRA: The origin of Pañcarātra is obscure, because it has not one origin. Investigation into the meaning of the word pañcarātra in so far as it might shed light on the origin of the tradition associated with that name has been hampered by the too great emphasis laid by recent authors on the ‘philosophical’
content of the tradition. It is noteworthy that Yāmuna himself does not accent this philosophical content at all in the Agama-prāmāṇya, and that he understands Pañcarātra principally as a tradition of ritual worship. What Pañcarātra signifies for him is dikṣā and the other sacraments; Ārūḍhana and the various aspects of the ritual worship of the God; pūjā, devotion to the arcā, function and use of nirmālya and naivedya; and rites like the pañcakālikā. A similar significance does it have for Venkatanātha in his Srīpañcarātraraksā. As has been pointed out by other scholars, the cosmological and philosophical content of the Pañcarātra Saṁhitās are far less considerable than their ritual contents.

In these ritual contents we have the cumulative growth of many centuries, and at the present stage of our knowledge concerning the history of non-yajña ritual it is vain to identify the origins and early development of the numerous rites and ritual speculations. Inevitably the name pañcarātra has invited speculation7 that the tradition is historically linked with Vedic ceremonials, like the Pañcarātram Sattram;8 it is, however, impossible to find convincing arguments for such a construction.

The question thus rises whether it is permissible to separate the cosmological super-structure from the ritual content, and to seek to connect the name pañcarātra with the former. This is tempting because in the Mahābhārata we find several references to a Pañcarātra system just in connection with certain speculative tenets. I believe that although without a
doubt the system referred to in the epic as Pañcarātra is basically the same as the cosmological system described, or taken for granted in the later Pañcarātra Saṃhitās, the original meaning of the name pañcarātra cannot be elicited from the epic.

All but one of the occurrences of the term are to be found in the Nārāyaṇiya book, chapters 334-351 of the Sāntiparvan. One of the most distinctive features of the doctrine there set forth is the fourfold nature of the Supreme Being, which immediately recalls the Vyuha doctrine of Pañcarātra. There are two series of names to describe the four aspects, one of very minor importance, and one of major, and remaining importance MBh. 12.334 relates that the eternal Nārāyaṇa was born the son of Dharma in the Kṛta age during the Svāyambhuva manvantara, as Nara, Nārāyana, Hari and Kṛṣṇa Svayambhuva. The devotion to Nārāyaṇa, the general concern of the Nārāyaṇiya, which is also called Sātvatamata and proclaimed by the Sun, is associated particularly with the people of Śvetadvipa north of the Milk Sea. Although thus there is a very definite identification of both doctrine and devotion with the name of Nārāyaṇa, the most common description of the quaternity of God is in Kṛṣṇaite terms, as Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa (Baladeva), Pradyumna and Aniruddha. But in these terms is also captured a particular doctrine of the relationship between God, soul and body, in terms which strongly recall the essentially theistic Śāmkhya of the epic. The Puruṣa, the Supreme Being, who is the soul of all beings, is Vāsudeva. This Puruṣa enters the body which is constituted of the five elements. The context conveys
that from this contact between puruṣa and body the jīva appears, which is the embodied soul, or the puruṣa as embodied. The jīva is called Seṣa,14 but more generally Saṃkarṣaṇa,15 by the name of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva’s half-brother. Saṃkarṣaṇa produces the manas, 16 which is described also as an incarnation of Sanatkumāra,17 but specially as Pradyumna,18 Kṛṣṇa’s son by Rukminī. From the manas Pradyumna originates he who is the “agent, cause and instrument, from whom the universe of moving and unmoving entities derives, the God manifest in all actions,” the Ahaṃkāra named Aniruddha after Pradyumna’s son.

This doctrine must have enjoyed considerable currency and in many places of the epic, outside the Mokṣadharma, there are references to it. It is also a most interesting doctrine, since it combines a particular cosmological-psychological view with a devotional religion concentrated on the person of Kṛṣṇa. The philosophical basis is easily recognizable; the doctrine is that of the eight prakṛtis and God/puruṣa. It differs from the most common descriptions of the eight prakṛtis in that the three superior ones, jīva, manas and ahaṃkāra not only deviate from the usual series buddhi, ahaṃkāra and manas, in name as well as function, but that the three are put in a very close relation to the puruṣa-Vāsudeva, a relation so close that they can be described as forms of the God. Nevertheless, the three are different from God, as the kinship pattern in which they are arranged clearly illustrates. In a way this part of the doctrine resembles the doctrine of the sūkṣmaṣaṭarīra or liṅgaṣaṭarīra.20 The place of manas is puzzling since regularly the manas appers after and
below the ahaṃkāra. But this may be not more than a particular use of the term; not infrequently in older texts we observe that manas can be a name for that entity that is elsewhere known as buddhi.21

The kinship pattern in which the cosmology is put is quite important, because it very lucidly illustrates how the relationship between God and the world is represented and by itself refutes the later objection against Pañcarātra that it allows the jīva to "originate" from God. The fact that God is called Vāsudeva, and that the jīva is designated by the name of Saṃkarṣaṇa proves that some sort of independent coexistence was admitted of God and individual soul, for Vāsudeva was the half-brother of Kṛṣṇa, not the son. The relationships this pattern illustrates are:

\[
\begin{align*}
Puruṣa & \quad \text{\textit{jiva}} \\
\text{Manas (Buddhi)} & \\
\text{Ahaṃkāra} &
\end{align*}
\]

At this point it becomes clear that the doctrine is basically not an eight prakṛti doctrine, but a seven prakṛti doctrine, which is the older form of the former. The jīva is the individual soul which heads a series of seven evolvents. That at one stage the relation between jīva and manas was not viewed as a simple cause–effect relation may be shown by the fact that the jīva is called Saṃkarṣaṇa, who was not the father of Pradyumna.

In the absence of evidence in the epic that Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha were, in their own right, the objects of cult worship, the conclusion is justified that their role was primarily that of providing the cosmological doctrine with an imme-
diately, and popularly, comprehensible pattern. The puruṣa of the doctrine was identified with Kṛṣṇa who himself was equal to Nārāyaṇa; the others illustrated the relations between the various orders of the cosmological doctrine. Hence they have no independent existence from Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva, as for example different avatāras of one God may have a separate existence of their own. In the form of the doctrine known from the Saṃhitās, this is formulated in the doctrine of the Vyūhas, which is that of the one God in a quaternity of forms, which should not be equated with the cosmological orders, for they are each God. This point will occupy us when we consider the interpretations of the utpalāyasamabhāvādhikarana in the Brahmaśūtras.

It is not clear from the Nārāyaṇīya what relation the series of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha entertains with the series Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Hari and Kṛṣṇa. After the latter four have been described as manifestations of the Supreme, it is the former manifestations which are described in detail when an account is given of Nārada’s visit to Śvetadvīpa. And on Nārada’s return to the Badarī hermitage, only Nara and Nārāyaṇa are brought further to the scene. Perhaps we can think of regional variations in the developing Vaiṣṇavism which will be absorbed almost without trace in the Pancaśāstra system. This much is clear that Nara-Nārāyaṇa (themselves frequently equated with Arjuna-Kṛṣṇa) were closely linked to the doctrine of the four Kṛṣṇaite manifestations which thereupon seems to have superseded a Nara-Nārāyaṇa tradition.
The tradition in which the cosmology of purusa jiva, manas and ahamkara was formulated in the terms of Krsna Vrsudeva and his family and certainly involved a Krsna devotion, is described as Satvata and Pancaratra. But the literal meaning of the term “Five Nights” does not permit of interpretation in this context. It is noteworthy that the Narayaniya itself seems to make an attempt to reinterpret the term Pancaratra. In the Narayana litany 12.338.4 Narayana is called pancayajna, pancakalakartipa, pancaratrika. This series of three epithets each compounded with panca can best be interpreted as a unit and translated as follows: “(Homage to) Thee of the Five Offerings, Lord of those who perform the Pancakala ritual, Thee of the Pancaratra.” Unless I am mistaken, this points at an interpretation of Pancaratra as “The tradition which observes the Pancakala ritual.”

An explicit reference to this Pancakala ritual is to be found in a previous chapter of the Narayaniya 12 336.51:

tair istehi pancakalajna harir ekantibhir naraihi |
bhaktya paramayah yuktir manovakkarmabhis tadah ||

If my suggestion that Pancaratra is here connected with Pancakala is correct, we still have to regard it as a reinterpretation of the word, for Pancaratra “a span of five nights (and five days)” cannot really signify “five times” as a name of a ritual that took place five times a day.

The only other explicit reference to Pancaratra in the Mahabharata is not very helpful. Here (12.218. 11-12) in a very early layer of the Moksadharma (but probably interpolated) the thinker Pancasikha is thus described:
The sloka is obviously inspired by the name of this thinker. He was an early Sāṃkhya philosopher in whose doctrine there is no association with Vaiṣṇava-Kṛṣṇaitc Pañcarātra.

A critical survey, then, of the epical evidence for the term Pañcarātra does not produce a solution for the problem of the original meaning of the word. Therefore, there is perhaps some merit in approaching the question from an entirely different direction. Could the case be made that in Pañcarātra we have a specialized use of a term that originally had a wider and more general use?

The juxtaposition of Pañcarātra with traditions like Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāśupata, the references to the esoteric nature of the doctrine, and the intimations of the ascetic life of its followers suggest that the Pañcarātra way of life was typically that of seekers of wisdom and enlightenment whose beliefs and practices were not necessarily part of Vedic ritualist sacerdotalism, but who were wandering sages, and recluses, and pilgrims. Like so many of those mumukṣus who from the sixth century B.C. (and doubtless before) went about teaching or settled down in semi-retirement from active life in a life of contemplation, the Pañcarātrikas too, whose doctrine later on remains linked with the innovators rather than with conservative ritualists, may have been part of the same movement that in the first millenium B.C. largely reformed the ancient āryan tradition. These sages were not necessarily organized in definite groupings, although the
very fact of the early appearance of orders in Buddhism and Jainism must indicate that many of them observed similar or comparable regulations and vows which could become the basis of monastic life-rules. Among the commonest of these vows were self-chosen homelessness and its corollary, religious mendicancy. On the practice of these vows, however, nature imposed certain limitations. Surely the rainy months always forced the homeless wanderer to seek a temporary retreat in a village, and the normalization of this in early Buddhism, which led to the Vihāra system, must reflect a generally observed practice.

These observations may provide an approach to the explanation of the name pañcarātra. Non-doctrinaire literature knows of Pañcarātrikas without any apparent creedal affiliation. Thus for example, the oldest extant Sanskrit version of the Brhatkathā, contained in Budhasvāmin’s Brhatkathāślokaśamgraha, describes a certain grhastha as a Pañcarātrika who led a ‘ascetic’ life. This grhastha, which in this text generally means vaiśya, in the present case, specially a prosperous farmer, gives up his old life in quest of salvation. His complete lack of allegiance to any school is brought out with humorous emphasis. The farmer reviews the practice of pilgrimage to Avimukta and Benares, the philosophy of Vedānta and the doctrine of the Buddha, and finally decides himself in favour of the last “for the doctrine of the Buddha has a reputation for efficiency.”

It is clear from the context that the Pañcarātrika is not distinguished by any particular faith or creed,
but by a more or less ascetic life-rule. And elsewhere the same text tells us precisely what kind of life-rule is expressed in the term *pancarātra*. The setting is a conversation between a disguised Pāṣupata and a young brahmin friend. He remarks to his friend that his affection has caused him to stay several months at Rājagṛha and that he is now obliged to depart. For even householders have to obey certain observances for their own good, let alone the seekers after the highest good; whereupon he observes:

\[
\text{ekarātram vased grāme pāncarātram munih pure} \\
\text{iti praṛājitaśāram etam veda bhavān iti}
\]

"The hermit should live one night in a village for every five nights that he stays in town; you know that this is the life-rule for those who have left their homes as *praṛājakas*.”

This rule clearly does not apply to Pāṣupatas alone. It is far more likely that it is inspired by the hoary practice of homeless wanderers to retreat during the two rainy months and to go abroad during the remaining ten. Towns rather than villages were the scene of their preaching and mendicancy, but the villages were their retreats. Quite consistently with the *gṛhaṭha pāncarātrika* who became a ‘Buddhist’ pilgrim, this Pāṣupata too thereupon departs on an extensive pilgrimage. The context shows also that one need not leave town every five nights, yet the five-nights were made characteristic of a whole way of life.

A *pancarātrika* in this very large sense is therefore an itinerant religious recluse, who follows the Five-Nights rule regardless of doctrinal allegiance. With
the growing systematization of doctrine which identified certain wandering saints ever more precisely with definite schools and traditions, Pañcarātrika became specialized in its meaning and was mostly, though not invariably, associated with the Vaiṣṇava tradition since known by that name. Pañcarātra, from which pañca-rātrika or pāñcarātrika was formed, was reanalysed from the name: a pāñcarātriṇa was a pāñcarātiranusārin, and Pañcarātra became the reinterpreted name of the tradition he followed.

This explanation of the name seems on the whole somewhat more plausible than that which postulates a relation with the pāñcarātraṃ sattram mentioned in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa. Pañcarātra as a system allied itself from the beginning more with popular devotional religion—bhakti is repeatedly mentioned in the same contexts of the epic—, than with the brāhmaṇaic ritualism that was obviously losing its hold.

3. PAÑCARĀTRA IN THE BRAHMASUTRAS: According to the commentatorial tradition the concluding sūtras of the Tarkapāda 2.2 of the Brahmasūtras deal with the doctrine of Pañcarātra. The sūtras concerned are extraordinarily cryptic, and without a firm tradition to that effect one could hardly make out that its orthodoxy is at stake in sūtras 42-45. The four sūtras read: utpattyaśaṁbhavāt; na ca kartuḥ karaṇam; vijnānādibhāve vā tadapratि�śedhaḥ; vipratि�śedhāc ca.

According to Sankara, who interprets the lines as a condemnation of the system, the point at issue is the relationship in the Pañcarātra doctrine between puruṣa—Supreme Brahman, the jīva (Saṁkarṣaṇa)—soul, and the
This view is accepted alike by Bhāskara, Yāmuna (who also adds alternative interpretations) and Rāmānuja. In Śaṅkara’s and Bhāskara’s view the four sūtras enumerate arguments against Pañcarātra, according to the others the first two contain the pūrvapakṣa, the latter two the siddhānta.

However unsatisfactory in most cases a prima-facie-translation of single Brahmasūtras must be, it may be useful to make some attempt to discover how the Author (or as some maintain the interpolators of the Tarkapāda) viewed the Pañcarātra. If indeed the Pañcarātra is at issue in 2.2.42-45 (and this we must take on faith), some primary observations can be made. In all previous cases the traditions discussed are condemned. Secondly, the Brahmasūtras are not concerned with saving any particular tradition, e.g., Pañcarātra from outside attack; their concern is to defend the aupaniṣada tradition against rival traditions whose views are in conflict with it and which can be shown to be unscriptural.

Therefore, if we find, after the refutation of several heretic traditions, an adhikaraṇa devoted to Pañcarātra, our first assumption is that the Author has something to refute in it. But against this, it may be argued that the Author was himself in favour of Pañcarātra and wished to conclude his argumentations of the Tarkapāda on a positive note, asserting by way of siddhānta the orthodoxy of this tradition. On the basis of the sūtras themselves neither of the two assumptions can be proved.

One more argument can be made. The fact that Bhāskara’s commentary on the sūtras follow that of
Sankara very closely while the *aupādhikavāda* philosopher lets no opportunity pass to attack his advaitin adversary when a controversial point is at issue has led INGALLS to conclude that both Bhāskara and Sankara virtually copy a pre-existing bhāṣya by a Proto-commentator since Bhāskara cannot be expected to copy his arch-antagonist. Following this line of argument the hypothetical proto-commentator must have rejected the authority of Pañcarātra and explained the sūtras concerned as containing a condemnation of the system, because both Sankara and Bhāskara explain them thus. Even if INGALLS' hypothesis is right, this does not bring us much nearer to an understanding of the true sense of the sūtras. Moreover, the hypothesis is unconvincing; although there are indications that there existed a traditional explanation of the sūtras (the principal argument for which is the firmness of the tradition concerning (the upaniṣad passages explained in the sūtras), there may have been several and they may have been minimal. Considering the extreme paucity of surviving comments from before Sankara, on which I have enlarged elsewhere, I find it easier to believe in orally transmitted school traditions, which might differ from place to place, than in a fixed text available to both Sankara and Bhāskara.

On the whole one is inclined *a priori* to expect that the Brahmasūtras include a discussion of the Pañcarātra in order to refute that part of the doctrine that the Author considers unscriptural. Whether the Author, or as the case may be, the interpolator was correct in his condemnation is another matter.

The first of the four controversial sūtras reads *utpattyasambhavāt*. This must be the *hetu* to an implied
proposition, on which all commentators—Sankara, Bhāskara, Yāmuna and Rāmānuja—agree: “[This tradition is unscriptural (like the preceding ones)], because of the impossibility of origination.” The only entity of which it can be said in this context that it cannot originate is the soul.

The second sūtra is clear enough: na ca kartuḥ karaṇam. Considering the previous sūtra where the origination of the soul was in question, it is clear that here too we must supply a word like utpadyate: “And the instrument does not originate from the agent.”

The difficulty lies mainly in the third sūtra: vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratisedhah. The genitive to be supplied is to be supplied from the previous sūtras; it is either “(soul) or karaṇa, or both. The commentators take the last possibility, treating soul and karaṇa in Pañcarātric terms as vyūhas which in turn imply the other two. The translation then would be: “Or in case [the four vyūhas are taken] in the sense of vijñānādi, there is non-rejection of that.” For bhāve “in the sense of...” one may also render “if they are...”. All commentators allow that vā introduces a new argument; for Sankara and Bhāskara this is a different characterization of the vyūhas, not as entities in cause-effect relationships but as personifications of the divine properties of God, for Yāmuna and Rāmānuja the new argument is a refutation of the previous objection. The latter two do not take vijñānādi to refer to the divine properties. Yāmuna suggests no less than three different explanations: as dvandva: “knowledge as well as beginning,” i.e., a
description of the supreme brahman; as a tat-puruṣa: “the beginning of knowledge,” in which case the genitive to be supplied to viṣṇuṇādiḥbhāve is asya paṇcarātra-gamasya: “since Paṇcarātra is the source of true knowledge”; and finally is a bahuvrīhi with the same supplement of asya paṇcarātra-gamasya: “since Paṇcarātra has its origin in the true knowledge of God.” Of these explanations Rāmānuja retains the first one.

If we may accept that the supplied genitive is indeed teṣām vyūhānām, the explanation of viṣṇuṇādi: “The divine properties of knowledge, etc.” would seem not only hermeneutically the most obvious one (... ādi- in the expected sense), but also contextually the most relevant. Then the problem shifts to tada-pratīṣṭedhali: non-rejection of what? Either of the impossibility of the origination of the soul, or of the impossibility of the origination of instrument from agent, if we stick to what the sūtras themselves have supplied. What happens if Saṅkarṣaṇa is not taken as jīva, nor Pradyumna as manas, literally, but as aspects of the deity which each represent certain divine properties? These aspects are all equally God, and cause-effect relationships simply do not obtain. If this is indeed the correct interpretation—and Sankara’s and Bhaṭkara’s contrary ones are far-fetched—, this would in effect mean that the Author reverses himself.

The discussion closes with a last argument in hetu form vipratisṛṣṭedhāc ca “and because of conflict,” which is such a general ground that it can be interpreted any way, depending on how one interprets the previous sūtra. Brief and general though it is, the sūtra offers
a problem of its own: ca. The commentators in general ignore the syntactical patterns of the sūtras and, as here, treat hetus in the ablative and propositions like na ca kartūḥ karaṇam as being on the same level, with no apparent reason for the difference of syntactical formulation. But what does ca join? According to Śankara's and Bhāskara's explication the hetu vipratisedhāt with both the hetu utpattyasamābhavāt and the hetu analysed from na ca kartūḥ karaṇam, according to Yāmuna and Rāmānuja vipratisedhāt with the hetu analysed from vijñānādibhāve vā tadarāpratisedhaḥ. Perhaps it is possible to link directly utpattyasamābhavāt.... vipratisedhāc ca. These two hetus are interrupted by a parenthetical discussion na ca kartūḥ karaṇam, vijñānādibhāve vā tadarāpratisedhaḥ. This is a kind of construction well represented in philosophical style of which this sūtra style is a severe abbreviation. A possible interpretation then would be: "... because of impossibility of origination (also the instrument does not derive from the agent; or, if these entities are taken in the sense of knowledge, etc., we need not reject this part of the doctrine), and because of conflict." Under this interpretation the final conclusion would be against Pāñcarātra.

It is obvious that the above attempt at a philological interpretation must remain inconclusive. It may, however, have its use by showing how completely dependent we are on the commentators, and how completely absent our criteria are to judge between one and the other. I am not without hope that a comprehensive study of the style and syntax of the sūtra collections eventually may provide criteria of judgment; in the absence of such a study we must for the
time being resign ourselves to the fact that we cannot utilize the Brahmasūtras in specific detail for the history of Vedānta and of Indian Philosophy generally, because we cannot independently make sense of them.

4. Sankara and Bhāskara on Pañcarātra

Hereunder, I add new translations from the commentaries on the utpattyaśaṁbhavādhi-karaṇa by Sankara and Bhāskara which are our earliest evidence of the attitude which at least one tradition in Vedānta took to the orthodoxy of Pañcarātra. As both philosophers point out, it is not the general orthodoxy of Pañcarātra as a system of religious practice which is at issue, but the orthodoxy, or conformity of specific points or theological doctrine. Somewhat in contradiction with this view of the matter is the interpretation by both commentators of the last sūtras which clearly implies that Pañcarātra is non-Vedic in orientation; but neither thinker gives much weight to this point, though it must be noted that for Yāmuna this was the fundamental objection raised against Pañcarātra.

1. Sankara, Brahmasutrabhāsya (2.2.42-45)

utpattyaśaṁbhavāt (2.2.42)

The views of those who maintain that the operator is not the material cause, that the Lord is only the operative cause, have now been refuted. Presently the view of those who hold that the Lord is the cause in both ways, material as well as operative, is confuted.

Objection. But in previous sūtras,30 it has been decided on scriptural authority that the Lord is in fact
both operative and material cause. Why then should the Author now wish to refute this point?

**Reply.** Even though a certain part of a doctrine may not be open to disagreement, because it conforms and holds the same view, nevertheless other elements of doctrine may give rise to disagreement; and it is with this point in view that the Author now embarks on his refutation.

The Bhagavatas maintain concerning the question the following doctrine: the venerable Lord, the unique Vāsudeva, whose essence is unaffected knowledge, is the supreme reality. He exists in four forms, into which He has divided Himself, as Vāsudeva, Saṁkarśaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is called the Supreme Soul, Saṁkarśaṇa the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind, Aniruddha the ego-factor. Vāsudeva is the supreme cause, Saṁkarśaṇa and the others are effects. When one has worshipped this Supreme God for a hundred years with the rites of preparing the way, preparing the gifts, offering them, and studying, and when all one's sins have been cleansed, one will attain to the venerable Lord.

That part of the doctrine which states that Nārāyaṇa, who is well-known to be transcendent over the āvyakta, who is the Supreme Soul and the soul of the Universe, divides himself into more than one being and exists in this condition, is not rejected; for it is found from such texts as "He exists as One, he becomes three, etc.," that the Supreme Soul exists in a plurality of forms. Nor is it denied that propitiation of this venerable Lord with rites of preparing the way, etc. is
to be constantly observed with exclusive concentration, for religious devotions to the Lord are quite well-known in both śruti and smṛti. But as to the contention that Saṁkarṣaṇa originates from Vāsudeva and Pradyumna from Saṁkarṣaṇa, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna, we maintain that this origination of the individual soul, called Saṁkarṣaṇa, from the Supreme Soul, called Vāsudeva, is impossible, because it entails the defect of non-eternality. For if the individual soul has an origin, such defects as its non-eternality follow. Consequently, its attainment of the Lord cannot mean salvation, for if an effect returns to its cause it is completely merged with it. Also, the Author denies the origin of the individual soul in the sūtra: “Not the soul, because there is no śruti to that effect, and because, its eternity follows from the śruti.” Therefore, the assumption is not consistent with the truth.

na ca karuṇī karāṇam—43.

Besides the assumption is inconsistent, because experience shows that an instrument, e.g., an axe, does not originate from an agent, e.g., Devadatta. The Bhāgavatas however maintain that the instrument, sc. the mind called Pradyumna, originates for the agent, sc. the soul called Saṁkarṣaṇa. Out of this mind, itself born of the soul, the ego-factor called Aniruddha originates. Without an example we cannot ascertain that such is indeed the case; nor do we find a śruti to this effect.

vijnānādibhāve vā tadopratishedhaḥ—44.

Or else it may be that these three beings Saṁkarṣaṇa, etc. are not really meant to be identical with
soul, etc. But then what are they? They are all to be accepted as Gods who possess the divine properties of knowledge, sovereignty, power, strength, heroism and splendour. They are all Vāsudevas, defectless, causeless, immaculate. Consequently the afore-mentioned defect, namely, the impossibility of origination does not obtain.

REPLY. Even so, there is no refutation of it, that is to say, non-refutation of the impossibility of origination still obtains; that means that the same defect, sc. impossibility of origination, obtains in a different manner. How? First, if the meaning is this that these four, Vāsudeva, etc., are mutually distinct and are all four co-equal Gods, and that they are not identical in essence, then the assumption of a plurality of Gods is senseless, because the functions of God can be accounted for by one single God. Also this violates their own doctrine, because they hold that only the venerable Lord Vāsudeva, is the supreme reality. Secondly, if the meaning is this that these four are the co-equal divisions of this one venerable Lord, still the impossibility of origination obtains under this condition. For Saṁkarṣaṇa, cannot originate from Vāsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Saṁkarṣaṇa, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, because no one exceeds any other one. For it is necessary that the cause exceeds the effect, as in the case of the clay and the pot; for without such excession, the effect can be regarded as the cause. And those who follow the Pañcarātra doctrine do not accept any difference in degree of the properties of knowledge, sovereignty, etc. between anyone of the four divisions, or between all four of them, for they
hold that all the divisions are Vāsudevas, without any differentiation. Nor are the divisions of the venerable Lord limited to four, since we find that all things in the Universe, from Brahmā to a blade of grass, are divisions of the venerable Lord.

vipratisedhāc ca—45.

A variety of conflicts are observed in this system, like, for example, the assumption that property is substance: for we find that knowledge, sovereignty, power, strength, heroism and splendour are properties, yet they themselves are all Lord Vāsudevas. Also there is conflict with the Veda. For we find that the Veda is being censored in statements like this: “Failing to find the supreme good in the four Vedas, Śāndilya learnt this system.” Therefore, it is established that the Pañcarātra theory does not conform.

2. Bhāskara, Sārīrakamīmāṁsābhāṣya, 2.2.42-45. utpattyasaṁbhavāt—2.2.42

Now the doctrine of Pañcarātra is examined. The objection is raised that there is no justification for doubting its validity, because it does not militate against revelation. Why? They maintain that Vāsudeva is the material as well as the operative cause of the Universe; and a discipline of ritual acts is the means of attaining Him. It is taught that when one has propitiated the venerable Lord Vāsudeva with ritual disciplines like preparing the way, preparing the gifts, the offering of them, and studying, one will attain to Him. All this is quite well-known from revelation too. Therefore, we find nothing in it that is to be condemned.
The ritual acts, characterised as worship, meditation and contemplation of the God, as well as the knowledge concerning such acts, are considered valid. However, if some part is found among acceptable elements that is in conflict, that part must be rejected.

According to the doctrine of the Bhāgavatās Vāsudeva is the Supreme Material Cause, and the Supreme Soul. From him the individual soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa originates, from Saṃkarṣaṇa the mind called Pradyumna, and from him the ego-factor called Aniruddha. Against this view this sūtra is laid down: “because of the impossibility of the origination of the individual soul from the Supreme Soul Vāsudeva.” Why this impossibility? Because this entails the defects of non-eternity, etc. In the absence of beings which are involved in heaven, hell, or release, the authority of the Veda is vitiated, and the ordinary practice of the world is brought to a stand-still. Therefore this assumption is unjustified.

It is also unproven that the mind called Pradyumna, which is the inner organ, originates from the agent, namely, Saṃkarṣaṇa the individual soul. For the axe docs not originate from Devadatta.

The particle vā in the sense of indicating an alternative meaning. All these beings are indeed Lord Vāsudevas and as such without cause and defectless, possessed of the divine properties of knowledge, sovereignty, power, strength, heroism and splendour.
The reply to this is as follows: even if these are knowledge, etc., this does not invalidate the argument, that is to say, there would not be refutation of the defect of impossibility of origination: the same defect obtains. If all four are equal, there is impossibility of origination because no one exceeds the others; or if they are unequal, the impossibility mentioned above obtains nonetheless.

vîpratiśedhāc ca—45.

In stating that the mind is called Pradyumna and that Aniruddha is the ego-factor, it is stated that they are instrument and ego-factor respectively. Thus the postulation that they are all souls in the above assertion "all these souls..." is self contradictory. And there is conflict with śruti: "Failing to find the way to the supreme good in the four Vedas, Sāṇḍilya composed this system."

5. RĀMĀNUJA ON PAṆCARĀTRA

In view of his predecessor Yāmuna's concern with Pañcarātra, the reticence of the illustrious Vaiṣṇava philosopher Rāmānuja about the same system is somewhat puzzling. Except for his commentary on the utpattya-saṁbhavādhi-karana, in which he follows Yāmuna, Rāmānuja remains wholly silent about the elements both of doctrine and of religious practice of Pañcarātra. Elsewhere, I have suggested that Rāmānuja was motivated by a desire to reach all Vedāntins and did not wish to limit his appeal, which he based on śruti and universally recognized smṛtis, by emphasizing his allegiance to any particular school and by quoting as decisive authority, saṅcārīa texts that others would
refuse to accept. Also the cosmogonical doctrine in which most of the philosophic superstructure of Pañcarātra consists was of no immediate concern to Rāmānuja's ontological preoccupations. Still it remains curious that even in his introduction to the Gitābhāṣya, where Rāmānuja enlarges upon the manifestations of God in their different gradations, no room whatever is given to even a passing mention of, for example, the Vyūhas. Rarely, moreover, will one find him use the appellation Vāsudeva. When it occurs in the texts, he comments upon, it is translated into Nārāyaṇa, which is his favourite name for God.

Therefore it may be useful to include here the full translation of Rāmānuja's commentary on the utpattya-saṁbhavādhikaraṇa, both for its own sake and for its relationship to Yāmuna's discourse. In the numbering of the Śrībhāṣya this adhikaraṇa comprises Brahma-sūtras, 2.2.39-42.

\textit{utpattya-saṁbhavā}-39.

Another doubt that may arise, viz., that the Pañcarātra system—which being promulgated by the Venerable Lord Himself actually sets forth the means of attaining the sumnum bonum—has also no authority because it would be in the same class with Saṁkhyā and other systems, is presently disposed of.

With regard to this system the objection is raised: The individual soul, Saṁkarśaṇa by name, originates from Vāsudeva, who stands for the Supreme Brahmaṇ, the ultimate cause. From Saṁkarśaṇa originates the manas called Pradyumna. From that again originates the subjectifying organ called Aniruddha: Thus is, as
is well-known, the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas. So it is held that the individual soul has an origin; but this is contrary to the śruti: for the śrutis maintain that the soul has no beginning: "The intelligent being is not born nor does it die."\textsuperscript{45}

na ca kartuḥ karoṇoḥ—40.

"From Saṅkarṣaṇa originates the manas called Pradyumna" means that the instrument manas has its origin in the agent soul—which is impossible because the śruti declares that the manas, too, has its origin in none but the Supreme Brahman: "From Him spring breath, mind and all senses."\textsuperscript{46} Consequently, this system is also denied authority since its teachings are in conflict with the śruti.

At this point we propound:

vijñānādhīvāve vā tadapraṭisedhāḥ—41.

With vā this view is exchanged for the opposite one. Viṣṇu, i.e., vijñāna "knowledge" as well as ādi—"beginning"—refers to the Supreme Brahman. Where Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are of the Supreme Brahman’s being, the doctrine which declares this very fact cannot be denied authority. In other words: that the origination of the soul is promulgated in contradiction with the śruti is an objection raised by people who do not really know the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas. Actually this doctrine is that the Supreme Brahman—called Vāsudeva—, moved by affection for those who take refuge in Him, exists Himself and by His own will in a quadruple form in order to serve as a refuge for His votaries. So in Pauṣkarasamhitā: "Agama is that in which the Brahmins
who adhere to the tradition make a duty of worshipping the quaternity under its different names,” etc. That this “worship of the quaternity” is the worship of the Supreme Brahman under the name of Vāsudeva is declared in the Sātvatasaṃhitā: “The great upaniṣada of Brahman is the most important śāstra as it imparts discrimination to the Brahmins who worship the real Brahman under Vāsudeva’s name.” This Supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva, whose personality is constituted by the six qualities in full measure, the votaries will attain when they have worshipped Him through acts following on knowledge, and each will attain Him in proportion that he is qualified: in His subtle form, or as Vyūha, or as Vibhava, in which He is differentiated. Through worship of the Vibhava he will attain the Vyūha, and through worship of the Vyūha he will attain the Supreme Brahman in His Subtle form in which He is called Vāsudeva. This is their view. Vibhava is defined as the sum-total of the manifestations Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc.; the Vyūha has the four forms of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; the Subtle is the Supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva whose personality is constituted by the six qualities alone. So in Pauṣkarasaṃhitā: “That śāstra by means of which one attains the Supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva completely through acts following on knowledge,” etc.

Therefore, Saṃkarṣaṇa, etc. also constitute the voluntarily assumed personality of the Supreme Brahman who, according to the śruti, “is born in many ways without being born:” so, since it is declared that Brahman has births in the form of voluntary assumptions of individuality occasioned by His affection for
His votaries, the śāstra that declared the same cannot therefore be denied authority. Saṃkaraṇa, Pra­dyumna and Aniruddha are in that system, the operators of the categories of soul, manas and subjectifying organ, so that there is no contradiction if they are denoted by the words for soul, etc., just as Brahman is denoted by the words space, etc.

vīpratisedhāc ca—42.

Besides, in that very system the origination of the soul is emphatically denied: as in Pauṣkarasaṃhitā:

"The nature of prakṛti is declared to be non-spiritual, subservient to the other, eternal, ever-developing, governed by the three guṇas, the field of experience for beings subject to karmāṇa. The conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa takes place through pervasion, for the puruṣa is determined as being in reality without beginning or end." Therefore, since all the Saṃhitās declare thus that the soul is eternal, the origination of the proper form of the soul is denied in the Pañcarātra system. It will be said later on, in the sūtra nātmā śruteḥ, why in Vedic and profane usage the soul is said to be born, to die, etc.

To conclude: the very doctrine denies the origination of the soul, so that the objection that it is not authoritative, since it holds that the soul originates is absolutely rejected.

Then there is the outcry of some who think that since Saṃdilya studied the Pañcarātra doctrine because he could not find a proper basis in Vedas and auxiliary sciences, and that this signifies that no proper basis for man’s ends in life is found in Vedas and auxiliary sciences, it follows that the tantra is incompatible with
the Vedas. But this is obviously no more than a parti-
pris of people who have not the faintest idea about the
purport of the Veda and not the slightest consideration
for all the canons which corroborate the Veda. For
example, in the text: "Morning after morning those tell
lies who offer the Agniiotra before sunrise," the censure
with which the oblation before sunrise meets serves to
exalt the merit of the oblation after sunrise. Or, for
example, in the opening text of the so-called bhūmavidyā
Nārada begins: "My Lord, I have studied the Rgveda,
the Yajurveda, the Śāmaveda, and fourthly, the
Atharvan, and fifthly, epic and purāṇa," continues to
sum up all the branches of knowledge and concludes:
"but, My Lord, here I am knowing the mantras but
not the soul." That he thus declares to have found no
knowledge of the soul in all the branches of knowledge
except the bhūmavidyā means that he exalts the value of
the bhūmavidyā, which he is about to set forth—or else,
the contention of this Nārada is occasioned by the fact
that he was unable to find out the Supreme Reality
that is set forth in Vedas and auxiliaries. Similarly
Sāndilya's contention, as may be gathered from his
exposition later on of the Supreme Reality Brahman
called Vāsudeva, who is to be known from the Vedānta.
So it is said in the Paramasamhitā that in view of the
difficulty of understanding the meaning of the Veda,
the śāstra has commenced in order to facilitate this
understanding: "My Lord, I have studied in great detail
all the Vedas with the auxiliary and subsidiary sciences, and
I have listened to the auxiliaries together with the disputations.
But nowhere in all those texts have I found beyond all doubt
the road to bliss by which the end is attained," and "the
Lord Hari, who knows, has taken the essence from the Vedānta and summarized it in an easy form to show His mercy to His devotees.”

Therefore, it is beyond reproach that the Lord Vāsudeva who is identical with the Supreme Brahman and who is known from the Vedānta—absolutely opposed to all imperfection, solely comprising perfection and ocean of immeasurable perfect qualities like infinite knowledge, bliss, etc. and whose every will is realized—has gazed upon His devotees, distinguished according to the system of the four stations and four stages of life and conformably pursuing the four ends of man’s life, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa; and shoreless sea of compassion, clemency, and affection, He considered that the Vedas which teach true knowledge of His proper form, His supernal manifestation, the means of His propitiation and the fruit thereof, were difficult to grasp for all gods and men different from Himself, as they are divided in Rg, Yajuḥ Śāman and Atharvan, with numberless branches and consisting in injunction exegesis and formula, and therefore He Himself composed the Pañcarātra śāstra to teach the true purport of the Vedas.

Moreover, if others interpret the four Lessons of the Sūtras in such a way that they deny the authority of an incompatible component part, this interpretation runs counter to the very letter of the Sūtras and to the intention of the Author of the Sūtras. For the Author of the Sūtras, after having promulgated the Sūtras that set forth the canons of Vedānta, composed in support of the Veda the hundred thousand ślokas of the
Bhāratasaṃhitā, in the jñānakānda of which, the Mokṣadharma, he declared: "When a householder or an initiated, or a hermit, or a wandering mendicant wants to attain the final aim, which deity is he to worship then?" and so on and proceeds to propound the doctrine of the pañcarātra śāstra in a long disquisition: "This has been extracted from the Bhārata epic in its full length of one hundred thousand ślokas after it has been churned with the stick of thought: like butter is extracted from curds, and curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the Aranyaka from the Vedas, the Aṣṭāṅga from the herbs this Mahopaniṣada which is consistent with the four Vedas and the demonstrations of Sāṁkhyā and Yoga is called the Pañcarātra. This is bliss, this is Brahman, this is absolutely salutary. Consistent with Rg, Yajurveda and Śaṁan and the Atharvāngirasas. This discipline will of a certainty be authoritative." The words sāṁkhyā and yoga above denote jñānayoga and karmayoga, compare "the sāṁkhyas through jñānayoga and the yogins through karmayoga." Further in the Bhīṣmaparvan: "Brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaيṭyas and śūdras as described are all to worship, to serve and to honour Mādhava according to the sātvata ritual that has been promulgated by Śaṅkarṣaṇa." Now, how would it be possible that the foremost of Vedic scholars Bādarāyaṇa, who has said this Himself, would say that the sātvata śāstra, which sets forth the ways of worshipping and propitiating Vāsudeva, the Supreme Brahman, the One known from the Vedānta has really no authority whatever?

However, in texts like: "Are Sāṁkhyā, Yoga, Pañcarātra, Vedas and Pāṣupata all founded on the same principle or have they different foundations," O Sage? and so on, it
is said that Sāṃkhya, etc. do also deserve our respect, whereas they are refuted in the Sārīraka. Hence it would be the same with this system too.—No, for in the Mabābhārata the same argumentation is embodied as in the Sārīraka. The meaning of the question: "Are they founded on the same principle or not" is this: Do Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāṣupata, Vedas and Paṅcarātra set forth the same fundamental or different ones? And if they set forth one and the same fundamental, what is it? But when they set forth different fundamentals, their teachings are incompatible and since we have no option in matters of reality, it follows that only one can be admitted: what is that one?" To this question he replies: "Know what these different theories of knowledge really are, O Royal Sage. The founder of Sāṃkhya is Kapila," etc. and he declares that Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāṣupata have their origins in persons because they are creations of Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha and Paṣupati; then in "the teacher of the Vedas is held to be Avāntaratapas," he states the impersonal origin of the Vedas, and finally he says in "founder of the entire Paṅcarātra is Nārāyaṇa Himself," that no one but Nārāyaṇa has promulgated the Paṅcarātra system. What the author here intends to say is this: Inasmuch as the personal systems hold mutually irreconcilable views on reality and maintain tenets that are incompatible with the reality as we know it from the Veda without the slightest possibility of such errors as inaccuracies, etc. since its origin is impersonal, they can hardly be deemed to carry any authority on reality such as it is. And Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, is the One known from the Veda. Therefore, we may accept the fundamentals of pradhāna, puruṣa, paṣupati, etc. as propounded
by these various systems only in so far as they are ensouled by Nārāyaṇa the Supreme Brahman, who is the One known from the Veda. So he says: "In all these different systems of knowledge, eminent prince, we see that according to tradition and logic the sovereign Nārāyaṇa is the only basis:" ⁶¹ i.e., he who ponders over reality yathāgamanī yathānāyam, sc. as propounded by these different traditions and corroborated by arguments sees clearly that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis of all reality. That is to say: as the fundamentals are not declared in these systems to be ensouled by Brahman, the one who, on the authority of śrutis "all this is verily Brahman," ⁶⁵ "Nārāyaṇa is all, etc." ⁶⁶ realizes that everything in fact is ensouled by Brahman, understands that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis.

Consequently, considering that Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, the One known from the Vedānta, is Himself the founder of the entire Pañcarātra, and that this system sets forth His proper form and the means of worshipping Him, it is evident that no one can seriously maintain that this system is on a par with the other systems. Hence, it is declared in the same epic: "Thus it is said that sāṃkhya-yoga and vedāranyaka—which are mutually complementary—constitute the one Pañcarātra:" ⁶⁷ sāṃkhya-yoga is "Sāṃkhya and Yoga:" vedāranyaka "the Vedas and the Arañyakas": these are said to be mutually consistent and to constitute the one Pañcarātra because they form a whole inasmuch as they all propound one truth. In other words: the Arañyakas accept the 25 fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya, the discipline of yama, niyama, etc. of the Yoga and declare that these fundamentals are ensouled by
Brahman, that this discipline is a form of worshipping Brahman, and that the acts of the Vedas are propitations of Him, so that they hereby propound the proper form of Brahman: it is precisely this that the Supreme Brahman Nārāyaṇa Himself elucidates in the Pañcarātra Tantra. And what is rejected in the Sārīraka is not the fundamentals as such of the Sāṃkhya, but the tenet that they are not ensouled by Brahman; and what is rejected of Yoga and Pāṣupata is not the discipline and Paṣupati as such but the tenet that the Lord is only the operative cause, the fallacious opinions on major and minor fundamentals and certain unorthodox practices. Therefore, the text: "Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pañcarātra, Vedas and Pāṣupata are all in essence authoritative and are not to be invalidated by argumentations," which means that their fundamentals as propounded in these systems are to be accepted and the systems are not to be anathematized in their entirety like the fundamental doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism: for this is in agreement with the statement that "according to tradition and logic the sovereign Nārāyaṇa is the only basis."
NOTES ON INTRODUCTION

1. Ātmasiddhi, Ittvasiddhi, and Śaṃsiśiddhi, Sanskrit text and English translation by Rāmānuja-Chara and Srinivasa-Chara, Journal, Annamalai University.


3. §139


5. Cf. my Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā (The Hague 1953), Introduction, ch. 3; appendix.

6. As represented by, e.g., Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, whose common objections (infra ch 4) keep recurring in Yāmuna’s argument.

7. So still F. Otto Schrader, Introduction to the Pāncarātra and the Aśīrbudhnya Saṃhitā (Adyar 1916), p. 26, where he states the opinion that the name refers to “the Pāncarātra Sattrā of Nārāyaṇa (spoken of in Saṭapatha Brāhmaṇa, 13. 6. 1.) interpreted philosophically as the five-fold self-manifestation of God by means of his Para, Vyāha, Vibhava, Antaryāmi, and Arcā forms.” However, though the earliest sources in the epic know the Vyūhas, there is indication of the five-fold nature, whereas references to the term pāncarātra tend to another interpretation, see below.

8. Śat Br. 13. 6. 1. 1. sa etam puruṣamedhah ma pāncarātraṃ vyāha-kratum apātyat, where pāncarātra should mean “lasting five days and five nights.”

9. Cf. also 12. 339. 14; all references are to the Bombay Edition.

10. 12. 335. 19; 24; cf. 12. 242. 78; 348, 55.

11. 12. 335. 19.


_tad (sc. tarīram of five elements) āvītati brahmaṇ na dṛṣṭo_

laghu$cikramah \| 

ut panna eva bhavati tarīram caṣṭayan prabhūti

na vinā dhūtasāṅghatām tarīram bhavati kva$cit \| 

na ca jivaṁ vinā brahmaṇ vāya$cāt caṣṭayanī yu$tā \||


15. 12 339. 36; cf. 5. 67; "Sāmkaraṇaṃ agrajaṃ sāvakhaṭānām, created by Kṛṣṇa; thus 12. 207. 10; 344. 16; 13. 159.


17. cf. 1. 67: Pradyumna as incarnation of Sanatkumāra; 10. 12, Sanatkumāra is described as Kṛṣṇa's son by Rukmini.

18. cf. 6. 65: Kṛṣṇa creates himself as Pradyumna out of himself and evolves Aniruddha from Pradyumna; in 13. 159 Pradyumna is described as Kṛṣṇa's third form.


20. In the sense that the four vyūhas, or Vāsudeva and the three others constitute the ensouling principle of the gross body (12. 339. 34 ff.), yet Vāsudeva is the soul to Sāmkaraṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; comparably the Pañcarātra theory of the subtle and gross creations.


22. 12. 334. 9.

23. 12. 336. 27 ff.


25. e.g., 12. 339. 111; 349. 64.

26 "parivarāt pañcarātrikāḥ; the edition is by the French scholar Félix Lacote, Budhasvāmin: Brhat-kathā, Člokasamgraha (Paris 1908-29). The same farmer complains (ib 63);

_dhyānādhyāyapradhānaṃ ca vihitam bhikṣukarma yat \|

vaityakarmabhi yuktasya tasya nāmaḥ pī nāsti me \|

27. ib. 65–67.
28. ib 22. 220.
30. BrS. 1.4.23.
31. BrS. 2.3.17.
32. The only edition in existence (by Pt. V. P. Dvivedi, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 70; 185; 209; Benares 1915) is very poor; the Amendments suggested hereunder are based on an examination of all extant MSS, collated for a new edition which I have in preparation.
33. Read cintā for citrā
34. Read trutivirodhābhāvāt for trutir virodhaḥbhāvāt.
35. Read abhiṣgaṇano for adhiṣgaṇano—.
36. Read karmā jñānaṁ ca for karmajñānaṁ ca.
37. Read avāntaraṁ for avāntaraṁ.
38. Read Pradūmannasāṇāyaṁ mano for Pradyumnaḥ saṣyamāno.
39. Read 'nityatvādi- for nityatvādi-.
40. Read 'bhavād for bhavād
41. Read utpattyaasāṁbhavaṁ doṣasyāpratisedhah for utpattyaasāṁbhavaṁ doṣaḥ syāpratisedhah.
42. Read tathāpy utpattyaasāṁbhavaḥ pratipādaḥ | VIPRATI-ŚEDĀC CA for tathāpy utpattyaasāṁbhavaḥ | pratipādita- vipratisedhāc ca, and thus restore the submerged sūtra.
43. Read vedeta caturṣu: all MSS have ekaṁra; all other authors have avagalavān.
45. Kaṭh Up. 2. 17.
46. Mund Up. 2. 1.3.
47. Sātvat S. 2.5.
48. Teitt. Ar. 3. 12.
49. Br S. 2. 3. 17 (18).
50. Ait. Br. 5.316, see translation note 196.
51. Ch Up. 7.1.2.
52. MBh. 12.334.1.
53. MBh. 12.343.11-13.
54. MBh. 12.339.111-112.
55. MBh. 12.335.32.
56. MBh. 12.335.40.
57. MBh. 12.335.44.
58. Bhg. 3.3.
59. MBh. 6.66.39-40.
60. MBh. 12.349.8.1.
61. MBh. 12.349.64-65.
62. MBh. 12.349.66.
63. MBh. 12.349.68.
64. MBh. 12.349.68-69.
67. MBh. 12.348.61.
68. not identified.
69. MBh 12.349 69.
PART ONE: THE MAJOR OPPOSITION 3—52

"Pañcarātra Sātra is not a valid means of knowledge."

3. The validity of Pañcarātra must depend on other means of knowledge. It cannot depend on Perception.

4. Nor on a supposed all-embracing divine Perception.

5. Objection. The scope of Perception depends on the percipient; in a supreme percipient supreme Perception is possible.

6. Refutation. No Perception can be supreme, since it is limited by its organ.

7. Objection. Even so, Perception as a whole could be total.

8. Refutation. No, the finite can never become infinite. Thus there can be no all-embracing perception and the validity of Pañcarātra, dependent on such Perception, collapses.

9. Nor can its validity depend on Inference.

10. Nor on Scripture, whether explicitly found, or proved to exist by Inference, Analogy or Circumstantial Implication.

11. Objection. The same reasoning applies to the validity of any Smṛti.

12. Refutation. No, since the validity of Smṛti resides in the fact that its injunctions are observed by the same agent as observe the Vedic injunctions.
These agents do not observe Pañcarātra injunctions, because those are condemned by exemplary exponents of the three Estates.

13. *Objection.* But since the Bhāgavatas are Brahmins, this should validate Pañcarātra.


15. Discussion of the caste rank of Bhāgavatas and Sātvatas; the evidence of Smṛti.

16. Evidence of their customs and conduct.

17. Pañcarātra is invalid, because it opposes the Veda and is therefore heretical.

**First Minor Counter-opposition:**

*The Naiyāyika View 18–23*

18. Pañcarātra is independent of Veda, both corporal of verbal statements being accounts of the universal Perception of the same Personal God.

19. For the Veda too must have been composed by a Personal Creator.

20. This Personal Creator has complete knowledge of Dharma and Adharma.

21. For these are the means of world creation and must therefore be completely known by the world creator.

22. Proof for the existence of such a Creator is furnished by the proved producedness of the world.

23. The ritual acts of individual performers cannot be ultimate causes of world creation and destruction. The existence of a divine Creator is abundantly evidenced by Scripture and Tradition.
24. There is no authority for such a creator of the Veda either in Perception or in Inference, since such an author would be motivated by bodily existence and since, if Dharma were provable by other means of knowledge, there would be no purpose for the authority of the Veda.

25. The argument that someone must know Dharma because someone has created the world is fallacious, since there is no scope for a world creator.

26. Nor does a creator need to know the means for his creations.

27. Nor can it be proved that the world as a whole is produced.

28. If it were produced, the producer could not be God.

29. The God of reason is a person with personal defects.

30. He could not operate independently of his personal kārman, which renders him superfluous.

31. No author of the Veda is remembered.

32. The preterpersonal virtue of the Veda.

33. Conclusion. Since there can be no divine author of the Pañcarātra, it must have been composed by someone in order to deceive.

34. Objection. God need not be proved by Inference. He is proved by Scripture.

35. Scriptural testimony is informative of fact as well as of kārya, and Vedic statements on God therefore have full authority.
SECOND MINOR COUNTER OPPOSITION:
THE PRĀBHAKARA VIEW 36–41

36. Only injunctive Vedic statements are denotative.
37. Factual statements are denotative only if connected with injunctions.
38. Generally denotation belongs to words in so far as they are connected in an injunctive sentence.
39. Otherwise indicative statements with injunctive sense are impossible.
40. Thus the Upaniṣads are informative only in so far as they are construed as subordinate to an injunction, which even then does not prove the existence of its content.
41. Consequently Scripture cannot prove the existence of God.
42. Continuation of the Bhāṭṭa opposition. Even if God existed, he could not be omniscient, since all knowledge derives from sense perception.
43. The omniscient Gods claimed by different sects cancel one another.
44. Objection. Vāsudeva, the omniscient promulgator of Pañcarātra, is proved by Scripture and must therefore not be compared with the Gods of other systems.
45. Scriptural statements concerning the omniscience of Paśupati are figurative.
46. Refutation. If Vāsudeva is indeed proved by Scripture, the promulgator must either be a deceiver or Vāsudeva in his role of illusionist. Consequently Pañcarātra has no validity.
47. Pañcarātra Tradition cannot be compared with Manu’s Tradition, since that would make the promulgator dependent.
Pañcarātra is traditionally known as a heresy.

And it is also heretical because of its unscriptural doctrine that the soul has a beginning.

Pañcarātra cannot be eternal.

Arguments against the Pāsūpata and other such Traditions apply equally to Pañcarātra.

Final Conclusion: Pañcarātra is not a valid means of knowledge.

PART TWO: MAJOR ARGUMENTATION 53–139.

Syllogism. "Pañcarātra is valid, because it produces faultless knowledge, like the Vedic Statements".

The thesis is not disproved by Perception and Inference.

It cannot be shown logically that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda.

The thesis is not disproved by the Veda.

The ground of the syllogism is not defective.

It cannot be shown that Pañcarātra as language statement is defective because it derives from a person.

Nor can the Prābhākara view be admitted that all non-injunctive statements are non-denotative.

The Prābhākara view should be restated as "denotation of connected meanings generally."

Kārya is but one of several factors which decide denotation.

Kārya statements can only be understood if the words constituting them are already known.

It is inadmissible to assume different denoting powers for different kinds of statements.
67. It cannot be shown that a Kārya statement proves that Kārya itself is instrumental in bringing about the fruit.

68–69. Not Kārya but heaven is the Śādhya.

70. Objection. A fruit is not essential to a Kārya.

71. Refutation. It must be, or all acts are fruitless. Conclusion: Factual statements can produce knowledge of their contents.

72. Objection. But this knowledge arises from Inference, not from the verbal statement itself.

73. Refutation. No, since a word naturally communicates its meaning.

74. General Conclusion: The substantive statements of the Upaniṣads concerning God are authoritative.

75. The fact that the content of a statement may be known through other means of knowledge does not render this statement non-authoritative.

76. Omniscience is not acquired through the senses.

77. The scriptural statements to this effect cannot be disproved.

78. The view that statements are only denotative if they prompt to action is incorrect.

79. The person celebrated in the Upaniṣads is Viṣṇu.

80. It is not stated that this Person is Siva.

81. Viṣṇu’s supremacy, and consequently the acceptability of His composition, are not sectarian assertions but are proved by orthodox scriptures.

82. The necessity of Pañcarātra.

83. The same cannot be proved of other Tantras. The Kāpālika and Kālamukha doctrines are heretical.
84-85. The Pāṣupata and Śaiva doctrines are in part heretical.

86. These doctrines have been promulgated by Siva in order to deceive the world.

87. Since the other Tantras are not based on Scripture they cannot compare with Pañcarātra.

88. Even if Pañcarātra is based on Scripture this does not mean that its author was not independent.

89. Pañcarātra is a digest of the Vedic tradition.

90-91. Pañcarātra does not censure the Veda.

92. The fact that Pañcarātra enjoins additional sacraments does not render it non-Vedic.

93. The fact that Pañcarātra is not included among the fourteen sciences does not render it non-authoritative.

94. Bādarāyaṇa-Dvaipāyana does not reject Pañcarātra.

95-116. On the understanding of Brahmasūtras, 2.2.42-45.

95. Against the condemning interpretation of BrS. 2.2.42.

96. Of BrS. 2.2.43.

97. Of BrS. 2.2.44.

98. Of BrS. 2.2.45.

99. The correct interpretation of BrS. 2.2.42.

100. Of BrS. 2.2.43.

101. Of BrS. 2.2.44.

102. Of BrS. 2.2.45.

103. An alternative explanation of BrS. 2.2.44.
104. Of BrS. 2. 2. 45.
105. An alternative explanation of BrS. 2. 2. 42.
106. Of BrS. 2. 2. 43.
107. Second alternative for BrS. 2. 2. 44.
108. *Objection.* Pañcarātra cannot be optional vis-a-vis the Veda.
109. *Refutation.* It can, since it is based on the independent perception of its author, God.
110-111. On self-validity and defectlessness.
112. The defectlessness of Veda and Pañcarātra.
113. On invalidation.
114. The living tradition of Viśnu’s authorship of Pañcarātra.
115. Second alternative for BrS. 2. 2. 45.
116. On Jaimini’s rule of the invalidity of statements conflicting with the Veda.
117. The fact that Pañcarātra is ‘accepted’ by those who are outside the Veda cannot render Pañcarātra invalid.
118. On the distinction between those qualified and those unqualified for the Veda.
119. Pañcarātra is accepted by the Vedic sages.
120. Bhāgavatas are Brahmans.
121. On the distinction between Brahmin and non-Brahmin.
122. The Bhāgavatas have traditions of Brahminic gotras.
123. Brahminhood allows of proof.
124. **Objection.** None of the means of knowledge can prove it.

125. **Refutation.** It can be proved by Perception.


128. On conventional and etymological meaning.

129. Bhāgavatas do not observe vrātya occupations.

130. On rathakāra and the meaning of bhāgavata and sātvata.

131. Bhāgavata does not exclude the connotation of ‘Brahmin.’

132. On the professional priesthood of the Bhāgavatas.

133. The professional worship of Viṣṇu is not condemned.

134. On naivedya and nirmālya.

135. The explanation of Pañcarātra condemnation of naivedya and nirmālya use.

136. The nirmālya of Viṣṇu is supremely purifying.

137. Naivedya as means of the prāṇāgniḥotra.

138. Bhāgavatas do not reject the Vedic sacraments; the Ekāyanaśākhīyas do, but on the authority of their own Vedic śākhā.

139. Concluding benedictions of Nāthamuni and the Vaiṣṇava sacred texts.
श्रीः
श्रीये नमः
श्रीयराम नमः
श्रीमद्यायमन्मुनिविरिचितम्
आगमप्रामाण्यम्

वर्णस्माप्तिप्रचंसमहान्दैकेत्वे
कतामालविविविदर्य पदयते विश्वेन नमः || १ ॥

ये अमी केचन मतगात्वचयसी दुर्मोनसाय नयाः।
गम्भीरां गुणशालितिमपि गिरं निन्दुन्ति निन्दुन्तु ते।
सारालकविचारकौशिकदुर्गापरे प्रेषेवस्थिता।
सन्तस्वन्तवन्तुवोरूपः बहुः शासन ते महिरम् ॥ २ ॥
अभिनवेशाकवीस्कृतं चतुरुक्तमपि सम्भवितः भ्रमः।
तद्विद्ध भागवतं तत्तस्तरा मतमिरी विन्दुशन्तु विपिष्ठितः ॥ ३ ॥

४. इह केचिदृः तदस्त्तोऽवगतकृतिप्रकृतिकर्क्वकर्कखिस्तुर्विचि
विजितमन्तखीमार्गसंस्कृतसङ्क्राम्यात्मजेन निजविन्दर्कौशिकशालिश्यासुप्र
दृश्यायन्तः परमपुरुषविरिचितनिरिवितशयनिःध्रुपःगोचरपश्चात्मात्मापाण्ये
विपिष्ठितात्मन्।

चद्विन्ति च।

हेया खलु प्राप्तं बलचालस्वरते।
परं मानान्तपेत्रमनपेत्रमृत्तरम्॥

तत्वपि।

न वाचस्यप्राथिनिर्पणं धर्मं न कचिद्।
आसीद्विति प्रमाणत्वमपेत्रत्वलक्षणम्॥
पौराणिक हि वचः प्रमाणान्तरतपतिप्रवद्वस्तस्थाप्योपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपायोपाय0
प्रथमः
इन्द्रियान्तरपिठां विभेषः गोचरयेण तु।
फळः प्रत्यक्षशिवां विद्रष्यः दोषपितुः सःसमः॥

५. ननु तद्विजळागय्यः विद्यमानोपधमने।
अरस्ति हि स्वभावान्युवय्यिनः विद्यमानोपधमनत्वे प्रत्यक्षतेव
परावते, न द्वाजङ्गानितुः वा वानगम्याद्वृत्तानादि प्रत्यक्षशिवांतिशोऽहमः, तेन अरोपविपयवात्वक्षणार्यस्यक्ष्यकोऽः स्वभावात्मिनेनिौवितोऽः
इति न हृद्यमभिवेद्यति।

६. ह्रद्यामपि सतिशयेन विनिर्विशयमयुक्तिमाः पुष्टो ध्याचाममुः।
"सतिशय मधवः विकृष्टः तां दशामयमवत यतः परं न समयति
महत्त्वममितिविवरे बाल इव ध्यायन्नामूः", अर्थादिकः सतिशये
केतापण्येन विनिर्विशयेन भवितत्वमिति, आहोक्षितांमानाजातोऽणे
विनिर्विशयदशामयिविवेद्यन भवितत्वमिति।

न तावद्रिष्ठमः कत्यां कल्प्ते कुलुक्तमस्यतः।
न तिनां दशायादि ध्यायेयेश शात्वेभवम्॥

यदि च तदेव सतिशयमसंभावनीयप्रकर्षैः परिनिरीत्वेत्, इत्यतः
तथेऽत्वें घंटमणिकादिना श्रवाण्डोद्धरविवर्मापूरितमिति तत्त्वतःहलकतेतरामम्यात्मकः।

व्योपधिः दन्तवसावाण्यवत्मः सिद्धायानं।
कप्यान्त्वेभिः पुरावां धर्मान्तपनितदुःखमः॥
विशुद्धत्तसाधकत्वः सम्भवसत्ताविशयो न हिः।
द्वपूर्वत्थान्यानावन्यायांतः स्वित्व पत्रः सः॥

यद्रेव विशिष्टे परिधिनेन निर्दितति तद्रेव विनिदर्शनीयेव।
पश्चात् हि नाम देशावक्तेऽध्यत्ता परिभाषापूरितमिति यावतू।
न च नमश्व तस्ततित धर्मिन तवेत्तनाग्नि निर्दिष्टेत। यद्रेव
च नस्मिति तदुनुमनीति तद्रेव वाहि सम्भावनापूरितमिति पुनर्वपि
साध्येन्द्रिकतता।
9. न च अनिश्चितेन प्रस्वयवेषण दीक्षाराधनाद्वयो धर्मत्वा अवबोधिता इत्यपि प्रमाणमस्ति; तसादसदादिपु आलोचितपरे वेतनानिर्देशकपरिवर्तनायव्यवस्थलित नामितेतसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धे प्रस्वत्व प्रमाण, नतरा तन्मूलतया पश्चर्यस्तुर्तिः प्रमाणम्।

10. न च करणपथतृप्तवाते प्रस्वतवस्तुन्यबिनाभावाचावधारणागधीनोवयमनुमानसम्पुर्णमस्य, न हत्तत्रचरणमनुमानस्यविनाभावित्या धूमभवतुसंदर्थति।

11. न चागमसात्वशस्त्रसमयसिद्धियाक्षातपलेक्षोपविशेष-पर: परिबद्धं, चेतन तन्मूलतया पश्चर्यस्तुर्तयं प्रमाणे स्थ:। न चादसमानोज्यतमनगोचरः, यथैव हि तत्त्वसिद्धिः; दीर्घायत्तत्त्वसिद्धिवस्त्राध्यायन-तत्त्वसिद्धिवस्त्राध्यायनमादिसाध्यसाधनमायो नातुमनगोचरं सम्बन्धवधारणविवचारः, एवं तन्मूलागमोदगि तत्त्र एव नातुमार्यं दर्श्यः।

न चागमनानापि प्रस्वतसर्वाभावमूलभूतावमाचारमः सम्बन्धति। स हि देशचा पौड्यप्राणाचर्यस्यदेवाः।

न तात्त्वपीर्वेषण वचसा तस्य सम्बन्धः।

विविधयुगमि भृयुमेव पुरुषा यतं॥

अवध्वेषण्य ः हि द्वयते के चित्रारागमिकस्यः॥

अतागमिकस्यार्थो व्याच्यादित्वानुचित्वा॥

तत्त्वसत्त्वचक्षुदानापि प्रस्वतमूलभूतावमाचारमपुरसं सति किं स्तवनिवत्ताय वैदमूलाच्यतात्सिद्धिः, किं वा यथार्थचर रचयतां प्रदेशनाय तथा चतुर्मयित दश्वामहे।

तात्त्वा च प्रमाणत्वम् व्याख्यातेत समीहितम्।

न हि नित्यागम्: चतुप्रदृश्ति तादशागोचरः॥

न चापमाणात्त्वचक्षुदातिसिद्धिसम्बन्धः।

कथं हादगपुर्वं सा स्रावशाचारगोचरः॥
न भार्याप्रचित्सत्वमूलक्ष्यितिसिद्धः, अनुपत्त्वमायाद, सरणाभ्यासुपपत्ता द्रियत्स्वल्वा प्रापंवर्धितः। सर्वंति हि पश्चात्प्रक्षेत्तः—दीक्षारत्िनादि ध्रमत्त्वभयपक्षारीनिव मन्याद्वः। न धानुष्मूले वस्तुनिः सरणाक्ष्यितार्थिन्ति, अनुभवेद्वेदितहोस्वंसद्वावनुपयुक्तार्थिन्ति, इत्यादिगर्भेनुभवादेपानाविविज्ञ्यांकोदनाये मृत्युपक्षार्थिन्ति। सिद्धेष्वर्णय सनोरसः, यद्य द्रिय यथार्थ्वविनय्मोक्तार्थिन्ति। प्राप्तादित्वात् स्वद्वरोधयिनि मन्याद्वः, तदा युनाराग्नयामिनिवेदार्थिन्ति। पञ्चाङ्गादेपात्ताय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय भानात्। स्थानस्य च: स्थानस्य च: स्थानस्य च: स्थानस्य च: स्थानस्य च: पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय पञ्चाङ्गाय तत्रः।

तुल्यारूप्यतमाधारे पञ्चाङ्गाय मुक्तितमाः।
प्रमाणमधारे द्रवितमाधारे युक्तिमां।
स्थत्त्रादि मधारे मन्नदिस्तृतिमोचयमाः।
विश्वेष्य पञ्चाङ्गस्य धक्ष्ये वा—

१२. स उच्चते॥
अथ च: कर्त्तवामेत्रेऽपि प्रमाणमिति सुखम्।
स्वार्थः स्नातकोऽपि बैंक्षण्य: विवक्षितम्॥
तथा हि शृविविधितानामनिहत्युज्यं तौरं पूर्णादयस्य त्रिभुवननिहत्येकारणां स्मृतियुज्येकारणां संभीयानां नित्यवेद्यानि विविधानाम इत्यं 

परमहितव्युज्यं बैतिक्षत्वां निरिक्षेयमनुष्टिः स्न्यायपदन परिवर्तितो शृविविधितानास्यं द्वेकारणां निरिक्षेयमनुष्टिः स्न्यायपदन न चैत्यावनषमनवादीनिव शृविविधितानास्यं विविधानाः युज्यायिनस्ताब्तिकाचारानुपचरस: प्रयामः

प्रत्यूतिनानां विगाहिते कुर्वाणानु वेद्याविनिव इत्यं

tमादू यतकर्मायांत्र प्रामणं स्मृतियुज्येद्वितमः

नैव तत्ततञ्जातानां दिवाहस्वरणामिति

न हि वैवर्तिक: शिष्यस्तदुकार्यानुपासते

१३. नन्तू तत्तथापि शृविविधितासतिसमाख्यायकीवतायिनाय श्रमिनिभिवतं वाहणेतहरतूरियमानार्थवेन चोदनामूलवव संमाह्यमाने कथमिव प्रामणमायानि कस्मूता अमाविसर्गमादवः सरणारणवता फलयंते

१४. उच्चयते

हन्तेच्याविनिव सत्तुः प्रामणसुपपादितमः

यत्तू वैवर्तिकविभिधानिर्दिशाया भागवतः हृति

नन्तू ते कथमिश्रिता ये वैवर्तिकायामण्या ग्राहनं ? तत्त्वं तेहां वैवर्तिकविभिधानिर्दिशाया अस्थि

कुँरे ग्राहनं भागवतः ? न हीनिद्रियसंयोगसाधनसत्त्वं के तुमिथे वेदेद्विरोपेणुत्त्वान्तमानसमन्त्यो व्यायात्मानं नस्तवत्तिरिक्षिपिन ग्राहनं नाम जातिविरोपस्यास्यामः, दिवायकश्वेतावत्यस्य मूद्यान्तरिनां धिशीयमान्तः न तद्भवाध्यात्मिनं अतते, भागववेत्ताः, इत्युपराविदुह व्यधिशवास्तिति, अतिरिक्तसाधिक以往वहर एवाध्यायमानिद्वितमः

१५. न च भगवतेदु ग्राहणं सुपपादिताः वैवर्तिकः प्रमुखते।

महतिः पुरुङ्भो द्विप्रजेः—इतते ग्राहणं हतो भागवत इति। यदेदता?
श्रान्तेंत्रेव इत्यादि गुणयोगादि सात्तथमांगक्तादिविभागादेशाः यथा नेर्वेश्वर विद्यामकाराधिकार्याः इति तथा ।

रुद्धा सात्तथांशेषेष्ठे कैथित्व डुल्सितयोनयाः ।
उद्यते तेषु सत्से शार्दूलो नामयन वर्तते ॥

सन्तिकैमित्वस्मिनियोगागक्तिकरिष्यधाः ।
अयुक्त इति युक्तश्च रथकारपदेः यथा ॥

अपरखा फलसिंह रथकारसन्त्योपयनविद्यक्त्वमाक्तेनापि शैविकी व्रतिमपाधया जातिविद्यापत्म मिनिविद्याते । इति च सात्त्वताः

नाम उत्तरानातिसंस्कारहिताः वैद्यमात्यान्यिनोऽवरज्ञनाः कैथित्वमात्यान्यिनोऽवरज्ञनाः कैथित्वमात्यान्यिनोऽवरज्ञनाः कैथित्वमात्यान्यिनोऽवरज्ञनाः कैथित्वमात्यान्यिनोऽवरज्ञनाः

वैद्याकु जायते मात्यान्तु हृदयावाचार्य पव च ।
भाववध विज्ज्ञाय मेनसात्त्वत पव च ॥

इति,

मात्यामात्यापदेश सात्त्वतेषु वर्तत मात्याव्यवहारमेव पव ॥

इति

प्रथमं सात्त्वतो नाम विष्णोरात्यतनानि सः ।
पूज्येद्यायाः ग्रामोऽस दु मात्याव्यवहारः स्वात्त्व ॥

इति

तथाचोर्कृतिभास्तमक्रमपक्त्रित्वापीध्येत्यपेदेश तस्रति पदंभी ।
प्रत्यक्षशेष गुरूद्वर्गमात्यतिद्विनासाय देवन्ते । तथा चोरानी सर्वं विष्णूक्तोपजीवनं आचार्यवृवत्तक्त्वयोगवर्मणं इति, तथा वास्ते पुराणे विष्णु-रायतनानि स पूज्येद्यायाः राज्याम् ।

इति, तथाभ्याप्ति सात्त्वतानां च

देवायतनश्रोतिः नेर्वेश्वरश्रोतिः प्रतिमासरक्षणम् ।

तथा चैद्यासंदेह युड्यासाय मतोंर्वेचः ।

प्रज्ज्वला वा प्रज्ज्वला वा वेदित्वाः विशममिष्ठः ॥

इति।

१६। अपि चात्यातः चेतामाहायामायाः प्रतीत: ।

इति तथा दैत्यापूजः दीपानैवेद्यमभक्षणम् ॥
गर्मीधारणाप्रदाहायत्रांस्कारान्तरस्वेतनम्।
श्रीतिक्रियानवनुसा्नं द्विजेस्वमद्धववर्जनम्॥
हस्तादिभिमार्गाचार्याण्यं सुनिर्जयम्।
सरतिः हि शृंचितो देवपूजनाय ब्रह्मकौम्भनधिकारिहे त्वथा।
वेशां वंशकमामेव देवार्चाणुसितो भवेत्।
तेपामध्यवने यथे यात्रे नास्तिः योग्यता॥ इति।
तथा च प्रमसीहितायं तेपामेव वचः—
आपचापि च क्रमायां मीतो वा दयंतोमपि वा।
पूजयेनेव वृत्त्यस्य देवदेवं कदाचन॥ इति।
यदं त समस्तसिद्धिगतिः निर्माणिः द्रष्टव्यमभास्थं चायो चायं तद्दशि
तद् पूजामाहः भूतवार्यस्य वायूलयाति। इतिः।
अपि च यदवकलामाधि विरियाधानदात्रायणादिमाययिचनि
विद्धिति कथे तत्तपरं: श्रुतिमूलकमभागः तत्वभागाः।
सरतिः हि देवलकायलोकं प्रायदचिचं देवलकायारसी देवकशोप-
जीवितवादू वृत्त्यस्य देवपूजनात्। तथा च देवलं। देवकशोपजीवी
वस्तु देवलक उच्चतेः। इति।
तथा, वृत्त्यस्य देवदेवेऽवीर्ये वर्षनि यो द्विः।
स वै देवलकानां नाम सतैंसंसु गाढिताः॥ इति।
अपि वृत्त्यस्यादपरं परं द्रभवार्येऽवेत्ताय देवमनाध्येऽवेत्ताय द्वस्तते,
अतो देवलकवित्रीमेनायायप्रभुत्वात्त्वम् तथा च।
विद्धिरातं च प्रण्डं च यूयं देवलकं प्रायम्।
मुखानि ब्रह्ममेव द्रष्टा चान्त्रयां चरतेऽ॥
इति प्रायथिर्च सरतिः। तथा च विशालसमीपाये वर्षप्रभासण्यं
वर्णयति। अवादूषा देवलकां कल्यायकं गणमोगदेवलकाँ।
भागमतसाधनार्थिति चतुर्वेदे एते उपन्यासाणा हृति। तथा च भगवान । न्यासः।

आदायका देवता नाष्टरघामार्गाधारका ।
एते ग्राहणचण्डालं महापविकर्षामाः ॥ हृति ।

वशं जाता कर्मणा च धर्मीमार्गश्रुपभ्रुभागवतजनपरिश्रमद्य पञ्चरागायसमां धर्माण्यात्विद्याय पर्यते हेतुः,

तथा हि।

१७. विशादाध्यायितुं नर्म्न न मानं पुण्यपापयोः।
पर्यवावर्तीर्युक्तवाच चेतसवन्दर्नवायुवत्॥

अनि च तेवं पर्यावार्त्यायापुरस्तः सर्वेच्छांभूदेश इति स्वायत्नेच उपन्यायितं चतुः ब्रह्मेषु ब्रह्मेषु परं धर्मोक्तमः शास्त्रमध्ये इत्यर्थे। तद्विन्दु सर्वविधाया कथा चतुर्वेदीयस्य देवतानां निधेयसत्साधनायोपविकर्ष्युद्धेन आरम्भाणं तत्त्रातावगतमथे युक्तवत्त्वा कथयत्तिर्युद्धेने।

मन्याद्यो हि वियदितत्तल्लभमाहितताधणायोषकमावृक्षमूलममिद्राहाः दद्यनेत।

केदारकिलो हर्ममूलं स्वतिरविलेच च तद्रितम।
शुरुतिस्तुतितिविहितो धर्मः। स सर्वोपविहितो वेदे सविख्यानमयो हि
न् ॥ हृति च।

(१) यद्यपार्थु उपनयनादिसंस्कारामध्यत्तां च अविन्द्राक्रिय-स्मस्वैदिकमस्मिनु पुनः प्रिय मगवदाराधनाधिकारविद्याय वीकात्मक-संस्कार्यन्त तद्विद्याविकर्ष्युद्धेन हृति तैतेय सस्तरै-संगवदाराधनाध्यायितिनितिभेशर्।

(२) चर्त्री धर्मममण्यात्या समस्तानिकानिपरिस्थितेः च चतुर्वेदे-विवाहायातनिपरिष्ट्यनं तद्विदितकवेदे विधमू अन्यथा हीदमपि तदन्वत्तमदेव सर्वेऽ न च सर्वते। तदवसीयते अवधितक्रियों

पञ्चरामायनामाहिति।
(3) अत एव च भगवता वादारायणेन अथीरामांत्यनीकमृतकणेशुणक्षरेरसुगुरुमतादिवायासमयनिरासासत्सरस्य तद्वस्य निरालः।
उपत्यक्षर्यांसवातू हृति।

जयसिद्धसिद्धमसवृहेण तथा भयीवाहपरिव्राहेण।

अनवरोकेरिपे हृदेतु भिन्नस्त मातवादिसरणेयस्मानम्॥

१८. एवं सति यान्यानि खोंके व्यामोहयितः विक्रेयमोक्षशादनं
वशीकरणार्थेद्वृद्धिविद्यामयेमेव वहुःशुद्धिदाहिःंबन्धववाराध्यनादि
कल्पिस्यवैदिककर्मणि पाश्चात्तत्राकैरितिहित्रते तात्त्वव्योगाण्यन्य
विच्छेदणेवाति च भवतितिनिर्क्षणार्थिविदितं मन्याते।

ततो न वेदस्थलवें वाच्याथस्य युज्यते।

शास्त्राय प्रतिपदेत येन मन्यं विद्वेषानवतः॥

अन विद्वेषाह काम प्रायोगितायासारमेव वाज्यादिसरणेषु
कारणतया वेदूः परिक्लस्यात्, पाश्चात्तत्रार्थस्य युज्यते न किं वेदेन
तत्त्वलक्षणवृद्धिते वेदानामापि यथूमयस्विनिस्वातं शास्त्राय तत्त्वस्य
प्रवृत्ति हि पाश्चात्तत्रार्थस्य विद्वानं, न ख्वु तत्त्वस्योपनुपकारकमि
सरणीयोमतिस्मृतमूढ्यिमावः।

परस्परमेतेऽत्र तु वृद्धकाह्ये न हि स्मृतः।

पाश्चात्तत्रार्थस्य तद्वारापेश्ये परस्परम्॥

वेदस्थलवेदक्ष्यनं पाश्चात्तत्रवर्षीपदितः।

कूलस्तांसृहतालानालामो नावतीपदितः॥

१९. आह निन्देऽवै रेता अपि पुनःवेदार्थानाममाण्याः पौर्णेऽपि
एव कस्तिकिं यत्र हि पार्श्वानर्थविद्यायासारसुपकारकमां
कथमपरावर्तिते वेदजनो महिमा वग्नेचित्तु
अर्थस्निहोर्ष्यमा वार्त्तावलीविचित्रितं इति वेदत, हस्त तद्हि पवित्रविनो
ध्वस्यार्थ भविष्यमा हितैश्वरनमेवतेनाण्युविद्वेषार्थिरस्त्यो मन्यविविधो
रूपिति किमिति न स्मान्।


twetyo. na nu thamatinitsmānaātārāvatare dhanā pranayam savantam, maṁ yatasthājatvādeśānātātāsthāārmānām eva bhagavān jagadānukṣepa vedaṇāmāna pranāmaḥcyayati.


twetyi. vīmorāthmeñgocharaṁ pītākṣaṁ, vādē thammanātho tadā bhūvānaśīkṣāmupajñayati, sa hi tathā kartā bhojanī yo bhavyaṭāṣṭrasupakaranā sāksaṭkāruṇ pravartī thamāṁaṁ ca jagadāpakaṁ sīmāṁ sāksaṭkānaṁ ca samstamē tva. tatāthāṣṭrākāri koḍyāraṇīyam eva ca vedaṇādārī nirāmātināti.


twetyii. yathu bhūte nirāmucanadaṃ bhaāva na karaṇa iti mārtiṣṭhyādevam.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

tathā saśyathavati vinaśīkṣatvābhūvñānādattam.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.

vīmānaṃgoccha matva karaṇa viśvabheraṇo.
न च वाच्यं कर्मणेमेव स्वातुभावं पुरुषलोकिषितानि सम्पाद्यतामन्तरं नान्तरेऽयनं ततसुभुवनादिकार्यं निर्माणमिति यत्क्षेत्तनानिषिद्धतानि ताति न कार्यं जनपितुःसदाहिस्वे अवेतनत्तवादू वासीवेन, न हि चेतनेन तद्वारंनिषिद्धं च वाची यामेव यूपादीन्यापादंतुमसम्।

न चापूर्वात्परिप्रायम् च यमं निर्माणायिष्ठानाम्।

न हि कर्मादयात् पूर्वेऽसाध्यात्मक्षुः क्षमामहे॥

उत्तमं हि उपादानोपकरणसाधारणकारणं पवित्र तन्म तत्र कार्यायुक्तात्।

न च कर्मणेन्यापूर्वसाधारणसम्महं। कर्मणां कतिपयं प्रक्षार्यं प्रतिकार्यं यथा ज्ञातं यथात्मकं सोद्योगों धान्यत्वप्राप्तिमां धान्यत्वाचेतनांलोकस्थतुतुरः। कर्ममा निर्वितायशचितवचितिः पुरुषोपहुःसतान्तवं तत् चामातिज्ञानात्याद्यस्तत्ततः।

यथा॥

शास्त्रमातिषां तत्स प्रेमायश्च जगत्तये।

पेष्वायेश्वराय धामाय्तसहस्रसंख्ययां चतुर्ग्रामम्॥ इति।

हमेश्वरायं सम्भारेश्वरादित्यात्मात्मासृष्टियाः च रोद्योगायिष्ठानाम् चारावृत्तिविशेषां जनपतिः चेत एकः। सत्ततिज्ञानांजगत्त। इत्येवमाद्यः।

स च यायांमाधिपादेभ्यान्यं तथान्निसिद्धविलक्ष्य्वेदविभिन्नेऽविन्योर्भस्त्रयेश्वरेऽसुप्राणायः जान्तंगत्तुत्तमायात्मायार्नवेव। कर्मनुमोक्षात्मन्त्रत्वत्वमातिरितसर्वसंयोजनं निनिर्माणात्मुद्यनम् अवलोकयं परममकर्षणं ततस्मानसः। परमात्मेवसाधनस्याराध्यायोथ्यधाननी्र्याम्। पवित्रतमबंधिताः सत्ततुमार्॥

िः प्रमायचे॥

िः ययात हि चेतनेन चेतना वर्णसंकेतस्वितं भोगायो नामकृतिः ते चेतनेश्वरस्य इस्तुन्नेत्रः।
नारदःद्धीनियोऽयोऽ्वचनिः स्मरायसमानस्वतःस्वाता। स्त्रायूणि
कल्याणः यादशतारद्धमन्यादिसरणगोऽधिमिथिनृत्तिः

२४। स्थादेवं यद्य चेतुरां निर्मातापि प्रमाणतः
पुत्रायुधकल्याणं न च शालादुपलम्भ्यते
न च वाक्यतःविप्रेव चेतःशालादुपलम्भ्यते
अभिवादनंविनोपणः विपर्यासमस्ततः
धाक्यं हि यत्र प्रयाधीनरवधनं संप्रद्यते
शरीरिणिः तस्य समाधिमयमां चितोस्यते
पुष्पयानासिनिष्टः शरीरं सर्वदेवहिनामः
प्रवन्दिवाणुवरहार्विसुवस्य रेदिनः
अनिर्वर्षष्ट्र निर्माणं वाक्यत्वममुद्यायेत
अपि चें च प्रमाणलर्व बेश्रानामिपि दुर्लभम्
न हि मानान्तरपूर्णं घरम तत्स्याति सम्भवः

२५। नन्सकर्षणं मानान्तरपूर्णं घरमः स्त्रायूणम्
उत्तरं हि लाशात्तरोति
धमाध्यमौ धममन्यथा तदुपकरणं जगांजयति

तत्स्यमुक्तं दुर्लभं तदुः विश्वसं जगातो न हि
विघघये खोऽधरिपि निर्माता प्रेमवमशिपि तलन्त्ये
विविधाद्विभेदात्वयुत्तथा यद्धिः साधितमः
सम्पोषल्ये नः भावा दीपिवे: परिहोरियाः
प्रस्पर्शस्यक्तिः के चिते पद्यायः
अध्यायमनिर्माणस्वस्तराष्ट्रस्य गानायः
सन्त्रामानिनिर्माणः के चित्र विश्वम्भरायः

तर्क प्रथमसन्दुःशिराधिकाः श्रवणकाश्च विश्वस्यापातः
विश्वम्भरायः प्रथमसन्दुःशिराधिकाः श्रवणकाश्च विश्वस्यापातः
धममान्यकोषयावचयावचयायोऽयोऽधिमिथिनृत्तिः
इत्यादित्वतिथिः समासाब्यात्मापिस्ममतावेद्यति नित्य-साधनत्तमः.
युद्धमकर्तर्षता यात्रि प्रवासनें सर्वधिताः
साध्यते साध्यि सिद्धेऽयुतंतयो हि चेलनाः॥
यागार्जियः स्यभूमाकालसहुत्पादिन्यति नं॥
युक्तशोभयसिििशाय तथाचिज्ञानकल्पसु॥
वचव्यत यागर्जाः नाबजक्षेत्रैः नभी यतं॥
करणं शक्तिरां यद्वयुताराधिपद्धतमः
मा भूति प्रवद्यताः तस्य च किं तेताध्यसितेन नं॥

२५. न वर्षु कुवालाश्चः कुम्भीकार्यमारिस्मानाः तद्वलकानोपकर्षमुख्योत्तरणविकारायोपाधेयांशक्तिः साघकालस्त्रैः तच्छारभक्तेः

यदि परे भक्तिमिहादयामिलितसाधनाय तद्वलकानो-पकर्षमुख्योत्तरणविकारायोपाधेयांशक्तिः साघकालस्त्रैः तच्छारभक्तेः

तथा च प्रत्यक्षमद्वितिकरणं कर्मकरणं प्रवीणों नेशाने न्यूनमं श्रमैः हिति
च ताष्ट्रां नियमः।
अपद्यवेयां श्रुतिकरणे स्वाराममनयि
नई याने नारी भवति पुरस्तलक्षणमिच॥

२६. निनाचीलें विभां जनधवप्रित्वच्चवीरि च गतः।
प्रवीणं जनधवप्रित्वच्चवीरि जनधप्रावि तदसदृष्।
स प्रयार्षेन मेधार्दिक्षासर्वनियत्व तत्तितः।
धरिनी हैवेति स्फुटमिद यतो धीरज्जिते॥

श्रावणि हि प्रत्यक्षेऽवायुम समस्तकालसम्प्रभुमेधार्दिनावर्गितिः सिंहः
हि पूर्वकाल्योर्वि तादाः पुरुषः पारुः सन्ति च वेपमिद्यसर्वस्याः, प्रयोगाध्यभवति।

महिमालपणे प्रत्यक्षार्दिनावर्गसंघर्ष॥
अर्थशक्तिः प्रात्त्वार्दिनामीतन्त्रकालसर्व॥
तान्त्रिकविवेदोपेनाणुपाण्यतीति। न क तात्त्वतिमयकः। भमान्तवर-गोचरे हि तित्विन दिखालाकरपततो विपरीतविवेदोपस्तमाणमेव प्रतिलंगति। जन पुनरित्यतिमातान्तरस्वमहावें भगवति विवाचितति, चावतोऽन्तन्यतिरेकाकाकरताविविनायामाहाजो चर्मस्तान्त्विवेदोपस्त- स्वापपति। तथा च प्रानष्णिकक्तवरसिद्धधर्माणथिवर्णवतितपुरय- व्यावरणभम्मवैकल्यं, तत्त्वविनेद्रिश्चत्रुवाचिन्धानकर्णो वल्लनामानसेव।

३०। क वा देवश्री तिमेग्रन्नवर्तकः किमिति वा 
कद्वा वा निम्नीक्षण्यति तदेवताधिरुत्॥

कविचित्रविशिष्टमि किमं फलसुप्रिद्य करिणः।
कदाचिन्तित्वाचितिविज्ञापति कुलालालिजिविलः॥

इत्ठार्थतालीकः न च भवति हेतुवर्दः खलु
स्वामायः स्वातन्त्र्यं त्रैकितितमहै सम्प्रति विशोः॥

अभिमेतं किष्किष्कदयमसमीक्षवे उञ्जयते।
जगान्मस्तेश्वरप्रचलितमहायाससमवः॥

अनुक्रमप्रयुक्तेऽस्निमान्ताय जननः।
सुंदरिनः क्रिय सुनायते। तत्त्वमित्वादि यदि॥

तत् स्वतत्त्वतात्त्विति। किष्किष तैरेक हेतुभिः।
उपायेचिन्ते वैचिन्ते किं तत्तलन्यायानम्॥

अतो नास्ति तात्त्वो मुद्यः प्रस्तमस्तत्वाद्विषिन्यः। लाक्षात्तृत- 
वर्मीयसों वेदानारत्थति।

३१। अपि च यदि वेदा। केनचिदर्शव्यतत्तत्सदनाय सिद्धिता 
अयति तक्तत्त्वं स्पर्शित। न च जीतांकुप्ताभिवाससमां सुरक्षे, सुन्यः हि 
चतुष्प्रयोजमानाभावम् कर्तुरस्मयं, वेदे तत्त्वनिद्धर्मत्त्वाद्विषिन्यस्थापयम्। सत्य: किमिति प्राक्षपिततत्त्वाद्विषिन्यस्मात्त्वन्त: के च भृद्धीत्र,
तथा हि निर्या वेद्वां असर्वसम्प्रणार्कृरूपावतादू वे यथोक्तसाध्य न
मयनित ते यथोक्तसाध्ना अधि न मयनित यथा भारताद्; अभी हु
यथोक्तसाध्ना इति यथोक्तसाध्य न, तस्मादपरे प्रया वेद्वा इति,
स्वसिद्धान्तां निर्देशविश्वासुभविदिनिर्मितिमिति यत्रुभविनिधनं
वेदमाण्य तदनुभविनिधनं पञ्चरारामाण्यमिति।

३२. ननु च चिमिर्मण्पौशीत्वं वेदानं, यद्य नित्यवणिर्मितं
समानमिति च पञ्चरात्तानामाणाम। अथ पद्धारान मित्यत, सापि समानैः
न चायपूर्वी नित्यता, न हि नित्यानामात्तपूर्वी अप्रभाव उपपचते, उच्चरणातु-
पौर्वेऽपात्तपूर्वी चर्णानामिति चेत तस्तानि तदनित्यतवादेव अनित्येति फः
खल्दिते विनेपं पञ्चराराभुज्योः।

अयापचे चिदेयो यदेकस स्वतंत्र पद पुरुपस्तां तामात्तपूर्वी रचयति
इतरकेष्ठपलो निष्पदेव पूर्वाघ्येदतस्थिरमेव विलक्षणति, कमायान्तरातिक्ष
प्रत्यक्षविश्वासमितिः नापदापमहतितर्च्यो विविध्यो।

३३. सिद्धमिति न विद्यर्पणपुरुपस्तनविश्वक्ष्यविनामाण्यवर्णं
साधीय इति।

यतो न साधारतपुरुषसारपुरुषेण पुरुषां प्रमाणप्रतिपन्द्यस्वत्वः।
अतो जगमेविन्युं श्रीतं नरेण केनापि हि तत्रसेवतृ।

३४. ननु च केवलतर्कवद्यम यदि सिद्धांभियापदमीः
भवनु नाम तथा सति बृहस प्रविष्टिषितप्रकीर्तिः हि भास्वरः।

यदृ तु सक्तबुधपूर्वनिमाोकृत्वकमस्यस्वस्वपत्तयारस्तपुरुपस्तनितकाद्
कार्य नित्यानामात्तपूर्वेष यदृरहसुपरम्यते चतुः तद्दुत्तमसूत-
समरणामाण्यायहुच्छरणं।

३५. न च परिनिष्ठितकसुगुच्छवत त्वानि प्रमाणतर्कस्वस्तपरिशिष्टितुपर्ज्ञानं, पृष्ठेष्वरच्यां
स्वरससमालादित्रप्रमाणायान्योगात्।
न च सिद्धे वस्तुनि साधकात्मकमोर्न्यतरोपनिपतसम्मानसस्करे-
भविता वायुजिप्ययोगलोचनया तद्वृत्तचरावसः प्रामाण्यप्रचुयति—
कार्यनिषिद्यापि तत्सेवनेते, कार्यसंपादिः हि मानान्तरवेद्ये ज्ञाते
भूत ज्ञाते विवस्थापि वेदमोदलेवावेदाविश्वायुपमानात्।
अथ विचल्पणानिद्रियादिविचयायकर्ष्यस्मात्माविद्यातमात्रतयो
तत्त्वज्ञात्वदप्राप्तः प्रामाण्य: हृत तद् निद्रितेशांवशेषवर्ध्यमहाअत्थज्ञोद्विधपुष्पि
भगवति न मानान्तररागिन्यसम्बन्धैर दृष्टि सर्वं समानमन्ययातिमितिविशतात्।
अपि च महावृत्तप्रमाणान्तरसंपि स्वगचरारं तश्चरत्यवां नायामस्य तातो
परं ध्यायति प्रामाण्येऽव कुजस्तुपरिनिपातसंभावनयावामुदार्थम्। कथा चा
प्रत्यस्ततिमितसम्भववृद्धयवायवेशद्वसंपन्नतिष्ठितवगमावुभुवः
ः प्रत्यस्यः पूजोऽपमंदूकयोहरीयमानस्य
सम्भावयमानाचविचितविश्ववे: प्रामाण्योऽर्थादिवापदनितिः यत्वित्वित्वेऽतु।

हर्षः श्रद्धाशतमधिगतिवधिधोचैवेश॥ भवेति
सामान्यद्वांशोवतिलासर्वशिक्षितमहात्माध्यायतादयः
दोमा नाचकारामशते
हुत्सुनेव श्रीयादयः।

ततः

श्रुतिपुरुषः प्रसिद्धेन सर्वेष्टेन निमित्तमू।
तत्तथा मिथ्येति वर्धे न: कथा जिहा प्रवर्तिते॥
अहो मन्दस्य मीमांसाध्रममहानिर्विवृत्तमते।
मीमांसासम्बन्धेतः कथमिथ्यामुक्तिः
कार्यामानान्तरपूर्वः समात्मा वैदिकः वचः॥
प्रामाण्यिति हि प्राहः मन्यते मात्रोद्विभः॥
पदानां तथावृद्धे व्युभचरेयवायुभातत।
न खल्वन्यपरेव श्रवणः व्युस्तेन तस्मयः॥

तथा हि वुज्योर्वशहारोतरशुद्धमुदक्ष्याविष्कार्यसमन्तरे
जनितान्तरशृङ्गसम्बन्धेः द्वारा अन्यायुपयोहोधीयमाना शास्त्रे—

ि इवविधेन।
शक्तित्वादनादस्थायपर्यंतवसायनेरायसीयते, प्रतीता हि स्वकार्यसंज्ञाने कार्यसंविदेशः तत्द्विविद्येशः तत्त्विद्येशः। तद्यमिलापि तदार्थी प्रेक्षि पद्यनेत्रेवांकमल्यति नूतनिमित्तसञ्चारादेशः कार्यसंविद्विद्विरासिताः पद्य- मेतदुन्नतस्तः प्रवत्तति हृदिः, पथं च समलच्चके गहारसुत्तमकृत्तिमितिकार्यः प्रतिगाढ़तपरतया व्युत्पनं शाश्वे यतत्त्वायोपोऽक्षात्मकायिनो येवधर्मायास्ते प्रथमसाधनमानीमूतकार्यायुगस्तः तैत्तिरिमिद्रधियन्ते इस्वव्यः। तथा च तिद्वाद्योज्यमिचर्यताकार्यसंबितः, कार्यविदीर्यस्री साक्षा- समप्रभुवि तिद्वाद्यस्तु तत्पेक्षितालिकायोऽक्षात्मकायिनुवमितिप्रस्तादेस्तु तत्त्वमात्यमन्युवम्युवनतातीति।

35. न च पुजः जननादिस्वयमपेदनपर्यंति वसायि विद्। पद्यङ्गुणः कोद्यवदादिभिरभिसमतत्वं जननादिस्वयमः। कार्यसंयोगः किं च जननादिस्वयमः। अंतारिक्षात्मकसुप्रतिविधायह्रं हेतुप्ररतातः यमस्य मिलेति निर्धार्य प्रतिपुमणाग्रास्यतातः।

प्रतेन व्यवस्थेनेतरपदसमितिव्यय्याद्वितर्मानानिदेते शुधी कार्यमपर्यं- चिरहितपुदश्चिरहितविधायप्रतिविधिरुसंचालनः।

38. पद्यस्तराणि यात्रि हि सूचना व तदाध्याम्।

इत्या पद्यमिलेत् तत् सूचनां तत्र।

ताति कार्यसंविद्विद्विरासिताः साधितमः।

अधूर्वले विद्विद्विरासिताः प्रवत्तति न शोभिते।

अधूर तन्मात्रा हेतुवस्तत्र स्वादिक्षितः।

न वस्तुरुपे विचित्र शास्त्री युविः। प्रयोगकार्यः।

या: पुनर्वैभिन्नसमस्यान्वसन्तात्मकाविन्योज्यवाच्यव्ययतयस्ता आदुमहिन्योज्यनिविन्यः। न शास्त्र सूचनाः तर्क तत्सामत्वत्त्वव- सामस्त।
३९. यदि तापरताराहः शाख्वान्ना नैव चिन्यते।
अनिवोच्छ तुलोहैसितित विष्णी कसाधुपेते॥
अथ तत्र प्रमाणमेव संयुतेऽधिपि च ताबता।
पुष्पार्थिनान्नाहाय विधिरस्युपप्रथमेषे।
तद्यद्व र्माणां प्रयोजनवधातुगा।
प्रयुक्तः किंतु तत्सुलः प्रयोजनवधिरिहः॥

न खलु फणकविभिन्नपतः शिठाच्योक्तकमानसविभिन्नतिमतित कतकाचः
कोयनातांफ्रियेतुमुचिता।

तापरमेवः शाख्वान्ना यात्कादि न विद्यतम्॥
न ताबद्रतात्मानादि निधीसे विधिकल्पनः॥

४०. एवश्चोपंपिपदाराम तत्रत्वायस्मात्मानसानोपासनादिविधियोप-
तयास्थरं व्याकरणः तद्यथः संवेदस्मानन्त्मानानं जानीयाय हृदि।

न च ताबता स्वहरम् सिध्यतीतव्यध्ययवस्यः असंत्वेष रूपः
तद्विः तथा विद्यानोपपने। यथेतदि धिंतयेव पितरं जानियाविदिति तथा
चावृद्धिः भोज्यारिः वद्धित्विधियानिमिति। (उ. १२५)

यानि पुनरात्मसात्त्विनित्वाव्यावीय साकायानि तात्यविद्वैतिक-
कालगत्विधायनांक्षिप्यमाणामुखिकक्रमोगोचित्वेवहकेनर्तप्तिप्रख्यात-
परणि अतो न किंतु दस्य चो मूलेऽस्य प्रमाणम्॥

कात: *सर्वोपायानामापिः परिनिपित्वद्रोहदाहितिप्राहस्यता-
तारणोपाद्व्येन चहृतरत्तविधिविधिप्रदायतस्यवत्त्याचि।

४१. तस्याध्यायोक्तिपूर्वपदानात्योिणामापतात्तथाविचित्री-
विचित्रविविधेऽर्जुवाहित: पुरुष इत्यज्ञाविष्टिविश्वेते॥

४२. सिद्धमिः न श्रृतिलोकप्रभिमतपुरुषः प्रतिशिप्तीति।

* कात एत्यायायानात्मान्मीति पाः।
अपि च भवतु भूलमणि वस्तु शास्त्रमय विषयं, अथ च कथमिव चोदनाजनितिधिरञ्जिनवर्धियं द्वमायमां विजनाति विक्रियानितावर्षी।

सबैशता हि प्रसिद्धेऽरे प्रमाणे: यथायथामधृतिनवग्रहण्योऽपि संग्रह्यते, न हि सर्दिति वचनं यदृच्छया प्रसिद्धबुद्धुत्वदृत्त्हमहत्तिसुखेण सार्वेश्यं शाठायति।

यथार्थि किंतुद्विविष्णपती, तथापि परस्परन्यर्या-सुचितपद्धार्थं-तयार्थवादवादलेखम् सर्वधार्मिकोऽहमः। प्रमाणान्तरगतंयोग्यतादिपुरससस्ति पदेव्यो बायधार्थवृद्धिप्रज्ञायामान। प्रथमतपतिष्ठतिपेश्चित्तममाणान्तर-चिरोधेऽ कथमिव जनिनमुनमात्तीति सर्वमायामः।

प्रत्यक्षादितिधिरञ्जिनोऽचरं वचनं यदि।

प्रमाणे को हु तादात्मायः विहन्त्यादित्यवृद्धिः॥

अपि वासित नरः कथित्वत् तादात्मातिशायाध्रं।

सत्यघातिनित्व्र्यमाण्यस्य किमाण्यतु॥

ढ़े। नहुं च त्राज्ञापुरुषेऽन विचित्रादिनित्वात् परमराणमोक्षात्-सारिणं सदित्व। पाशुपता या विन्दु सर्वत्र। तेजपि खदर्शानां-द्वारिकानितविज्ञान्यमाण्यचक्षु। तथाऽज्ञायं।

न च सवेंद्री वर्धिः विहाराधवंदेवानुपदेत॥

य एव च वादिनामेकत्र वादिन: सबैवसिद्धी हितमेवाति स शवेंद्री सापारण: तत्रेक्ष वहुपुरस्पर्शविद्यमद्विद् महासिद्ध्विद्वह्योज्यात्तु कतमं सर्वेश्वरस्यवसाम॥

यथार्थसस।

सवेंद्रपु च भूमस्तु विक्षिणाधवेंदेतितुम।

तुल्यस्तुपुरस्तु सवेंद्र पु सस्मृती निरह्वताम॥

इति।

सत्यानाधिनमाण्यानं सवेंद्ररक्षित्वनम॥

परस्परमृत्ती तचात्सत्त्व्यमाण्यमावधे॥
44. नु, श्रुतिस्तुतिप्रसिद्धेन यामुद्येन भावितम्।
कर्थि तग्रान्तदेवतात्‍ तुस्वकर्षयाः निवेदक्षेत्॥
तथा हि पौर्णे मूके शृवः तस्य ध्महाम्।
पद्मम् मूर्यात्मिद्विधोपाख्यातिदृतारितः तथा पद्मम्॥
धर्मां च चैत्रद्वारे धृता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् इति,।
तथा सा प्रजा स दिव इति, तद्रिपणोः परसं पद्मम्।
न तस्य कर्तितं पतितं सन्नुभिेके
न चेतित तस्य च मृषावलिम्।
इत्तयत्तत् श्रुतारुपमेये भूति
जगतान्तमिदविभाषान्विनम्॥

विपण्याः श्राकाशात् शृवृत्तं तथा कर्तव्ये च स्विच्छतम्॥
स्पृहितसंयथेताः साधिलाहसा पराधरः॥
हर्ष्य तमेव समेवं मनुरपपाह तथा श।

"नामायणः परोऽयत्तकारूण्यमेव जस्मवम्ब।" इति,
हर्ष्य नामायणुनिवच्छस्ततस्ततस्तुय्यमानः
शानैःशायः परमपुरुषः पश्चार्य व्यधस्तः।
तस्येवेतस् श्रुतिमध्यवर्तिप्रमृहसितम्: समानं
पाठ०त्वेन प्रस्ततिः तदान: लोकपति तु तुल्यः॥
नैततत्त्वायः किमद् श्रुतिशु भावतो न प्रसिद्धा विगुदः
शालेत्तरीपिस्तम्मित्रुपश्चीरिविजयीन्सत्तै विविशदतः॥
पञ्चा घुर्रस्त एव विभुवननवनमारान्विविधवस्तेतः।
वेदान्तायां प्रमाणः कर्तितसस कर्थं वेदगोटिविहितत्स्म।॥

45. तथा हि भगवतः पद्धुतरावि सार्वेक्ष्यस्यश्रीविविजः
धृतमयुष्णमुद्यनते परस्याभ्यास स्वेच्छितु। तमीर्वाणां परसं
महेश्वरम् इत्यायः।।

† समान इति विपरिष्कप्तः।
सर्वेऽभवराष्ट्रं च नैते देवाचित्तनाकिनः ।
उत्तपत्तिशास्त्रया वर्त्ते सत्यप्रयत्नं उद्देशितः ॥
किंच सर्वेऽराह्यदेव सर्वोषे भविष्यादिते ।
पौनलस्यं प्रतिज्ञेयं सर्वविचाराद्वस्य धः ॥
अतः सर्वेऽराह्यदेवं मद्दैववेंकोवरः ।
तथा च सन्तुविचारानुराणानि पिनाकिनः ॥
उपश्रीणानि सापेक्ससच्चेवभ्योपपादते ।
तत्त्वस्य तत्त्वाध्येयः सर्वप्रभुर्ममनया दिर्घः ॥
प्रातः पावरतं तत्रं मनेन्योन्यविरोधतः ।
सर्वविचारान्तःपिपरिीणः प्रतिज्ञेऽते ॥

६६. अर्थं च भवतु भगवान् वारुणेय एवंपनिषद् पुष्पं, अथ च स कथमिच मूर्तिपरिज्ञातानात्मे सत्यं तत्त्वं दुर्मोहेन शुद्धिस्पृष्टी भवेऽवादेः” इति तत्त्वः ।

वारुणेयान्तिकधातुमेव वेदचिद्विमलनुसमु ।
प्रणीतं प्रस्तुतं तत्त्वस्ति निर्धिनुमो वयमु ॥

सर्वविचारान्तःपिपरिीणः भवेऽवादेऽवादेऽवादेऽवादं प्रष्टात तथापि ।

मायामोहनविचारेण हरिणा देव्रुद्रां संहस्तिमु ।
हल्लं भोहयतादसिद्धतामिश्रितात्मायदसिद्धितच्छल्लम्ब ॥
पदं कुदु नच्चरयसिद्धमहामायावारुणाग्रहः ।
व्याज्ञ्जनं, किमिदं न वैति विशये जाते कपये निर्धिष्ठं ॥

प्रत्युत्त भ्रमस्वेतं व्याज्ञ्ज्ञ्जनं गमयेन ।
पैद्याकृत्त्वादुतिच्चाय तथा दित्त्वं यथा ॥

पैद्यकृत्त्वादुतिच्चाय प्रान्गोच सत्याविच्चति, तस्मात् स्वतंत्रायुभ्यमूः।

तत्त्वमाऽसः ॥

१ सर्वेऽभवराष्ट्रं च नैते देवाचित्तनाकिनः ।
47. नापि मन्यादिसरापपिरिपुपपुषं पञ्चरासुर्यानम्।
यदि मन्यादिसरापन्नुपपपुषं पञ्चरासुर्यानम्।
आचार्येवा भोजयेत् नृपसत्सङ्गेत्त्रीर्गुप्त॥
हवात्नास्त्यक्षणामात्राम सत्यं मिथ्या तथा सति॥
अनप्रतिष्ठापि पेत्रोरस्य प्रतिमातीत्वं दूसिक्षम्॥
अम्र वार्तिकारण ये दोषस्मुद्रितिः॥
ते च सर्वेदनुसंबंधेया पुरावतिशयात्॥

48. किंच।
श्लेष्ममपयुपत्स्वेव बोधिमन्याहित्ते तथा।
कारणम पञ्चरास्येवचे पापण्डतास्मृते॥
वेदिकं नातिरिक्ततः चैतिः बिसामवरणादिपि॥
गुम्यते पञ्चरास्य पेत्रयाछत्यनिश्चय॥
श्लेष्ममपयुपत्स्वेव तौम्यम् व्युग्दत्तः धतुर्विभंगम।
लर्मेदः समुचिदः सहूरः न समावरेत॥ इति,॥
तथा॥
भाक्कं भागवतं चौव सात्वतं च तिधा मतम।
ह्येवं तवमेद्वेषकस्य पञ्चरास्येवपि ददयते॥

49. किंच।
श्लेष्ममपयुपत्स्वेव जनामदिगोचरम।
न्यायजीवं वचस्तथमभिन्नत हस्यमिदं महत॥
तथा च श्रुतिः अपिनाद्वां अर्द्धममत्तां अनुनिच्छिलथधारी
मातासस्मर्गस्त्यभवति इति तथा जीवापेत चाव किरेद्रमित्वे न
जीवो सित्यवेद इति।
स्यादेतत् उच्छेदवामात्मादित्वावद्मेतद्वन्ते न जन्माभावमवः
गमयतीन्॥
न, अनुष्ठुलनाधारने जन्माधारोबिधृपरते।
न दस्ति सम्भवे भावे जातो नैव श्रद्धिदिति॥

न च,
लदैव सौम्येदृस्तिमति लदैवकाळवधारणात्।
प्रास्तुधिकालाजीनामाहोकार्यवस्तीयते॥
यदैव जीये प्रथमभूतां प्रादूर्ह छतेण स्वम प्रताभवतः।
क्यमेन्तत्सदेविति लदैवकाळवधारणम्॥
अति चोच्यते सदेवेति यदैवकाळवधारणायां।
तत्तवसुधितवायब्रह्मविषयत्रैगौरवम्॥
पर्युत्तित्यानन्देन चकसा चैतन्यरोद यदैव।
गणनादेविनायस्यायि जनान्त निर्देष्यति॥
न च निदृश्यते तेन च जीयो जनित्वचछयि।
तत् जोहुक्ततेवत्भूतानून जीयस्य तीन स्वरूपः हि न श्रुतं॥

ननु च यतो वा इमानि सूतानि इत्यन्जीवनानीमेव जननजीवनः
प्रायणाभिसंवेदनानानि प्रतीयमने॥

tathā hi bhūtadātryaṃ jīvaṇāmāmādhikāyaṃ।
āśrayam manamaṃvātāntyayamādaṃ dṛṣṭānām॥
jīvanītihi shubdāḥyaṃ jīvīṣ्यवावकवरते।
teṇa jāyante hitayejanu śaityate jīvāgocharam॥

tādhyamkāraṃ bhūtadātrya vihāyaṃ-
pavanahutamamośāsyéminīdhi pravidda।
padmaśāmbhiprāṣāṃśaṃkṛṣṇātātithyaṃ
tevāṃ bhuviṣṭaṃ jīvan-vāṃ च॥
prāyōmaśitaṃ ca kādaṣṇo bhūtadātrak-
chabdugyuṃtāyāyaṃ vanti jīvaśīśaḥ॥

dhāriti jīvaṃ bhūtadātrakānām-
maṇi vadhitaṃ tāṣṇaṃ jām daśāhūshān॥
अतो जीवपरस्तेदिपि धृतमन्नस्य युज्यते ।
जायत इति शास्त्रोऽथ गौरजतो गच्छतीतिः ॥
tथासो लेख इत्यादः शुचयोजन्यः सति नः ।
जीवानुपतिविवाचित्वत्य भगवतो यच ॥

पश्चाति पुरूषं वैव विखयनादी उभायपि । अनो नित्यदशाक्षरकोषः
पुराणः । न जापेते दोषयते वा फलालूचितः । इत्यादि ॥

५०. न्यायः

विवाहाभासितो जीये न जातु वनिमृच्छितः ।
द्रव्याति सत्यमूर्चत्वाभिध्रुवतात्त्वत्यत्तमचतुः ॥
पदवतः पौर्णेयते दृष्यान्तुयक्षया दिशा ।
अनुन्यातः केषित्तु तवेन नित्यमतिधिपतः ॥

ततोत्तु सहदयुतिनिषिद्विशादवर्तकरणवित्तमित्तमभविप्रयत् इत्यपेक-क्षणीयम् ।

५१. किशः

इत्यं पाशुपतादीना न्यायः किं दृष्टावरितः ।
तथास्तिस्विति यदिः धृष्टाऽऽ धृष्टान्तस्यात् परस्परः ॥
सर्वत्रजस्विद्या च वातुर्वेदभवितता ।
न हातु शास्त्रं पश्चक्ष्यश्या पौर्णेयता ॥

अथो कथितो धृष्टाऽऽन्त्यपरिष्निविशिष्ठोऽक्षयोऽप्रामाण्येऽफर-वितो ज्ञेयुप्यत हि। स कथवयः किमु स्वयभिषियं लागुदमते,
tदेवेपति हात्ता नियमितमद्रस्ताम्यतु भवान ।

५२. तदेवस्मृद्दिनिनिन्यायः तत्तत्त्वस्त्रितोऽक्षयोऽविन्यायविद्धामिनि
धातनेन, सत्यसिद्धान्तपथमवर्धितेण च, स्वर्गापछादाननोतप्रेयते-
श्याजेन केनापि सम्बद्धयतुि विशिष्टतति पश्चात्त्वचारणीति मन्यामहे।
ईद्याप्रस्तिविषयमेव तद्वरः।
या चेद्वचाहः स्त्र्यो बाध्य काद्य हुयप्रयः।
सर्वस्त्रा निष्प्राध न्येय तमोनिष्ठा दिः सायः स्त्र्याः। इति।
ईद्यादुरुमगांगनागामिन एव तेषां परं वाखानेनापि ब्रम्हलिङ्ग निपिध्यते, उक्तः।
पत्त पवः च ते धेयां वाखानेनापि नार्मनम्।
पायण्डनो विकर्मस्वातः बैश्वालक्षितकामांग्न।
हेतुकानां पकातः स्वर्त्ती वाखानेनापि नार्मनेयताः। इति।

5.2. इयुपन्यस्तथा नील्य पञ्चराजनमशेषः।
अधमाणिनी भास्मेयं भास्मेऽभिधीयते।
विचाराध्यायितं तर्कं भ्रामाणिनी ग्रह्यताम।
निर्दोषानांजन्मत्वाः ज्ञानप्राप्तिः सूत्रायतनो।

5.4. न तावद्वुमाने नामनुन्यायशाृङ्ग्यदत्खरिदिः।
दोपाः मुग्यिनु शास्त्रस्तव पक्षं वर्णायताः।
पक्षो नाम परत्वायं तरा च तिरेन केनित्व।
स्यं लिङ्गो विशिष्टस्य यं लार्यिृतमेदितिः।

तद्न न तावद्वस्तितानवेरेपणं पक्षंः भ्रामाणिनांः पदार्थस्य
उपवादाद्विस्तादत्वात् मत्याशिृः, नाप्यमिृविलोणस्य पञ्चराजसाधनस्य
स्तव्योक्तकक्षमृतात्वाः, नापि सिंधुसाप्तं, परस्त्वतास्यभ्रामाणिनस्य
परिबादकनो निर्देशात्वाः, न छ प्रयत्नोऽविविदः अंग्राणप्रायतीनिद्र्यः
स्ताद, नाप्युपनाविहस्डः अपुर्वकम्भञ्चः।

5.5. नन्युपपत्त्व यवाद्वानामः—पञ्चराजसाहसममाणं चेद्वाहः
लयाय बौद्धगमितु।

अथ धृष्टः। दत्तादिब्रामाण्यं सिपाध्यन्यर्षितं यदि शाराजुतमधिः
क्षम्यतां तत् प्रवाहस्यं, प्रदायतः हि विविधानद्वारात्वस्सस्तः भोजः
पञ्चराजशाहस्याृङ्ग्ययानस्मन्तरसुपत्त्यायमां तद्यथविविलयं नामः।
नापि संदायलक्षणं तत्त्व विरोधावः न खलु "पदभिषेके चतुर्दीप्रकृतिः पूजयेतुपराःकमम्" इति इस्तवं पुष्पमेव सैतं संसारात्मयेतः प्रत्ययमूलतादेवति, नापि विपर्ययालक्षणं योग्यानुपत्तमन्नामावात्, अथात्विपर्ययोपहेक्षाया अपल्लविशोरोपार्द्धेतुत्त्वात्, प्रभावित्यते चैत-दुरित्यात्।

५६. आगमविरद्धः

पञ्चारामगमं स्वार्थस्तिक्षपिनज्यन्योधनात्।
अथ तर्कामाण्यते तद्विद्धो न दुर्घषम्॥

हन्त एवं सति तद्ग्रामवेद्येवतुसामान्यमात् अनुमानामाण्यें तद्ग्रामाण्य-मित्यान्यांत्रिक्यमाण्यम्।

५७. अथ यं चिमिरः ब्रव्याहतः यदि ब्रम्हन्वतः ततः प्रत्यक्षादि-भिन्नाकारः। अथ राण्डोवे भवति हेतुरुपिन्यते ततो निःस्वायनं, पदात्तः निरविशेषसत्तेतुपत्तो वृन्दिक्षेपणोपाध्यायं निमहं, हृतः, अनैफान्तिकक्ष मन्यानिलथायेः।

अथ तेजदोषेननात् ब्रव्यायत्वशास्त्रः।
अवेदमूलतां मन्ये मन्ये स किल्ल तारिकः॥

तेनात्मण्यत्: शब्दते सत्यब्रव्यमूलतावर्तं, ततो ब्रम्हलोकान्त्यम्, अथवा शब्दोत्तरे सति शब्दश्च सति अवेदमूलतावर्तं हेतुः, तथापि।

सांति नवान्ते दुष्क्रा इत्यादात्तेदेदेवे।
अवेदमूलहेतुविविक्तकार्यं प्रस्तुवते॥

अथ अवेदेरे सति शब्दे तति कार्यचिन्तकते सति अवेदमूलतं हेतुः, अथायु-अर्जिन्य मन्यानसैयान्डिवाय न्योज्यारिता।

यदि अतोकितदेशप्राविक्षेपमेव धर्मांकर्मिविन्यायान्यपि सत्यब्रव्यमूल-स्वात्तिक्यं हेतुः, ततो भागानिग्नो हेतुः, न हि पञ्चारामगमं धर्मं धर्माचरणविन्यायम्। शश्विविद्यायानीव चचस्य वाहुस्यात्।
अथ प्रमाणान्तरायोग्यार्थं सत्तितिः विनेतः तथापि वैवासितिः,
भगवत्मव्याप्तिः धर्मवायुवसीतितमत्वसतुगोचर्यां ध्युतिवितमहिलात्रात्
तथेऽद्विन्द्रन्तरमेव यद्यामः, तद्दल्मकन्त्रितितत्वपाद्यतमान्यपनितित्रत्
प्रतिमायित्वमितावेनोऽभेदं विनेतेन।

संमाय्यमानान्यपनुमानान्तराणि परस्तादुपन्ययं निरस्यन्ते भतो
नामनानाविद्धः पक्षः।

५८. नाय्यगमविद्धः पञ्जराधाश्चध्मान्यप्रतिपाद्यक्षयं हृदसम्
होपनिपन्दः इत्यवाकमहतत्स्य प्रदशौपिन्यमानत्वात्।

स्ववचन — स्वाभूयूपगम — स्वयंद्वेक्षितिदिवरिविदिोधार्याध्रुविविधं
प्रकारानुसाराऽपि एव, तथा हि न तावत्स्ववचनविरोधं, स
हि पेच्छा अन्विमाविरोधं, धर्मोक्तिविरोधं, धर्मस्युक्तिविरोधविषेति
तत्र न तावुतकामिनिविद्धकोप्यु पक्षं, न हि पञ्जराधाश्च ध्मान्य
प्रतिपाद्यक्षयं स्वार्थ्य ध्यान्ति पथां धार्मिकोमहाय चौरी इति, नापि
धर्मोक्तिविरोधं, न हि ध्मान्य पञ्जराधाश्च विरिविधामानं पक्षं
प्रतिक्षितपि सार्वशास्त्राविप्रलिपिमध्यात्मविचरणमू, नापि धर्मस्युक्ति
विरोधं, सत्यपि धर्मोक्ति धर्मान्यव्यवसायविद्धविविधविचारं
हि जननीत्वाधिक वचन्त्वतेन पञ्जराधाश्चायात्मने ध्मान्येन विद्धमू, न हि धिवाला-
ध्यात्मसत्स्य ध्मान्यप्रविशाने तत्र ध्रुवक्तिविद्धिविरोधं।

विहितहिंसानामिवध्मान्यप्रतिपाद्यं धिवालाध्यास्योपबक्षणपत्वात्,
अतो नामगमविद्धं, तदेवं प्रतिपदं पक्षं।

५९. नापि हेतुतेत्रकालितिन्तवादयो दोषा। तथा हि न तावदनी
कान्तिः, स हि देशा साधारणसाधारणमेकत्रात् यथा तृष्णिनितित्व
शाधने प्रणेयतल्या साधारणः, असाधारणस्तवेन गत्वत्ते, तन न ताव
चिरौपत्तानकारणं प्रमाणप्रमाणसाधारणे येन साधारणतत्त्वकान्तिः
स्वात्, न हि नित्त्रोपद्वानकारणं प्रमाणभूतविद्रहमकान्तचन्द्राच्छिदु
विपक्षेण दृष्टचरमः।
नाय्यसाधारणः योगित्रोमादिवायप्रणांतामिथायनेन्य सप्तकान्यस्य प्रदूषिततयात्।

नामित्विषदः, चिपरितवन्धवभावात्, न हि निर्होपसतानकारणेऽ
त्यम्यमाणारणेय न्यातमकः।

नच याज्ञवल्क्यादिवः पत्यशिवरोधाभावात् भागमानुगुण्याः।

न धानिद्रयमुः, असिद्धि आध्यातः स्वप्नोऽथ न ताव
द्वाध्यासिद्धि, प्रजापतिः यथाध्यासिद्धि, नापि द्वाध्यासिद्धः,
 तथापि केविर्य अशान-सन्देह-विचारंक्रमेदात्, न ताव
साधारणासिद्धि, तत्त्वज्ञाति
तहत्त्वज्ञाति, निर्दोषविद्या
प्रार्थति, तत्त्वज्ञाति, प्रतिपादित्वस्विद्धो दोषादुपलम्बार्तबन्धानाव
सिद्धार्थव, विचरणासिद्धिरस्तु द्वितीयेः।

६० ततु च यथेऽपरियतायसमाधानादापतत्ति
रोपस्मापनाना अपनी
मृत्यु यहे पश्चात्तत्वमाणाः। कर्म वायव्यसाधारणाशृपतत्ति
वेदेशु सा
वार्ते॥ अपोपलोकान्तवादिति चेतानिहाति सर्वाध्यात्माकारपरमपुरुषपरिपूर्वत•
वेदेत्यत्वमाण शास्त्रः ह्याणाः।

येतुद्वृत्तस्मातति।

नेत्र शरीरे स्वतः श्रोतः प्रामाण्यपरिपूर्वतः॥
सदि किन्नु स्वतता स्वामाण्यपरिपूर्वतः स्वितः॥
पंजारायमोपनेन केपुचितायोथेते।
महुक्त्वेलक्षित मात्रहूक्त्वेलक्षितमाणानु।
प्रस्तुतप्रायसंदेशेन पंजारायमाणानु॥
दोषादुर्य सत्यसम्बन्धवार्ताः नः॥
प्रदन्ति शुल्क वेदेशु श्रवणः जागतः जातः पतिमु॥
महाकारणेऽति सत्यमु विप्रणस्माणदः कथमु॥

६१। ततु च।

सिद्द्वे वस्तुक्ति शब्दानां प्रामाण्येऽनेत्यवादिति॥
तत्परेऽपु प्रयोगेऽप्रुणाश्चारणादिति॥
तद्वितिमञ्चमन्यथमाच्छाणां प्रयोगतः।।
लोकितां प्रतिपादने शास्ति कार्यपरार्थविर।।

तथः पुरस्ते जात इति चचन्त्रवज्ञानन्तरसत्वमितिविविधमयदनः
विकृतावस्थानसमन्तः हृदयपदायति प्रतिपदः हर्षेन तियत्वमम
निवन्धन इति ह्वात्मभावकल्याणः मध्यममुदर्श्यापि तस्मिन्यानेव हर्षः
मणिमाणस्तद्रवभावितया शश्वदेश्या चिरार्थवोधकतामध्यवस्तयति।

तथाप्यतीतानागतालिबियंतिमेव हर्षेदेहुपुष्पात्रमानेषु कस्य चकाद्ये
प्रसिद्धि विचिनितस्योऽसि—

तद्वितिमञ्चसंजातञ्जातकर्मायोऽधरतः।।
तदेहुपुष्पः कृष्णपति निधिव्यत्तास्मातः पुरा॥
कर्त्त्यं जातकृतस्माति प्रतीते तिरुः कारणम्।।
प्रतीते प्रयातियं विसुद्धस्वास्थ्यतिचित।
पुष्पनैवेदे सैवन्तायित्व मुनित्सुत्स्मेक॥

तत्।।

आवापोद्धारेन पदांन शक्तिनिमित्यः।।
उपवधत हृदयेऽविचिनितसिद्धायाधिचिता॥

62. नमु न तद्वितिमञ्चमानेष्य कार्यवक्यामाव, अविनिवाद्यात्।।
न च जातकृतकृतक्षत्यत्वमातितिनियमेन चिरार्थवोधमपुरस्तारी, हृदयेऽ
हि पुढ़ीमानाप्यवाचात्त्बिंद्यमानमनस्तोऽवतारिपुर्विकस्यापि तस्कर्त्तयताव
गतिः॥ कार्यवक्याति: तिं शास्त्रकारणिक ह्वा चेति गामानस्तद्रवः
गामानस्तद्रवतितस्य त्यतावगतिः: शास्त्रकारणिकचेति।

अथ आक्षरसिद्धातुपपेतेः ससिद्धितश्रव्य एव तद्वितियमपुरस्तति
वैतू प्रतामावयस्ते विचित्रितिस्यापि।

यथापि प्रयातिभिषेत्वर्क्यप्रतिपादकथा कहितु।
लिङ्गादिमन्त्यावाचात्रेतुः कस्यवस्तीते॥
यद्य कार्यप्ररत्नामिकल्याक्षमात्मातः, तेनान्यायाभोजकार्यानिदीर्घतासंस्थापितराजणामिव गवामधायानां तत्वद्वायता समाधिशाय, समस्यामानादिपति कार्यनिवित्त्वेष समाेथ्यत हुति चेतु अतं व्यस्तसेन अन्यान्यिताभिवधानेनाति व्यवहारारेपेते।

63. अवद्याध्यात्मानिवित्त्वमन्यितार्थाभिमियाचायता।
कार्यनिवित्ताभिमियार्थप्रत्याशनेन दुर्बंधय पदः॥
अन्यांस्य चेति दर्शन कार्यनिवित्तमेव सचेतं पदामियाप्रमित रिद्धारितु व्यमियापदः, रिद्धारिते हि प्ररिविनित्ताभिलाशायमुखान्यितानमेव स्वार्थ्यमियाग्याति।

अयं केत्त्वनिवित्ताभिवधानमितरत्य कार्यनिवित्ताभिमियानिति चेतु वद्यान्यातीते, ततो च सबैन्यान्यिताभिवधानमेवार्थायताम्॥

64. तस्मात् अन्यानुपायत्वादिनितासंस्थापितस्वयंवार्थान्तः॥
स्वायं पदानां व्यत्यायास्येश्याय सबैवादिमिं॥

यथा प्रवृत्तायुपायतिसंस्थितमन्यितानीयेव शाबद्विक्षत्वात्यापि।

tतस्मात् अन्यानुपायत्वादिनितासंस्थापितस्वयंवार्थान्तः॥
सबैन्यानुपायतिसंस्थितमन्यितानीयेव शाबद्विक्षत्वात्॥

यथान्यानुपायतिसंस्थापितस्वयंवार्थान्तः॥
सबैन्यानुपायतिसंस्थापितस्वयंवार्थान्तः॥

यथास्वयंवार्थान्तः पयसः पत्तादिविनात्।

यथाज्य णकार्यान्यिताभिवधानमितरत्य कार्यनिवित्ताभिमियाचायताम्॥

65. यदि च कार्यनिवित्तमेवार्थ शाबद् हृतिपिनाष्टं कार्य तेष्यं परिविनित्ताभिलाशायमुखान्यितायापि पयसः पत्तादिविनात्॥

नायं सद्वो भावानिक हृति चेतु क च शाबदानां साध्यायमोः॥
तदुस्तर हि साधयेन स्वर्गेणायें विशेष्यते।
स्वर्गेण कामयमानो हि पुरुस्तोषं नियुज्यते॥

न हि स्वर्गेणकिचारितिविशेषणं साध्यत्वात्।
सिद्धस्मेव हि सवेश्य नियोज्यस्य विशेषणम्।
जीवनादि तथेऽति कामनैच विशेषणम्॥

६८. अपि च नियोज्यविदेशोपणतामुञ्जस्य: स्वर्गेण: कीदसं
साध्यत्वम्।

यदि साधनसंवक्ष्यतें नैय तावता।
स्वर्गेण सिद्धता भाव्य: यावधोमूलभवनम्॥
सिद्धिपर्यंतता तथा नियोजकप्रमाणिका।
नियोगस्तत्तमाण्यश्रुत्योन्याधयं शुचम्॥
यदि स्वर्गेण साध्यतेन न नियोगस्य साध्यता।
साध्यद्रव्यं नैकसिसिद्धं वाक्ये सम्बन्धमहिति॥

६९. स्वतंत्रं हि साध्यप्रमेकान्तां निषिद्धि नानुरुणम्।
अनुरुणशैतलाध्ययनं नियोगसिद्धिनान्तीयक्क्वतात् स्वर्गेणिंद्रे:, यद्रह,
'नियोगसिद्धि सर्वे तदुरुणम्' इति, 'केन नैय: ते नियोगसिद्ध्या
फलसिद्धश्रिति च, तस्मादिरोध इति चेत्तस।

स्वर्गसिद्धि चिन्ता किष्ठु नियोग्या न सिद्धिति।
नाधिकाये न चिन्तो न चान्यदिश्यपक्षितं॥

५०. न हि नियाधिकारेषु नियोगताम्बंक्तेः।
न चान्यदिच्छतोपद्यन्तं नियुक्तिरंपर्यः॥
नियोगस्तेषु माहात्म्यातु नित्येष्वित्र नियुक्ते।

नियोगो हि प्रधानत्याःतिगंगमप्रायः स्वर्गाभिषेकाण्तिनित्यात्-
कथ्यते वा अतिच्छन्तसंपि नित्ये कर्मणि निर्पले प्रचर्च्यते॥
किन्न।
स्वर्ग क्रमयमानो हि निमित्यनिमित्यापि ।
न च ते स्वर्गसिद्धवां यागः किल्लेवचिन्यते ॥

७२. तत्साधनत्तथा में केवल गूढ़म इति चेनमतमू ।
यागाद्योऽऽ कि तद्वृद्धिमाणा विचित्रसन्निहःव्यः ॥
	
तत्र च ।
साध्यसाधनसंविन्यप्रतिपादनत्तथा ।
यात्र विध्यस्तावधात्तेष्यः सर्वकम्पणामू ॥

तस्साधस्विद्यव्यः प्रथममिश्रसाधनतासव्यामः, ततोपदातः प्रवृत्ति-
रित्वेव युक्तमू, तत्पूर्वकार्यमिधान एव शुरुया शाकः हतरथ
लाभगीत्विन्यापस्य, अत एव यथावथ ठौकिकशाख्तेभवसत्सिद्धार्थे-
गोचर गुद्दूडः जाहस्ते ॥

७३. ननु न ता: शाद्महिमसुखः आत्मामानिक्यो हि ताः, तथा
हि व्युत्पतत्समवन्वंचितविधिमसिद्धविव्याह्यायेऽपि पदानि क्षिणुद्
व्यमिचारसत्त्वज्ञितसविशेषमतिव्ययः न अत्तमाज्जाध्य निधियायनि
न चातिष्ठितयोऽर्थो भवति भविष्ययात्मो वानस्यासवादात्।

तत्साधारणः वान्यायं शास्त्रां स्वतिष्ठ विचिन्तिस्ते।
प्रवीत्योन्नतसंविन्यधोगायाः पदान्ययमू ॥
न चातिष्ठितसविन्यास्त, शाद्मानसतः प्रयुक्ते ।
तेनेत्रायासवायामस्तघ्नः वानस्यगायः ॥

पस्मन्यास्य अनुमिते तद्वृद्धिशितोऽर्थः न शाद्माकाह्वति अतो
ठौकिकम् वचसो यथानुभवपत्रत्वाय तत्वेय पर्यवस्थानम्याहः।

७४. दद्दसत, न हि लभ्यान्यात् प्रस्थमयमयत् यत्रः क्षिणुद्
क्रियादयोपस्त्वज्ञारमहिदितथ इत्यन्यायः पदात्तथाभास्य विवादसति
योधवात्तुलितां सुभवण्डात्, न हि मच्छमादिहुँदुःशाया हतवहो न दहती-
स्त्र्याकारी तादशादशाहादूता न दुहति, नापि शुभिरजतिधिवर्धने-न्यमिचारिणीमिन्द्रियं हेष्टहवाहादः चुनंदुपल्लिमिति घटादिकमिति नापगमयति, अतो चिन्तितपद्धतावस्थात: होतुस्तस्तस्य शाहोर्धर्मययोधयति। मूल्यां न प्रतीक्षाते।

मूल्यांपरितिषाणादर्जागंधितवोधिते।
कामयवधयं वैदेवत्यजमाने प्रवतते॥
फ्रिमातीर्थं घना चिन्द्रञ्जित्रसुमित्से।
विशिष्टेऽधार्यवोधानमुमतुम्येच्छसि॥

न तावद्रशमाहात्रु घना चिन्द्रञ्जितीयवतः।
व्याहरार्थवहारी या स्वातं वातावर्णोऽगच्छति॥

विशिष्टेऽधार्यवोधानभन्तोऽनुज्ञानन्तु प्रथमसानप्रज्ञवद्विजस्यसमुपरीः
मस्त्र्यवेणानुपाधिमति प्रागेव शामायोऽवज्ञनतयः, न हान्यसादितिविप-विशेषसंस्कर्मः संनिदधः परसपतो व्याहितिष्यन्ते।

न च तथा-अत्युतिताधिकर्षिणविद्वेष: सिध्यति। यादशादशमतिः
वातन्तोयेयभ पदरतना सा तदन्त्यलामापर्यवतीति वेदः, अवगतस्तवदि
प्रागेवाध्यानमान्यतः, न हि वुजावनायोहित प्रवीणः प्रयोगम
व्यवहितिष्यन्ति,

\[74. \text{तस्सार्थस्ति नन्दीतीर्ये फलमित्येवप्राप्तिदु}।\]

\[\text{या सिद्धार्थिया दुहितः सा शाही नानुमार्थिकी।} \]

\[\text{तत्रथ कहृत्यकार्यगोचर एव शार्दुः प्रमाणमिति।} \]

\[\text{स्विधान्तिहिराध्यायाः स्मार्थवय्यबुद्धिमित।} \]

\[\text{उल्लमकेन मार्गेन युक्तायाध्यापिः रक्ततत।} \]

ततरथ यान्येतानि विठङ्करपुरुषमतिपाठकानि बेदान्तव्यासी,
“स एव सर्वान्तविति सर्वेद्व्रलानं सर्वैःप्रतिप्रशारसि। तस्ताथाध्यक्षमिवे
सर्वेऽ” \text{इत्यार्थे, तत्त्वेऽपि तत्र प्रमाण तद्ध्रियांस्वतिग्राविपर्ययश्चनां
हैतुवात्।} \]

\[\text{† व्यान्यायांकुलद्विठामुस्ति पाठकुः न तु किं प्रति मन्यामेण।} \]
75. नम च परिनिधितवस्तुति साधकवाधक्योर्षेच्यतरोपनितानि साध्यात्माकर्षितुतनुवर्षिकार्यवाचायत्वात् तद्विधवर्सस्त्रापास्त्र्यन्वयनत् नामाण्य-प्रक्ष्युतिः, कार्योनुक्रमाणकि तत्सत्यहाते, कार्यमिति मानान्तर्विजमेव समिदाःहृदयिः, \"तथा मानान्तरुपानि वेदोमदलवाच्यूक\" दिः लघुप-गमातुः।

अथ विद्यासिद्धिहृदैवक्षरार्थव्याससंभावितान्तरगतिः तत्त्वतिपादायद्रवः प्रमाणे, हल्त तथ्या निरतितथावश्योध्वर्मस्वायते-संन्वेदान्युपि भगवतिः न मानान्तरसंवेदनगण्यत्य इति सर्वं समाजमन्यात्रामिनीवेदात।

अपि च।

प्रमाणान्तरसपायपरिणार्थिविष्णुपि रेस्युल्ल।
प्रमाणेषु, तद्वृत्तिः न चैत्यवाच्यूक्तिते ।।
तथा संभावनामाणारुपान्तरमणीप्रक्षिप्यात्।

तत्तत्त्वपरिनिधितवासुपायवाच्यूक्तसः तत्त्वतिसंस्कृतविश्वासानि प्रमाणोपस्यन्त्यात्। अति इवभवादस्तम्।

76. भूतवशेषः करणेत्र साधक्यं नालवतेति पद्यः। यत्र शृविशाय तत्परिपूर्वी, पदयुक्तव्रतस्त्रुपौर्षकर्षिः पश्चाख्युपा न पद्यपि यथाख्युपां पदयति। न तस्य कार्यं करन्त्र च विदयते। स्वामाच्यिकी खान-वज्रकिया च इत्यदिकः।

न चासां गुणवादस्त्रां प्रमाणार्थानुरूपः।

अवस्थानमुपायसतयमा गुणवादसामायः।
तथाते चैह सुस्योपयते इति तत्कलपना सुपा॥

77. सन्न्विशाहारी पुष्पार्थमभोज्यकार्णमिति प्रमाणान्तरविरोधः।

कुतः प्रमाणान्तरात्, न तपस्यार्यत्र, न हि प्रवक्षुपरविशीतः-पुष्पामायायभिजक्ष्यकमित्राय मां दासे, योद्धानुपलब्धभावन्तिक्ष्रयः इति
चेष्ट प्रमाणगृहीत्येष्येन शास्त्रेनेवोपलग्ननात्, नायकुलमानात् तद्दीय प्रज्ञानमादिक प्रमाणप्रस्तुतिसूत्रस्य वक्तमिह मन्त्राद्रव्यः चादुर्मैवति।

विश्राभयं सति यथार्थं: क्षयर्गुणरूपानुक्रियते\।

किमात्रेन विश्राभेत्, शास्त्रं चैव यथार्थं यथार्थते\।

शून्यादित्यार्थिनात्त्मक्य प्रत्यक्षगुणवास्थितम्।

विश्राभस्रवेदस्य वाच्यं नामसारिकाविभिन्नायो\।

अथि च तस्मान सतिष्ठत्वूपाजनंसतिष्ठत्वमपाद्यता अर्थवाद्वात्वादुरुक्त

शुचिवाद्वादिवाद्य, न चेष्ट पुनः चिन्तत्वस्य विभासद् यथार्थः।

अथ विध्यत्यावर्म्यावयं पुनः सतिष्ठत्वहानात्।

अभ्यासस्य विधिः तत्र विश्राभेत्यथार्थते।

७८. यथार्थः\।

राजस्त्र न थूल्य प्रमाणान्य प्रत्येकमवर्तमाननिर्भरते।

शास्त्रं न कुपि नायकुलमानात् ग्रन्थियोढचनानम्।

हेतु, तथा

क्षत्रियपुरुषाः विधिसंरक्षणमादृक्तहि पुरुषोऽधृत।

पुरुषस्त्रे जात हेतृतः तथे श्रीमतिः विधिः।

त स तस्मान विध्यवाच्छार, अन्तरमिथाणि विधिः पुण्यजनावयवादेऽदेव

हयोंप्रति।

तथा फा किया पाक हेत्युमान्योर्ध्वचर्यवाहरेष्य प्रयत्नसाधितातिस्थितः

प्रतिविद्वेश्याविद्रोपमादिप्रतिविद्धानावयवाच्छारेऽदेव न विध्यावाच्छारमपेषाते।

इति इति श्रावणां महानद्रवं श्रुतसम्।

श्रावणी दृष्टि भवति मामतति हस्तवित्व श्रुतसं।

अभावार्था ब्रह्मचार्य सार्थं सर्वस्मात् कामानं स सामागं।

इति मादिश्रावणं श्रव्यां तथा पुरुस्ताऽक।

तदेवतुद्वितीयसत्सानसमादिकावित्तसहरसद्वसाधारकारकः

विधिकार्याण्यम्मण्डितार्थी भगवत्व सिद्धथि, विधित्वेव तदनुमभूतस्य

तत्राथौवाच्छायो।
69. नवसु विरिचितनीया हक्किरास्तायमूर्ति-
प्रमितसहजस्वप्वेदान्यनास्त् नामः।
स च हृदरितिः यावधावम्येत सम्यकः
न भातु भवति नावत्प्राच्यां प्रमाणमुः॥

अत्यन्ते न नाहात्र जयविद्वृन्दे विवेदन्ते यादासुदेवं परमात्मा
अविश्वज्ञातकरणमिति।

श्रुयते हि स वैद्वान्ते “प्यात्मा नारायणः परः।”
“सत्यं शास्त्रमंतः च” “तद्विषो परमं पद्मः॥”

“परम प्रकृतिस्थितां यासुदेवस्तथा परः।”

“परः परस्त्राथ इदं भवूः” “यस्याद परं नामस्मातिः विनिश्चितः।”
इत्युक्तवाच्यायुरुः “यतो च ईमानि भूतानि” “सदेव सौङ्गः॥”
इत्यादिवाक्यं च तत्तत्त्व चिन्त्याच्यायुः चिन्त्याच्यायुः।

न चान्यस्मात्याज्ञनस्मिष्टिः च वसंसाद्युः शुद्धः।
यत्तथेते स सर्वेः परमात्मेति संस्ततम्॥

अस्यप्रेय परमात्मानं खङ्गपाण-पशुवहराः नादिमहृत्तिमहिप्रिवचनेन्यः
प्रतिपादामहे, तथा हि।

विष्णू सुप्रसिद्धां सर्वं मिति विद्ि पद्नस्।
खुसलयेव महारिण्यमृत्त्राम्यं चराचरम्॥
पप प्रतिपते वाले वाले विस्थाते युनः।
अवशि, गच्छन्ति विषयमेवाभ विस्थतयुः॥
अवादिनिधयः श्रीमानं भूतिनारायणः प्रसुः।
स थे युज्ञि भूतानि स्थायराणि चराणि च।
स ब्रह्म परं चेति तथा विज्ञायपि पक्षते॥
केशवे भ्रमर्वेदेऽः स ममानितवः परः॥
पुरुः सर्वेश्वेतच्रूपौ व द्वया शुद्धः॥ इति,
तथं जिङ्गसमानानं हेवकमे च वर्षेतोमुखः।
तत्त्वं भास्माद सहायोगी हरिनारायणः प्रसुः॥ इति,
तथा दानघमे।

परमात्मा परः शान्तः पञ्चनाभः परायणः।
इति वेदांश्च तु किं न वैतिषु पुराणः॥
तत्त्वादात्मन्यं सर्वे लोकानां स्थितित्वेव॥
आत्माशास्मसुप्रस्थं देवाश्च स्थानिनो मताः॥
यद्यि विषुरदातिनो नास्तकं विचाते शुभमु।
इति दृश्यं धच्छं तथा भारतमात्स्ययोऽ॥
तत्र यः परमात्मा हि स जित्यो निर्गुणंखुमः॥
स वै नारायणं क्रेयः सर्योत्तम पुरुषो हि सः॥ इति,

tथा वाराहि॥

यस्य देवस्य चारितं व्रतं समभवसुचि।

कोपन्यस्तम्बाध्येष्ठिनो मुत्वा नारायणं प्रभुम्॥ इति,

नारायणात्मयो देवो न भूतो न भविष्यति।

पत्त्रहस्यं बेदानां पुराणानां च सत्त्वं॥ इति।

तथा वेदे॥

स एकः पुरुषः श्रेष्ठः परमात्मा जनार्दनः॥

यस्मादू प्रथा ततो रामः तत्रत्रेवागिनें जगत्॥

तथा।

पिण्यसत्साकादुर्रूते गमगचित्र च स्वथितम्॥

स्थितिस्वत्त्वमार्गेः साविति पारार्तं वचः॥

तथा मातवे।

नारायणः परोद्वयकारदुष्यम्यक्तरसेपमैः॥

अग्निस्वात्त्वनिनी सोकाः सत्त्वात्र च मैदनी।

तस्मात्तत्त्वशुरसुतस्मृतातिहासपुराणपरः जोचनया अक्षुलजगत्कारणः

परमात्मा चामुदेव इति मद्ग्रीयते।

२०। न चैते परमात्मतं दृढः श्रवणे भाद्रिनिर्वंतम्॥

मर्दुतोपितिप्रतिखेरसुतस्थितायनसमः॥
तथा कैसे।

न हिंदुपुत्रैं काचित्तु गतिरत्या विद्वीयते।
इत्यादि तत्तवं बैद्धा गायत्रे साह संज्ञायः॥ इति,
तथा बायवीये।

सहच्छाद: परम: प्रभावति।
अर्ज्यपथे यः पुरूषो निरुच्यते॥ इति,
तथा भविष्यति।

वेदविद्यान्तमर्गेणु विन्युरेव परः स्मृतः।
विन्युरेव नरके हो महिषः पुरुषोत्तमः॥
इति; कर्म चैत्युपन्निषेणै निपुणतमुपपादित्वमिति केह
प्रकृत्यते।

तत्थः।

श्रुतिसूची मात्रेन व्याख्यैदेवेन भाषितम।
तन्न भविष्यति वर्कु नं कथा निःस्वर्तेन॥

82. न हि सहजसंवेदनस्वरूपस्कृतस्तंबरकाधानदिधिं। स्यांप्रवाहिदत्
चैत्यपीयस्वरूपमेकदृश्यमिर्तं, न चतुराभ्यन्तरमहाभिः इति तदि
दुःखपञ्ज एव निश्चित्य मोक्षाय गृहस्यभवः प्रमणज्ञ:। शाक्तिकारवतिनि
परामर्शिश्वतृतिरितिकालिकिष्यं येकं दृश्यमार्थकथानाय
योधिनिः प्रकारसंहिताः। निरमि�śलितिष्ठानिद्धीते॥

83. न च तथ्रान्तरे प्रेय न्यायः प्रसरमहृति।
पत्तस्तत्तत्त्तित्वपूर्णा विषाणाथि संभवि॥
प्रत्यक्षांगमहामात्राः न हि मूलत्यसंभवः।
तथ्रान्तरे पु: शाल्य तु मूले तैरेय नेपते॥

† स्नाशिष्यनामः भागवानमहामर्गतिपद्यानुपारएक्षुरायांयापरमाणुस्वरूपः प्रमाणवेयः ग्रंथः।।
अन्यष्ट वेदसिद्धान्तविद्यादार्थाभिधानतः।
प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिमूलवित्तक्तयानं तेषु वाध्यते॥
यथा महेश्वरे तथेऽविष्णुं यदुविष्णुं॥
चतुर्विधा हि तत्सिद्धचर्मोपलोकशारिणः॥
यथा कपालिका। कालसुक्तं पाणिपतास्तथा॥
शैवास्त्रव च कपालं मन्तवंेयं प्रचक्षते॥
मुद्रिकाप्रकटविवाहानां पुनस्तथैव धारणात्॥
अपयर्जनेवाः सिद्धं ग्रहागमाद्विति॥

तथातः॥

मुद्रिकाप्रकटतच्छं परसुद्राविवाहानां॥
महासनस्याचामां ध्यात्त्वा निर्यागमूळः॥

तथा।

रूपां यत्कस्मिन् षुण्डवद्ध रसिकायमित।
भस्म यशोपवीतच्छ सुद्रापुरुष प्रचक्षते॥
कपालमेव यद्वात्ममुखसुद्रुः प्रकीर्तिते।
आभिमुद्रितदेहस्तु न यूँ वह लीलाते॥

न च चेदसामुद्रिकाप्रकटपरिवर्तने-तदार्ज-विनिःसिपरमासनस्यविद्वेश्याम्याप्रपायसाधनवं शुचयो सृप्यन्ति, ता दैविकामुनि-मुक्तविवेणया।
विलोकयुवाच्छं अविलक्करणविद्यामुद्राविवाहावनकAMIL नाशाचर्यात्।
तमेव विदित्वा अविन्यामेति, नान्यं पन्यां अयनाये विद्यते ह्याभावं, एवं कालसुखं अर्थं समस्तवायुक्तिपरिवक्ष्यायं भूत्वा भभानात्मकतरण-शास्त्रभासाधान तत्पत्राः-सुगुणधारणं वृद्धाभ्यामस्थापन-तत्तत्वेऽवेदतत्वाध्वानं।
रेव विद्यासाराविलिसिद्धशिरोभाषणं श्रृतिविप्रत्यप्रतिवेदिः॥

84. शद्यं पाणिपतात्वैवेक्षणं विद्याविद्वेधसमसंयुगं किष्टःस्म-हिते च तद्रम शृतिविप्रत्यप्रतिवेदिः॥

† शद्यानारायण सिद्धामुर्यम्।
तैःया पाशुपतमक्षिया।

जीवाः पदाय उचयन्ते तेपामधिपतिदिशाः।
स तेपासुपकाराय पञ्चाध्यायीयस्मीचकल्पपतु॥
तत्र पञ्च पद्धार्यस्तु व्याख्याताः कारणाद्यः।
कारण कार्य विचित्रयोगों दुःखात्ता इति,
उपादानं निमित्तत व्याख्याते कारणं द्रिष्या।
निमित्तकारणं बद्धस्तत्तका कारणान्तरम्॥

भावानिविक्षिप्तः श्रुतं सुहृद्यवशस्थलप्रदैः
वैदिकपुन्मृतम्भुवदेशकाः तस्मात् निद्धीप्रथमेव
पैदोपि ज्ञानवृत्त्वेति द्रव्यमोदलपूर्वेप
यथा ध्रुवः पद्धार्यं इति भ्रमण्यात् इति ते
दुःखात्ता हि मतोपपरं इति संकीर्तिताः॥

आयुर्वीण। हुः दुःखात्ता विश्रुतं बद्धस्तत्तका
कारणान्तरम् भावानिविक्षिप्तः आयुर्वीणः
वैदिकपूर्वमेव पैदोपितमोद्वृत्त्वेति
यथा ध्रुवः पद्धार्यं इति भ्रमण्यात् इति

to

वातावरणस्यां वैदिकायैः पद्धार्यायणार्थाविद्यावतिः।
कल्पन्त्याधमाध्यमाति ततोपपी अवतिरंगावताः॥

यदाहुः।

दीप्चितावेशमात्रेय ग्राम्माणो भवति ध्रुवात्।
कार्यस्य सत्यस्याय विशिष्टविद्यान्तरम्॥

८६। न च वाच्यम् अप्रामाण्यसृतिसिद्धां अभ्यस्तर्थाति कस्या
तत्वर्थे यद्य प्रथमयति। न च समानानामनिमीतसर्वर्थनिवन्धनमि
गुम्मू मतिप्रस्थापितायतः—यत:—
ब्रह्मप्रामाण्यम्

नामित्वश्रवंत्रान्तिनित्वाद्रुपदयते।
वैद्वाध्याय पाण्यय तांतातिमस्ययते॥

प्रमादोषिपि च नात्यन्तं चदादिद्व न समयी।

तत्र गद्गद्यो मोहशाण्यं गणेवत्यायवगतेभदूः
व्यामोहितमेव हृदयशापिणयननुपपपतः
हृति नावदयं प्रमादु पवाभियितवच्, तथा
च च चारहेः।

तं हि कद्दोः महायाहो! मोहशाप्यः कारय।

शुध्याधीकरुणात्मिनि विद्विद्यांतिवानि च॥

दुर्मित्वायायमारतं फर्तं शीघ्रं प्रदुर्दशय।

दुर्मित्वाय जनं तथं मोहयात्र महेष्ठर!॥ हृति।

तथा तत्सारं भगवान् कद्दोः प्रस्तुताद्वायायायमानं
स्यस्यैव वैद्वाध्यायं च च च च च च च च
वैद्मार्गियं भावनाधिकारित्वं तद्यमोहित्वमयोजनतां
च दर्शयति।

वे वैद्मार्गियं पियुऽक्कस्तोपं मोहायथमेव।

नवसिंहान्ततेगणं या सारं प्रदत्तिः श्रयं॥

तस्यादेशर्यं काजातू मध्यस्विके मात्रमा।

शास्त्रविवाहितो लोको न वेदान्तं वहु मन्यते।

तथा पापुपतादीनि प्रवर्तने को गुणे॥

तथा च भगवतपरिवर्तन्यतितिरेिकेिं स्कप्रधानपूज्यं पापुपतादं दशम्
हिद्राद्वैद्याणं दर्शयति।

तवेद्वादानं कर्मकांसं मासुदिश्योपलेवद्यते।

तत्सारं पापुपतं नाम कनिष्ठं मोहयं नुण्मेव॥

मां विपुनुयतितिरेिकेिं पूजयति नराधमां।

इत्यात्तिपादमाणिनि न विध्यतेऽणिैसङिकवात्॥

व्यक्तः वैद्वाध्यायमेवत्रूपस्यायामानामेव।

तथा तत्सारं।

श्रदायां ताजःस्थमाः स्कपादमेष्टिवर्धारिणः।

भविष्यथ नर्मीवाहा वैद्मार्गियं पन्हस्त्रां॥
कलो तदुपिणिस्यवें जटालमुद्धारिषः।
खच्छन्दमतोपत्वत्वस्मिथ्यालिङ्गधरास्तः।
भद्रापापिनिन्देण्या खट्टका जटाधरः॥, इति,
भित्तिद्वैतज्ञवैवाकामेव।
श्रद्धास्य केघुर्य इतस्ते जटा चेका च मस्तके।
कपार्य भस्मना खानम्य इत्यादि।
तथा नैतिपापादित्यपुराणपतिष्ठि भरावत्वाणो नामे वेदैवार्यं कथयति।
अन्ये भस्मज्ञोपेता यथोका गौतमादु पुरा।
शापासन्त्याजितावै गौे देवे नारायणं तथा। इति।
किथैऽवासुदेववस्य गंद्रा निन्दा वितत्वते।
ते च पापित्तो हृया यथा दैके समीरितम्॥
ते तु सामान्यमाणवेन मन्तव्यं पुष्पोत्तमम्।
ते ते पापित्नो हृया वेदमार्गप्रवेण्यताः॥ इति,
तत्त्व।

eत एव च ते येवं वाज्ञानेणापि लार्चनम्।
पापित्नो विक्षमवाणात्याविद्वसुतिमूर्तिम॥
या वेदावहा इत्येवतुपि कोकशागोवर्म।
तसां वेदमूहत्वः नापि ब्रह्ममूलता॥
तन्त्रान्तराणां सुकेति किर्त्यते कारणान्तरम्।

84. नन्तु मूलान्तपेत्र यथि ब्यासतु दृष्ट्युम।
क्षत्रृभ्रमाणं विशारं भन्तं नन्तु दर्शने।
सत्यं तस्य विशालभ्रमणमपनीयते।
वाध्यक्षरणिकोपावम् तत्परं द्रवितं सुतुं।
पर्यं श्रुतिभिः दस्य सुतुमूलान्तस्य यथू।
पञ्चार्थिण साधारं तत्त्वानान्तत्परिति नम।
तिथिपत्यक्ष्योष्ट्रं यतोमूलतविनिधयं।
88. 

ननु च शून्याशुके वेदाद्रिपार्यांसिद्धितः।
तत्त्वसोऽनुसारः शर्मेन भेदे चूजूहुः।
ननैव न कर्मविषयं शुचिः श्रृव्यते दत्तः।।
तस्यायनिधिं सर्वं भागाभिमाणिद्वादतित्रिभु॥

89. 

ननु वेदमूलते पदं चेलेततः पञ्चाश्रयं संयतः।
किं तद्देव तद्यद्वेशस्तरं शर्मेन तत्वस्तरं
स्मरणयतनं भूतवेद्वाद्यस्तरं। ननैव चतुर्वत्ते
पाञ्जुष्ठित्रित्वम्।
चार्चितसर्पणस्य यथोजनवत्तयात्।
तस्य विफलवत् वदनावत्तियेऽयमिति
दुः, न हि यतः प्रामणर्य तदेव चिस्मृतं युक्तं।

अथ विसर्गोपपचे प्रतिनिधित्वायुगेत्वादेवार्थुः।
अधीयते तद् चेले येन प्रामणयत्वा परिश्रमिति
स तत्त्वस्तरात्येव क्षेत्रः प्रमाणे।
मिस्त्रामेतमालेनशात्योष्टुः स्यकपिसिद्धे
रेव दुः॥

अथ विधमानशास्त्रायुः।
पदं स्त्रितम्।
तद् तत्त्वस्तरायुष्येषोपि
तत्पर्वश्चेद्रमेरुवं इति ग्रन्थप्रणयनम्प्रयासवैयथ्यम्।

मयोद्यत्ते स खलु मगवान्। अमोगस९जस्वदेनसाश्रयायां
भ्रह्मे च वेदमनिधित्वत्र अविभिव्यवहितवित्यादिन्वादनात्येव कालाभाष्य एव
ब्रह्मार्थिस्मातिरितिमृणमिविधिविधीयं यथवार्थम्यग्नात्मके
साधारणायायाम्। दिव्याभिप्रस्थयो भक्तनाभिषेको तदुक्तमयाः
उद्धृतोपयेन तद्ये संक्षिप्यो
पद्वङ्गेऽस्यति न किंचिदेवुपर्यायम्।

यथाज्जुः।

बेदानायम् यथासारं सत्त्वं मगवान् हुरिः।
मकानुक्तमया विद्यानन सिद्धेऽस्य यथायथम्॥

इति, पति च मन्त्राधिकमस्तानसाधारणस्यायोऽविभिव्यवहितवित्यादिन्वादनायाम्।
पर्युत्योगस्त्रवाया
दीशात्तपरिक्षेत्रममन्यतप्रतिप्रियाया इति नेभ प्रद्धायते।

90. ननु चेले वेदमूलायथं पञ्चाश्रयस्तरानामवृत्तं वेदविद्याना
दृष्टभोजः। उत्तरं हि चतुर्युपर्यमत्तमनस्तः शास्त्रित्य हृदे शास्त्रः
मधुयायाम्। इति, अनन्यात्त्वचन्वणकार्यं शुद्धुः
हुः न हि निन्दा
निन्द्य निन्द्यतुः प्रवर्तते। अपि तु निन्द्यतादितरत्यांसत्सिद्धम्। यथेतरस्य-प्राणक्षान्ते प्राणतः मातरायुः से धार्मिक इत्यविद्विकाञ्चनिन्द्य उदितहोम-प्रदीशस्येषति गम्यते यथा मानवे।

चाम्बेदे देवदैवस्यो युद्धायस्य मानुषः।
साम्बेदस्तु मन्ये स्वाद तसातस्यांन्तिविचारते।

इति साम्बेदनन्दन्त्र हरिवेदेभदशायर्ह, यथा वा भारते।
चतवार पक्तो वेदः भारतो चेतामक्षः।
समागमेतस्तु ऋषिप्रभुस्तुत्तप्रकोपितं पुष्ट।
महीत्वे च गुरुव्ये च भ्रमणं यतोश्रुत्रिकम्।
महाचाय गुरुवाय महाभारतमुच्यते।

इति महाभारतप्रदानसायंति प्रदाने न बेदनिन्दिते। परं पञ्चायतन्त्रां प्रतापेरे गम्यते।

अयाधुनित्तीमादेशन्यम् स्तुतितर्शनात।
अत्यत्वर्त्य निन्द्रयास्तायांर्पि भविष्यति।
वेदमाधि वहुसां प्रदर्श्यते।
न हि तेष्यं परं चिकिष्टम वाचारमेव कमलासन।
वेदानौविद्येववेदां सत्याचारायणपादकेषां। इत्यादिः।

९१। अपि च चतुर्दश वेदेशु इति नायमध्यं: वेदेशु पुरुषार्थो नास्तीति किन्तु वस्ते तु पुरुषार्थस्तमयभासमु इति।

नजु पुरुषार्थ वेदेशु लम्बाय इत्यविद्यये न वेदेशु पुरुषार्थमतिम, मेवेन व्याचार्यामावादू। न हि वेदेश्वेवाय पुरुषार्थो न भास्ये अतो वेदेशु यं पुरुषार्थस्तमयभासमाय: तद्विषिलपी पञ्चायतनास्तस्तम् चत्त्वादित्तयामिनिति पञ्चायत-चत्त्वारनुरैकार्यपेत्र प्रत्यायते।

९२। वद्यानेश्वकत्वमण्यान्यायोंदिस्वस्थावनां भगवद्याचारानाश्वतत्वो दीयाश्वार्ध्यास्तमस्तायाविबधानादेवनिदित्वमति तद्युक्तं न छुपतनावनार्धे-
संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योतिषोप्राचार्यस्मारादि संस्करणां ज्योति
भीष्मप्रवेण्यपि ।

ब्राह्मणेण: द्रारजीवेणेये: शूद्रेश्व कुतुलक्षणे:।
अर्यनीययश सेव्यग्न पुजनीययश माधवं।।
सात्यं विद्विमाश्यं योऽतस्संकर्पणेन यं।।
ह्यापरस्य गुणस्तान्ते आदी कलियुगस्य च।। हृति।।

तथा शान्तिप्रवेण्यपि ।

अद्वयं दैष्यो दृश्यो दृश्येन्द्र मथरिरुत्स सर्द्धपलतः।
दृश्यित्य स्रोते विद्वाश्या प्रसीदेनाया दृष्टिः।।
इतस्तते दृश्ययोग्ये भीमे राजन्येर्भव च।।
श्रावः सबं वैद्धं हेमान्ते शुद्धसेव च।।
हितं च वर्षाकाले नु पञ्चरात्रविचारानात्।।

तथा।

वेदेश्तुर्भाष्यमेय समतु भगवान महामिति।
एवामसदिवयोंनदीयङ्गसादसामीर्यसिति।।
वेदान्तस्वस्वस्मात्मायं परं गतम।।
पञ्चरात्रं नीराकुलकथें कथे दैवपायः ख्याम॥

९५. कथं तदौं दृष्टं सुजमं उत्तरायंभवतु हृति। किं वाक्यं सुचनं
हेदयम्। हेदम्यं हुस्तं, भागवतशास्त्रेऽजीवोत्तप्तेऽपि: प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वाचं
तस्यायं श्रुक्तियायविरोपितसमवधारसमीचीप्रार्धणिष्ठा शास्त्रामिति। यतेन
स्वार्थःस्वर्गः पञ्चप्रेमायंनिराभरणंपरं सूं, न हि पञ्चप्रेमायास्वर्गेन
जीवोत्त्सविश्वेत्त्वेनेत्त्रयुगमुऩयते।

मनस्तीति चचने वाचः: धर नाध्यं: परा प्रस्तवं: पञ्चप्रेमायं ततस्संकर्पणो नाम
तीव्रो जायते सच्चािर्मात् प्रभुसंस्यं मणे जायते ततोऽसिद्धानां
आहानारो जायते। हृति,

| समं-भाज्याः प्रवेण्यस्मितो विद्विमाश्याः पञ्चप्रेमायं शान्तिप्रवेण्यस्मि।
| सममूतमण्याः महायो श्रमान्नतिर्मिश्व भाज्याः। |
भागमभागाम्यम्

ञः अपि नु व्यूहस्तेन व्यक्तिर्देवस्य कीर्तिते।
तत सङ्क्यवद्धार्ये जीव-शान्तः प्रभुन्यते॥
चण्डीगामणामुदिलोये पूज्यनेत्रमलिखिते॥

यथा।

चर्चित्वस्मिन्द्विचारे पूजनीयाः यथाकर्मम्। इति, अपि च जीव- मनोहराभाष्यादि न तत्मामर्चना अपि हु तत्सद्विहितानामितात्विद्विचारं- विग्रहद्वपुरुषाभिधाना इति,

विचित्रचिद्वस्वपन्न्रजेन्मेवति व्यपदिद्यते।

tोयेन जीवनित्येत्तवजयुमुद्भिः यथा वचः॥

अपि च जीवोपल्पिरप्रदायिनाचनाः श्रुतिस्वतित्लोकवादाः चच- चर्वयाप्रयमस्तु स्थातु तद्भवेदजस्ते भास्कद्वाध्माविद्विचाराय स्वयंस्वतेन इत्तत्त्वादीः॥

किंचि नामा श्रुतेन्द्रियत्वार्थ तथायः इत्यतः ब्रह्मणो जीवोपल्पि।
श्रुतिस्वतित्लिन्यायविरोधेन निरस्ता सती न पुनस्यन्यासं प्रयोजयतीति
अननिन्दनी मध्यः धृतरण्यमञ्चोऽसः।

९६। पर्याते न च कत्वूः करणम् इति घृण्यं व्यस्यात्, न हान फर्तूः सद्यर्धाियं करणस्य मनस्य उत्पत्तिवदयते, उक्ते हि विचित्वम- पुर्वपवचनाः एते शास्त्राः इति,

किंचिता वा कतः करणमोलिवते देवद्रचादि- कतः परम्प्रस्वति- करणोपचर्चार्दशं नानाविदित चेता, इति हस्तस्वहिं अपगतस्यिक्यकरणक्यव- स्वमदििमविविद्राणम्। प्राणमन्रःश्रुतिस्विनिक्यकरणोपचर्चामुयुगम्। इति- स्वाजाते आयो मन: सयिन्दिषेयो च इति,

अथ श्रुतिमानधित्यवाचनांधिपाप्येते।
पञ्चरागमसिद्धांतादीः किंचित्युप्येपि भोः॥

† सयानं, ननकल्केये जीवजामाधीने॥
‡ चर्चवान्धिक्रेणिमयः।
न हि स्मृतिसन्दर्भस्य परिवर्तनगोरस्तितिशोभन।
निर्देशियांजन्मत्वातु ग्रामाण्य हि समं द्रयोः॥

९५. यतु तत्त्वां यद्य कि समानेश्यर्यांगि।
स्वतंत्रा किमुक्तकस्य स्वेद्यामात्यतुतुदुष्यी॥

इति चिकित्स।

समानेश्यर्यांगिते तुल्यत्वाप्रेयो कार्यता।
एकस्य मूलं मेधेतेतु किं मेदेन प्रयोजनम्॥

इति दुपपत्तिति व्याप्त्यां विचारादिभवे वा सदापतिपेघ इति।
तद्युक्तम् असम्भावनीयतवादिकल्पस्य, न हि केन्द्रियभर
वादिनां अनेकेऽवर्ते जगद्युक्तात्म विद्यौतद्व वात्सरणिके। वारसौदेप
पवेकः परा प्रक्षतिरिति कषुहः, किन्तु तथा च एवं मगचान्, लीलाविरेत्रति
चतुर्भोज्यं लक्षमणपि मजस्यपदक्तलति।

न प्रेमदंसूपपञ्च नहर्षतावत्राप्रादिभवामुदवधुपरस्, यथैव
हि भगवत् वस्लीलाविरेत्रतमगल्पवम् हर्ष-विद्या-विद्याधिकस्य
अच्छरहितमहिमजीवीकपयोजनस्य राम-दास्यं भर्तर-शास्त्रावदायण्डपादा
विश्राम न विरोहस्यं एवं सदापतिमवाहि सिद्धति।

९६। पत्त्यां—विमितिपरेताः इति शुचों वेदेतु हि उत्तितिप्रिति
पेभास्त् तच्छानां परस्परविमितिपरेताः अथामामिति—तथा उत्तितिप्रिति
पेभास्तु शानिष्य प्राथुक्, परस्परविमितिपेभास्तु प्रथापुणमामामाम्य
विद्येपादरियसंपदानितिचतुन्यकीनां तच्छानां नास्तियेन। न्यायानुमहर
रहतानां तु चतर्सा न तितिपि परिविबधायक्तम्, यथासह, “न्याय-
संपदाधिवाचित न्यायानुक्षेपवोधकम्” इति। तस्मात्तव्यकरणं हैं
महोपनिषधमु ह्यादिहिच्छन्येद्वेग्यो विशेषेनाभिसत्ततस्मामाम्येव चष
रामङ्कोपद्याधिकारान्नीतिपितपणाध्यायों तविश्वारंपरतपत्तप
एम्ब व्यास्यामायो व्यास्यालयानिवायायाति व्यास्चति त्योरं महन्येन।


101. कितना सम्पन्नता द्वितीयचार्यचतुर्वेदीपि न संस्कृतिप्रसादमार्गमाधिकारणकारः सामान्यप्रतिक्षेपत्वम्।

102. भूमिकानुसारमाणी यथा तद्दर्शनीतिप्रमित। वा-वाच्याल्पक विपरीतप्रवृत्त।

103. कल्पन: कियम: समौ ।

104. स्वाध्यायनमाणीणेवयः। यथा हि स्वूपिण इन्द्रियमार्गस्य समपात हराते

परिवहन परिकर्ते।
यदि हि-विद्यानादय एते न मवेयुः स्यादृष्टिमितिपितः।

विद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादिः श्रेष्ठ तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति।

| 11 | भादार्थगृहेऽ-उपाधिस्वये उपयुक्तसे सर्वसाधार्यस्मिन्तादि सर्वज्ञसिद्धां वर्ष, भव

व्याख्या-बहुविधीयेन निरूपृष्टी सर्वास्ताः केवला बुद्धिपन्न विद्यार्थीहैं। शास्त्रीयेव विद्यार्थीहैं। एवं भ्रमणस्मिन्तादि केवला विद्यार्थीहैं। तथा तस्मादुपास्ते सर्वास्ताः केवला विद्यार्थीहैं।

यथा बिद्यानं चारिद्रेतेऽपितः पाठः । तत्तथ बिद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादिः इति

तस्मादुपास्ते-विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। इति

समाहक्षुः। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं।

एवं विद्यार्थीहैं। उपाधिस्वये विद्यार्थीहैं। द्वितीयेति: पाठः । इति

श्रेष्ठायेव तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति। इति ।

हि-विद्यानादय एते न मवेयुः स्यादृष्टिमितिपितः।

विद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादि। श्रेष्ठ तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति।

यथा बिद्यानं चारिद्रेतेऽपितः पाठः । तत्तथ बिद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादिः इति

तस्मादुपास्ते-विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। इति

समाहक्षुः। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं।

एवं विद्यार्थीहैं। उपाधिस्वये विद्यार्थीहैं। द्वितीयेति: पाठः । इति

श्रेष्ठायेव तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति। इति ।

हि-विद्यानादय एते न मवेयुः स्यादृष्टिमितिपितः।

विद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादि। श्रेष्ठ तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति।

यथा बिद्यानं चारिद्रेतेऽपितः पाठः । तत्तथ बिद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादिः इति

तस्मादुपास्ते-विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। इति

समाहक्षुः। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं।

एवं विद्यार्थीहैं। उपाधिस्वये विद्यार्थीहैं। द्वितीयेति: पाठः । इति

श्रेष्ठायेव तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति। इति ।

हि-विद्यानादय एते न मवेयुः स्यादृष्टिमितिपितः।

विद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादि। श्रेष्ठ तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति।

यथा बिद्यानं चारिद्रेतेऽपितः पाठः । तत्तथ बिद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादिः इति

तस्मादुपास्ते-विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। इति

समाहक्षुः। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं।

एवं विद्यार्थीहैं। उपाधिस्वये विद्यार्थीहैं। द्वितीयेति: पाठः । इति

श्रेष्ठायेव तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति। इति ।

हि-विद्यानादय एते न मवेयुः स्यादृष्टिमितिपितः।

विद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादि। श्रेष्ठ तद्वर्षे व्यहायवे उत्तमेरभ्रति।

यथा बिद्यानं चारिद्रेतेऽपितः पाठः । तत्तथ बिद्यानं चारिद्रेति विद्यानादिः इति

तस्मादुपास्ते-विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। इति

समाहक्षुः। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्याचारिद्रेते विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं। विद्यार्थीहैं।

एवं विद्यार्थीहैं। उपाधिस्वये विद्यार्थीहैं। द्वितीयेति: पाठः । इति
पत्रदुर्लं भवति एक्षरेष्व प्राप्तिन्यो भासुदेवस्यापरिणिच्छन्दकेःं
व्यासदेवसारामात्र स्वस्यर्करणभाषमायोगाचित्रितः।

पत्रु न सप्तसतारामात्र उपयोग्य प्राप्त एवं उत्तरातिस्तुतिरति तद्रिपि
तस्य विमानाक्षरित्वेन परिशिष्टम्।

१०२। अथ च, न च फलं: करणम् हिन्ति रिसुक्तं भवति किष्यस्यां
किमा स्वयं यथकरणं, ततू: तरिमायाक्षरिन्यान्वितेः, उन यदूः यथापि करणं
ततूः गुजारितस्य फर्त्तत्स्य गुत्तिः ततः⏳

तत्रादयः कत्रये सिद्धासंवतीय अनुमालस्य विमलितम्येवः।
न ग्राम भूमिश्रविक्षुधारणान्तर्गतं मनं भोगयाद्वः करणं कर्मचातोः
नापि ग्योत्तस्य दृष्ट्यत्वात्।

अपरेक्षितः कत्रये प्रत्यक्षां भिमलितम्येवः उदसकादारणाया
करणमुद्दानां
मनि घटारिनाः कत्रुः कुन्तलान्देश्वरः गिर्द्वर्त्तात्, तद्रिपः
विमलिते प्रेमिती।

१०३। यद्य सुमद्ध्यस्यास्त्र व्यास्त्यानात्तसुचित्यते।
पिष्टानांदेः: प्रभात्यादितोमोमात् युन्त्यते।
प्रकाशतन्मध्यनात्वनिष्पदेतेऽविनिः
रत्नमादिते विमुखितवचात्।
निरस्त्रार्धगृहादिते विद्यालब्धादिद्व।
प्रत्यक्षायतर्दायात्निसिद्धान्तास्यप्रथुः।
आदिदाक्षेत्र तत्रानात्तसोक्तव्य विकारितम्।

† विमलितेनासोक्तव्य इत्य प्रेमित।

इन न द्व नायमार्यापरितियेव: सौदितमावपारास्मायरकंरस्मादयः
सत्यं
वस्तिमेव सत्त्वात्, जयेच अविचारानिति पूर्वद्वितिति चेष्टा भएतः
सत्यं मनोकेषा नामि
मन वप्राहीयच एव कामविदेया राजवाधिका भाषणयुत्त।
तथा हि।

पञ्चवाक्षातु कुंदो लद्रा शहस्या बुद्ध्या समस्ते जगतुः
पुष्यामिबिधिष्टातु दिरति ध्यानेकसंतर्पितः।

नित्यावाससमस्तकास इति यं प्राहुर्यस्यार्गः
तस्मिन् विद्यमानसमस्तमुक्ता दोषा भवेयुः कथम्।

१०४. उत्पत्तसमब्वो यस्य पूर्वस्कड़ायोदितः।
संबिकायादिमूर्तिनां तत्र प्रतिविधियेते॥

विद्रिविपेधातु इति पञ्चरागसर्णानुसिद्धमगच्चत्वस्वत्वन्तीर्थिपिपेते।
वन्दुर्ममित्राद्वितीर्थिपिपेते।

१०५. यद्य सूक्ष्मां न्यायमर्दन्नरत्वाय पञ्चरागः योरसल्लगमिश्रितोरं फः तत्वात् चिन्तनम् तथा हि।

तत् वेदविधिद्वे कित्वा मन्त्यादिविचक्यत।
अपमाणमिभिर्शास्त्रं प्रमाणं वेदि संस्कर्ये॥
अपमाणं विद्यायम्यमित्युपत्यसम्भवात्।
असमस्मच्छा सापेक्षनिर्पेशान्ते।

पञ्चविधि सापेक्षो पञ्चरागसर्णो न मूलप्रमाणोपस्यानसंकेतेन स्वार्थं प्रमाणयुक्तमते तात्यतिर्पेशापौरंप्रयायमेनुसर्या। प्रत्येकः तद्यथा
स्मान्यत्व परिच्छेदादिश्रियते। प्रतिवेदः तदर्थस्मान्यत्वः।
तात्यथं पञ्चरागस्य मूलादित्यपोथंषौम्।
पञ्चश्चार्शास्त्रशास्त्रेण यावन्मूलेन न दृढः॥

१०६. नन्दु कर्यं वेदा वा निरपेक्षा पावता तेपामित समवदावः
सापेक्षमेव प्रमाणं तत्साधनवात्। यथैव दि पञ्चरागस्यं
वन्दुमयमस्यापेक्षा। इते वेदा अपरित् तत्रोच्चते “न च कर्मुः करणा”

ि विद्यमानसैव।
ि यावन्मूलेन स्थमत इति तदर्थस्मान्यत्वः।
न कर्नुषुध्बुवर्चस्य करणं चेदः। किर्त्तित्वा करणं, कर्मणि अयुर। अपौषेयं चेदः इति यावत्।

१०७. विज्ञानादिभावे वा तद्रतिपेधः, न चैतन्यति पश्चापमरशक्तिमथर्ममाणांमितिम। तिलकमि। तद्रतिपेधः प्रमित्युत्प्रेक्षितिपेधः, विर्द्धार्थमपि विकल्पने प्रमाणीनिष्ठवः। सत्साहवत्त्रमि किक्लसमकन्वन्दृणं सांवधारिकवेनादिवैहयात् अत्रायत्तकामात्ररुह साम्भव्याज्ञानीविविशषियवर्त्त प्रावाज, भागवतरु्तु स्वामावितिनिरीक्षणवर्यम्। तद्रतिपेधमित्युत्प्रेक्षितिविषयमत्तु साह, भागवतस्वर्य विज्ञानादिभावेः। तस्मात्तृत्वमाणान्तिनिनिष्ठवात् शास्त्रविषयषाशिसत्ता शास्त्रमाणां शास्त्रित्वमित्युत्प्रेक्षितिविषयमत्तु साह, भागवतस्वर्य विज्ञानादिभावेः। तस्मात्तृत्वमाणां शास्त्रविषयषाशिसत्ता शास्त्रमाणां शास्त्रित्वमित्युत्प्रेक्षितिविषयमत्तु साह, भागवतस्वर्य विज्ञानादिभावेः। तस्मात्तृत्वमाणां शास्त्रविषयषाशिसत्ता शास्त्रमाणां शास्त्रित्वमित्युत्प्रेक्षितिविषयमत्तु साह, भागवतस्वर्य विज्ञानादिभावेः।

१०८. नमू रथवृत्तिविशेषकर्मारथस्य प्रमाणाभुज्युपानम्। तत्रात्मारखे दिशुत्तथा शह विकल्पः प्रमाणित। विकल्पः अप्यरुपपुष्टः, यथा चकचन्द्रवात्तिपत्यागकारणामाणासहस्त्रभवनुपायः, यथा बौधिकिर्म्येत प्रथेवर्तेवत इति, न हि तनय्त्रऔपचारिका शास्त्रमूर्यमुमुर्यायन। न चैव मणि पश्चात्श्रुत्योर्विकल्पने नव्यत्वमु अस्तुलुक्तावत, निरपेक्ष दिशु दैविक चचन्मू आपौषेयत्वात्, सापेक्ष च पश्चात्श्रुत्वचनमिति कथमसिद्धिविविकल्पः।

१०९. श्रुतताम्। पश्चात्श्रुतवस्त्रचापिनिरपेक्षतावदेव।
कथमू पौषेयस्य वचसो निरपेक्षता।
इति चैव दिव्यां प्रस्तोत्रो तालिकां।
किमस्य वोधकत्वाय परापेक्षाभुषुपेते।
किम च निधायकत्वाय यथाविधिताययाय वा।
पुमायत्वाय वा तत्र निधानमनयुर्मस्मात्।

† असिष्यं विज्ञानादिभावी विज्ञानादिभावी इति पधीतन्तुस्यौ शेषः।
न खलते चक्रवर्त्यांनां भगवते समर्पणे दितीवधर्मान वाचने श्रुतिपालने नन्दते अन्यन्त्र भुवनचित्रमिहं गहणात, न च नावता दापेशक्ति दैवीत्वं शुभाविषं दैवीत्वसम्प्रस्थानः।

नापि निदाश्यजनानाय, न हि अर्थादेश्येततु अर्थादेश वैति संभाषितब्रह्मणसुराप्रवृत्त्विधेये अर्थादेश्यं प्रवृत्त्विधेये अर्थादेश्यं अर्थादेश्यं अर्थादेश्यं अर्थादेश्यं।

नापि यथार्थात्वाय, न छुतपाये शानं स्वकारण्यन्तिः विशुद्धत्वाय अयपरमेष्टे शुभत्, श्रावणमश्या दुर्गतत्वात् अनखुष्मानाद।

न च पुरयार्थात्वाय परार्धशास्त्रादिरूपर्वायोक्तादेव तत्त्वस्िरेण, इह हि यथोक्तसत्त्वायं शास्त्रवाचस्यात् तद्वृत्तायं तत्त्वसत्त्वादिरूपर्वायोक्तादेव कालिकामः, तत्त्व निरर्थितस्यसंपत्त्वसमित्वि शास्त्रादेशवाचायमाये।

१२०. अर्धोक्तेन रात्यिर फळ्यादत्वाभायं रात्यामाये रात्यामायपद्धतिनिधिपुरस्तरां दोषाभावायो नात्वार्त्वाये न रात्यामायपद्धति निव्रुत्ताय इति तद्‌सत्‌, न हि दोषाभावाय रात्यामायनिव्रुत्ताय निव्रुत्ताय निर्रुत्ताय परार्धादेव तदुत्तरः।

१२१. न च निद्रोद्यत्वायात्वायदििस्यनिधिसत्त्वायं सत्त्वामायेन तत्त्वरि, यथाह वाचिकर्षकः। तदा न ब्रम्हिष्ठमेवतु भाष्यामानत्वमायं शुभमाय। इति, दोषाभावादििस्य शुभमाय सत्त्वाय योयस्योयो वर्ततसे, दोषाभावाये तु विशेषे सत्त्वामायणकृतिः, इति। न चोलकमानि गमाणानानादिकं व्यवहारायायापरमेष्टे सत्त्वामायित्रप्रयोगमेव तत्त्वस्िरेण, यथादु, सत्त्वादििस्यनिधिसत्त्वादिकं व्यवहारः प्रवर्तिते हर्षसे।

अपि च रात्यामायानानां वेदानामपि रात्यामायानानादिरूपर्वायं दोषाभावाय नात्वार्त्वाये न रात्यामायानि भाषितित्वात्वाति हन्तायं दर्पेशक्तयम।

१२२. अथ योग्यानुपपद्मादिर्वतायायासातिस्वेदं वनत्वाय निराधारं दौप्यान्यसत्त्वादिरूपर्यं यथादु नान्सि, यथाहुः
तथापवादनिःसुक्रियायेतवज्ञायावाहुःसी।

वेदेः तेनामाणाणतं न शास्त्रामिगच्छति॥

हृति चेतु॥

हन्त तद्भवं पञ्चरथवनग्रेवति सर्वेदस्वं विरच्यत वामाचार्यदेव अयललितं

द्रोपदावे अभामाण्यशाल्ला नामतत्तीति समानत्वच॥

पत्तुदकं सर्वति उपयोगम्य स्त्रामाण्ययोरक्रम द्रोपामानिनिध्यः

तदाध्यपुरुषामानिनिध्यात्, अन्यस्म तद्विद्वस्तुप्रभुवच्छटक्षनिनिध्याबैतिह॥

यथा औप्यामानिनिध्यो नमस्ति तदाध्यपुरुषामानिनिध्यात्तत्

तद्विद्वस्तोपज्यः माध्यार्॥

११३. किंश।

सापेक्षानिरपेक्षात् न द्रि वायस्य कारणम्।

शुक्ली रजतवोधयां निरपेक्षस्य वायकम्॥

नैर्द्र्यं रजतविशालं तत्सापेक्षामपीयते।

सेयं ज्ञवेदिति संवितस्तैलवर्तिनिनाराजा॥

अनुमा वाधिका द्या सापेक्षास्मिस्थवस्मनं॥

अतो निरयनकारौ सावकारं निपिध्यते॥

न चेत्व सावकारात् भगवच्छास्यवेद्योऽः।

११४। अथ श्रुतिविचलस्य तन्त्रभागस्य दुप्प्रकामम्॥

वासुदेवमाणीत्वं निधीएत्तुमिति मन्यसे।

पञ्चरथविचलस्य वेदभागस्य वा कथम्॥

अपौरुशेऽत्तत्त्वानमार्थविभवति वाधितम्।

तस्यापि वेदभागस्य तथामाणोस्मुपेत्रते॥

अस्यापि पञ्चरथविवाह तत्पन्नीवत्मिष्यतम्।

कारुक्तमाणां च तदि वारुशेऽपेता॥

तत्कालक्तपूजास्य फिर्म स्वाच्छल्लेश्वरता॥

अति ज्ञातीयुक्तं सा द्रा स्वृत्तिपरस्या॥
पश्चपाष्ठस्य निर्माता केशवो भगवानिति।
तत्त्रातिहितविश्वासादू जगान्धवान् धमं वदु॥
दक्षिणां विचित्रां दृश्चा प्रविष्णातीति युवेऽते।
‘साहवस्य कपिलो चक्षु यः पश्चपाष्ठस्य केशवः॥
इति सङ्कुच्युः परपेते भारते तथा॥
‘पश्चपाष्ठस्य इत्यत्र चत्रायणः स्याम॥
’इदं महोपेशस्यार् चतुर्युपेरमन्वितम्।
साहवस्ययोगहस्तान्ते पश्चपाष्ठस्यान्ति।
नारायणसुखोऽहीते नारदे आश्रयन्युनी।
वशुब्रान्नसद्ने तात्। पथादते पथाश्चतमु॥
पश्चपाष्ठस्य निर्देहस्य निर्देहस्य निर्देहस्य।
वाहुदेहस्य निर्देहस्य निर्देहस्य निर्देहस्य।
‘इति जन्तुतिथिः कुन्तुने महामनाः।
विरागादिभावेऽ व तद्विविधे इति॥

१४। नन्तु च भगवत्स्य महोपेशस्य चिन्तेन विबलवध्यमानान्यमायायम्। भान्ति सर्वे।
शक्तिजनेन विहिष्णुवध्यमानान्यमायायम्। भवतीति किमिद्मस्य शालो व्यापारिहितुमिति
हितम् उत्तेन वस्तुतोऽविश्वासः। निविद्धित्याधिकाभक्षावलम्बनविविधयुक्तान्यमायायम्।
मनसा क्रृष्टि मद्यित्योपयोपाय, भवतु वेदविदेश्ये विद्यमानपल्लविद्यमानपल्लविद्यमानपल्लवै इति।

तत्र च विपित्तिएवादृ इति, समस्तहस्तीतिहासपुण्यवैतिः।
विपित्तिएवादृ इति। यदि विना कारणेन भगवतं सर्वं चक्षुस्तिक्षमामाद्
विस्मातन्तं।

† बिहिते। पुनः कृमत जन्तुराविहितशालं शालेः। अवधि स्थाय।
हत्तेऽऽ सर्वेशक्रिक्तवादके भाष्मिकारि।
पात्येंगेित सदेशास्त्रिष्टोषे जगद्वापतेत्।

भृगु चाेेर सर्वेशक्रिक्तवेन विमलस्यादि: फिमतीन्द्रियावत्त्यायांद्र
वेदतांशी निर्माय स्त्रिमार्गमर्गमार्गाकायिष्ठे हिरण्यभविष्काप्ति
तत्तत्त्वतः स्वाम्यायपरस्परामादिमां प्रवृत्तिवालः चेति संशयानाः। कर्थे
विष्वसिमः। अधीश्च सद्यपि सर्वेशक्रिक्तस्त्रिवाच्छिद्रकं करणे प्रमाणामे-
भायालु भागवताया भगवत्त्यथ स्माचारायेकेस्तकतथा विप्रदम्मभियोजने
विजुत्रं धैर्यम्म्येद्रुणादित्यंस्प्रृम्मित्या प्राचारस्वापृग्नवालः सर्वमार्णियात्यस्य
स्वामायलोकदेहने व्यवस्थायानां दिमष्टिक्षपुणीते च निबुधामध्य यावतु
स्वाम्यायाध्यायन-तद्दृश्यानुप्राणान्तः तत्कर्णेदृश्यप्रियस्त्रिमाणानुपपस्तोस्याद्वः
शाह्राहान्ति चेतेश्वेतस्विद्मन्यायारि समानम्।

तथा हि।

किमस्मायाययात्मकास्य सर्वेश्वस्य द्यानिधि:।
अल्पस्वैर्यन्यायंचिन्तामले: प्रयोजनम्।।
विप्रदम्मक्षु चतो तवसं कर्थे चा परस्मन्यः।।
इत्स्तत: प्रीणाभिन्त तुल्यवच्चत्रविवर्तमृतेः।।
तथा हि वेदेश्चाहु निविदिषों वाायाराम्याय-भारतां।
अमुहि तत्त्रस्य रहस्यायावसां वांदत्ति सम्बस्त्तमें वदामः।।
वेदेन पञ्चराजेन भाव्या यज्ञ्यः च हिजः।
भाष्योद्घ्न नान्याय भाष्या वर्षेन वायुरात्तेतरैः।।
पञ्चराज्य सध्यायां यदि कवित्र्यु प्रहीण्यति।
कर्मेऽते च मद्रको यदि कवित्र्युबिन्ध्यति।।
तस्य वेदा: पञ्चराजान मिलन् हदि हर्षिः।।
यवितां पञ्चराजां वा शालं पञ्चमुङ्गमां।।
तदु भवान: केदाय: तस्म गल्पतांतवसंशयम्।
पुस्तीकीव्र वेदेश्च पञ्चरङ्गेः तथेऽः।।

अ| अस्तानिधि ब्रह्मविद्याः। || ब| वत्सानिधि श्रुति वशिष्ठतत्त्वायाम्।
भाषान्तर योगिनों निम्नेऽकुतुसिद्ध यजनति तम्।
प्रभेदं साहित्ययोगं वैदिकयन्त्रकोणेच च।
परस्परान्वयेतानि पञ्चरथस्त्र सत्सम।
वेदेन पञ्चरथस्त्र वह पद्यंति स पद्यंति।
इत्यम्होपनिषद्चतुर्वत्ससमसिद्धम्।
अत्सख्यस्माधिनामात्रान्वयामुपर्यस्ते।
पञ्चरथस्त्रायं तद्विषयं श्रद्धासि श्रद्धुः।
सत्येव स्माणाश्वास्य इत्येवदुपविद्यते।
विषयं पेघादुः इति।

परशु।

विरोधेऽपि विकल्पं स्थादू भगवन्छात्रवेदेऽ।
विरोधं पयं नामतीति प्रागोप्य प्रत्यथादयम्।

११६। नञ्चभवतां भाष्यकारणं विकल्पः साधारणस्त्राणि समिधारं,
कथविचित्रं विरोधेऽ इत्याविविधता परिविभवत्सुपं सम्भवस्त्रयः
साधारणस्त्राणां समीतिः श्रवदा वेदान्ततरो मायूतिवेदविद्यम्,
वेद्यं हि भगवतो जैसिः कर्मफलोपन्यासं कर्मभ्रास्ति इन्द्रयानायायेति।

११७। वेद्याहार्दैवदीतवपश्चाद्याश्वाय।
पवद्याहार्दैवदीतस्वविद्य्याः वेदान्ताः सु न्ततु न ततु।
अपि च।

किं वेद्य वेद्याहारस्त्र का वा स्थायणदहीतता।
किमज्ञ वेद्याहारस्त्रं वेद्याहारस्त्रगुण्यते।
तत्रप्रत्यांस्कारितवारहं तदेवप्रत्यात।
तथा |

यूहीतत्वमधीतत्वं प्रवत्तं वा विचारताम्।
फितमाणार्थता वा स्पङ्कं तथेषु तुप्यति॥

तथा तावद्। |

यदि वेदान्तिभिन्नतं याहात्वे साप्तधीततः।
वेदाद्वयाधिकीर्तिः चैव द्रिकं वचः।
प्रवामणमित्रन्वेंक्तं हेतोस्थरं प्रस्तुतं॥
हातात् चैव गृहीतत्वे दोपादसाधु मुच्यसे।
पूर्वोऽर्थं वेदाधात्तत्वे क्रियमाणार्थता यतिः॥
गृहीतत्वात् चैव चेदः स्पङ्केत्रेव व्यविचारिता।
प्रितिविद्वारोऽर्थत्वेऽवेदाधात्तत्वक्रियाः॥
व्यविचारस्वयंवादः प्रायद्रिक्तविधायकः॥

प्रायविचारतिवाक्यकि वाक्यानि कप्रमाण्देशृङ्गयतु इत्यादिनि
प्रतिविद्वारकीर्तिर्भिस्मुणि चैव यमानार्थिन्येव प्रमाणानैवति तात्त्वेऽवेदः
हृदीहीतत्वमैवनैर्ज्ञानिकान्तिकृतम्॥

नापि वेदाध्यज्ञपरिप्रभृष्टीतित्वाद्वाद्रामण्य पञ्चारागतक्रामाः, हेतो-
रसिद्रत्वाः, अपि च न वेदाध्यज्ञपरिप्रभृणि अवामण्य प्रतिह्नि, यदि
हि प्रतिह्न्यःयात्तिर्यङ्गलस्तं नास्तिकानां पञ्चाः, ते हि वेदामाण्य-
शोट्साधनाय प्रवस्ततः

कप्रिक्तवाद्वायानि गृहीतत्वा विप्रस्वनतः।
अनायासेन मिथ्यायौः वेदान, हृदीहिंगम्यराः॥

198. अथ तत्रात्त्विधिकाशिकाग्रंथं प्रेताद्यवैद्यतृः न चात्मविद्या मेत्वं
यस्थानाैर्यात्तेः इत्यादिचवचनपरिप्रथोधनया दोषो न निद्रोपवेद्वायः
यमानि चेतृ,—त्यस्तु तत्तमेष्यन्याधिकारिको वैद्यसनामस्व दोषः, न
निद्रोपवेद्वायः यमानणि सव समास्मन्नज्ञानित्वादवै। अथ मथे बेदाध्य
ज्ञात्व नाम चैव द्रिक्कर्मानिधिकारित्वं तदन्धिकारिनिद्रोपवेद्वायृहीतत्वात्।
चैत्यांन्त: अभामण्डित: तत्ततापि किमकिंवते वैदिककर्मः
नवाचारिणपरियुग्यततं हेतुः, उत्त कक्षपवैदिककर्मानिकारिण्यत्रोऽ
tतत्ततामिति चित्तिच्छ व्याप्तामुः।

न तात्तुक्रिमां कल्यः कल्यते हेतुसिद्धिः।
न हि सोऽस्ति मनुष्येऽयः स्रोते चापि कर्मेऽः
नालिकुपरीतिहिंसातः मुमाणस्वत्त विकारतः।

अन्तथा हि भाह्यण्डन—सह्याप्रहरण—वर्गीकरणमेवद्विधय- नादि कुर्वणाश्रयङ्गङ्गाद्योऽ नुभयेऽः।
तत्त्तविकर्त्तव्यादः, यस्य हि
यथा कार्यस्य तथा हि तत्कर्षणा श्रयवायाः, अतः सर्वाधिकारकः
कर्मेऽः अविकारो विचित्र परेतसिद्धे हेतुः, साधनविध्य द्वारानः।

तापि कक्षपवैदिककर्मानिकारिण्यत्रोऽत्तत्त्वावादः 
समस्तेवद्वैभानाममामाम्यप्रस्त्रादः।
अस्ति हि सर्वेऽः कक्षपवैदिक-
कर्मानिकारः, भाह्यण्ड्येव रज्ज्येऽः, रज्ज्येः सोमपाने, अतो 
व्यवस्थतपणानिकारिण्यतवेवत्तनेर्लेखकानि केतुः, अप्योजकः।

चैत्यांन्तः सर्वोऽर्थस्वतितः गतःः।
न तत्त्तिरत्तेहानिक्ष्य फिन्तु कारणयोऽः।

१२०. अथ भागवतजनपरियुग्यत्वाविति हेतुः, हति तत्त्तिर- 
युग्यतः वाजस्तेक्षा कायमार्यावचस् प्रत्यक्षारीतिः चामामाण्य- 
प्रस्ताः।
भगवद्गीतार्यायम्

अथ तैत्तिय परियुक्तवादिति हेतु: तदसाधारणानेकलिकम्, असिद्धच।

किमिति वा तत्त्वरिप्रहारामाणयम् अनैदिर्गितवादिति चेत्
कि भो: शैवानितितत्त्वस्वरूपादिप्रज्ञानानुसारात्मात्मा
मार्गस्वच्छसां रथकार आदिवीत प्रत्या निपाचस्यपति याज्येत्
इत्यादिवचनां प्रामाण्यम् नास्ति।

अस्तुचार्यानितिहो: प्रामाण्यद्विते, पतेयां तु अगवच्छायानु
गमिनाः भागवतानाममुत्त्रप्राणाण्यं सर्वसंमाणसमवगतमिति
तत्त्वरिप्रहारामाण्यमेऽऽवाच। आहू केन पुनः प्रामाणीयां गाययमंवगतं, केन
चातुर्येशु।

121. नन्तु चक्षुविश्वारणास्मान्तः दिशा-वल्लोपवीत-पालाशास्त्रण-कौशीयुजो हिजकुमारकाश श्रधान्तो ग्राहणां इत्यवगच्छति इह वा विम
हर्षस्रीमान्यवाजसनायेक्षाक्षायानार, चिदुपवीतोत्सरीप्राप्ताः
शालिनोद्व्यापनां राज्यत् प्रतिग्रहतो विदुः पद्यन्तो ग्राहणां इति
नायन्ति।

अथ याजन-प्रचार-पालाशादानाशनां दुवसुड़ादित्व व्यभिचार:
सम्बादू ग्राहणप्रस्थहारकारणेन प्रवेशान न तेस्यो ग्राहणप्रियाः,
तद्भवभेदोत्तरविश्वारणामपि समानम्।

अथ सङ्कल्पो वेदं कृत्तिद्विबिधारे सत्साहायान्यात्मक व्यभिचार-
शालायां गुरुवा ज्ञेयतायो व्यभिचारारुते जज्ञो ज्ञजतिद्वारा व्यभिचार-
शालायां ब्रह्मक्ष्यिरोधात्रा अनवस्थतः अनुपरत्त्वामान्यव्यभिचारोद्वारांति
ए० तथावृत्तिनिर्भरप्रत्येकां समानम्।

122. अथ मतम् अन्येयां ग्राहणम् तदसाधारणोपसेरणार्थितम्,
तदु: भागवतानामपि समानम्, सर्वत्र हि मागवतां। वर्ये मार्दाजाः
वर्ये वादयण्डे वर्ये गौतमाः वयमौपग्नमाः हिति।

9
न चैदं गोविष्करण निष्पूण साम्राज्यां वा रविन्द्रविष्करणां तथा-भावप्रस्तात्।

संधात्म्यांसन्तोगत्त्वादः वंशानां गदि संशयः।

तदाहाणेऽति कोऽक सर्व व्याक्त्यबन्धनः॥

तथा हि।

अन्यायसन्देहात्म्याण्डालसंशयः।

निष्प्रियतं कथं वैवर्धार्यसाधुसत्यम्॥

तेन भागवतात्म्याविविन्द्यमपरस्पराभावात्म्याविविचित्रगोऽवस्थापितं भागवतायनपोलिस्नाति इति न भागवतात्म्यान्येषां व्रतां ब्राह्मणे कस्यिद्विविषयः।

१२३. यदि पर्ये परमपुरुषस्वाभिता एकान्तिः, अन्ये शूद्रदैवतिकाः स्वाभाविक इति। किं पुरुषेऽपि व्रतां भ्रमणस्मृतिम्। वदेवान्येपापम्। केन वा तेषां व्रतां व्रतायमनस्तान्? स्वयं प्रय्यात्, यदि व ज्ञातुहस्तम्,

शूर्यतासुभृत्राणि व्रतवर्त्तयश्वाहारकं।

प्रतिक्षानं वा तुहानं वा पद्धार्थमातिर्भुव्र वा॥

१२४. नतु कथं पर्यंत व्रतायम्यमवर्त्यति, न द्वि प्रथमक्षसबिभाती-समनस्तसमनस्तपूर्वविपथशसमनस्तपूर्वविपथशचित्वाधवहाजगममिहि।

विविशेषालर्थं भ्राह्मणं अर्थं सृष्टिः इति विभयोन्त्र प्रतिपादामहे।

न च तत्तत्तं भ्राह्मणस्वाभिता प्रक्षमक्षमेव सतिचिन्तित्यक्षिणि

भ्राह्मणस्वाभित्ति साम्राज्यं, तत्सनासेव पूर्वस्थापनविरहिणं वन्याभ-हस्तस्वाभित्तं उपर्ये॥

न चाहुतं नात्; तत्तत्तित्यवद्विभावार्थानात्।
भस्मप्रचारितो यदिः सपार्शनेनोपयोगयते।
अथवत्वादि: च दूसर्ये निद्रयो जायते घने:।
संख्यानेन घट्त्वादि धाराणत्वादि योगित।
कचिदाचार्याम्बिष्य सम्यकाॅम्बाच्छायाभित्र।।
इति।
यत्तमानवयोक्तेनपितकद्वयविलोक्तेः।
तत्त्वावत्तेन सैद्धो नावनालीति भापितम्।।
नैतायता विभागस्य पत्यष्ट्वायं नियते।
शास्त्रयवोपाचर्य वादः विभागस्यवराहः।।
समानसरस्यस्यानुसूक्ष्मकल्याणोऽयतोऽऽवः।।
विवेकः सहस्य नामाल्पद्विका कालान्तरे।विरि किम्।।
पत्यवशं न भवेदेवं विनिद्रश्वविशां विद्या।

यद्या संततिविवेचोपभवस्वतवचेव धाराण्यं,
तत्त्वाववथितिरेकाभ्यां यथालोकं कार्यान्तरद्ववात्ववामेव।
के पुः सन्ततिविवेचोळः? के पुः
धारणशाध्यं म्युज्ते वुधाः। के पुः वा म्युज्तः?

उक्ते गोत्रायायदिस्मृतिमतिस्वत्तेनकः।
आत्ममस्ततता चिन्ता प्राची मस्तुस्ये कथा।
सिद्धे गोत्रायायदिस्त्वादृ विमाभावता इति।

१२५। शेषयात्यान्यसे जनम यदेर्पामुपवणितम्।
प्रक्षमस्तात्वतो नाम विषोरायततनाति हः।।
पूज्येद्वराया राजः स तु भागवतः स्त्राय।।
शेषयात्तु जायते मात्यादिष्टि धार्ययद्यक्षणात।
जन भूमः किन्ते स्यां च चनाम्ब्यां प्रशस्ये।
अमिषधामाद्यो वा स्वाधिष्यो वास्मिष्यत्यताम्।

न तायद्व सत्वत-भागवत-शाब्दो शेषयात्यायमिष्यायकावेवति
नियन्तु शाक्यो अभासी:। अतिसाध्या। न हि पञ्चमः सत्वत इत्यथ।
न च पश्चमसा सात्यतवे सात्यतेनापि धैर्यवात्यप्रभणेन भवितवः, न हि उद्धामानस्यागतमवे उपाश्चीर्यमानस्यार्धूमयत्वेन भवितवः अतो नेन्द्रास्त्रितिपारोढऽतनया सात्यत-भाग्यत-आधित्वानं भावत्विनिःशयः।

१२७. यद्य पुनर्योज्जत्यन्त्रेऽपि प्रयोगो द्वै इति पतायता तच्छवर्धमिष्यतया भववच्चानागुमागिनापि विमाणां तज्जातीयत्व-निःशयः, तत्सङ्गेय सहृदयितचर्यमास्याकाः सहीम्याभावते भ्रूयोग-दृश्नानात् साहास्यस्यस्कवेदातुदितिजपरस्यापि भावत्वर्षे स्याद्।

अय तस्य भाववाचकचर्य-शास्त्रामिष्यतवेदेऽपि प्रमाणाणारेण-विभूतशाक्षायनिःश्यात् भावचर्य-शास्त्रप्राचिनोत्पत्ति चुम्बितम् इत्यादिः। गुणसाधनशास्त्राय धृतिश्रमस्य सात्यतर्फः, तद्नापि जात्यन्तरचर्यक-सात्य-भाग्य-शास्त्रामिष्यतवेदेऽपि भववच्चानागुमागिनामेवमीमांसतिक्ष्यविदियोगोर्यायायिनं दर्शिस्यालयानिस्यायत्वाद् भावप्रयत्न सात्यत-भाग्यत-शास्त्रोऽथ सत्यदत्त सात्यतिमयति भवति भक्तियोगेन धृतिश्रमस्य सात्यतचर्यदायित्वाद्, पत्तुके भवति।

न धीखांश्रवणवाच्य-बाधीकातिहतादेशेऽपि भवेत्।
मा भूताश्च शास्त्रवाच्यवाद भाषान्तर निःशयता।
तथा च इति-शास्त्रवेद द्वारा संपूर्वकान्तिता।
इति तच्छवर्धमिष्यतवाद् सिहदी मश्त्रक्य एव किम्।
तथा शो-शास्त्रवाच्यवाच्यवेदाणापि विप्राणवाद्।

† भेदोत्सर्वत्रहस्तादिकर्मः।
तत्थः

'सुप्न्वाचार्य स्वायत्ता यथाधीर्त्तर्वाचकाः।

वेदः वात्त्वच्ये मयुष्यते तथैवतैः अविषयतः॥

१२८. यदृच्छे योगः दिशाक्रिययोपनिशते सात्त्विक-भागवत-शास्त्रोऽसहिष्ठिते राजस्वायत्तर्वाचकाः।

तद्युक्तं कृत्तात्यवशात्त्वैवमित्राध्यात्मनीपथे सत्यांमहमहाध्यात्मनीपथे फलपादाभ्यात्।

योधपि हि सात्त्विक-भागवत-शास्त्रं योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्। निर्दोषस्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्। अभवमात्रचतुर्थे असाध्वेन सत्यस्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

सात्त्विकमं कृत्तात्यवशात्त्वैवमित्राध्यात्मनीपथे, चतुर्थेतः सत्यत्वमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्। निर्दोषस्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

तद्युक्तं कृत्तात्यवशात्त्वैवमित्राध्यात्मनीपथे, चतुर्थेतः सत्यत्वमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

योधपि हि सात्त्विक-भागवत-शास्त्रं योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

सात्त्विकमं कृत्तात्यवशात्त्वैवमित्राध्यात्मनीपथे, चतुर्थेतः सत्यत्वमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

तद्युक्तं कृत्तात्यवशात्त्वैवमित्राध्यात्मनीपथे, चतुर्थेतः सत्यत्वमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

योधपि हि सात्त्विक-भागवत-शास्त्रं योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

तद्युक्तं कृत्तात्यवशात्त्वैवमित्राध्यात्मनीपथे, चतुर्थेतः सत्यत्वमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।

अनवदेव हि द्विययवनयोऽसहिष्ठितम्। पायोऽसहिष्ठितम्। ज्ञोरस्ये योगः स्वायत्तर्वाच्यमन्योऽसहिष्ठितम्।


१३०. यदुनारक शातत्र-भागवत-शास्त्रियों के रचकर आदर्श हृदयार्पण रथकर्तार-सम्राप्तर रथकर्मणानेत्र वैराजशिवध्रुवीप्रभल इति तदनुपयोगम्। युक्ति हि त्राभानितोपतिवहिताय शास्त्रवस्त्रवदायिकानुशास्त्र-प्रस्ताव, लोकविश्वास तथा सर्वचक्र इति भण्यवर्णिगतजात्यन्तर-रूपितंयथमस्मास्त्रै। माहीप्येन फरियं तु रथकर्त्र प्रजाय्युः। इति स्वरूपवर्णिगतजात्यन्तरत्वेष्वपि क्षणियेवेदयानुखोकोलोध्यो रथकारस्त्रये-ज्ञायनोपन्यस्वक्षिप्तेश्वमतिपित्रिः। इति शत्रुयक्षादूः विधास्योऽदपि कर्मचिं अधिशक्ति विरोधानुष्ठापति, वैराजशिवध्रुविन्यात्तिपूर्वको दिशाप्रवृत्तिपितृद तेषु रथकारस्त्रयेवानुखोकोलोध्यास्त्रै, न चेत तथा विरोधाग्निः। अधि चः।

हतात्यवस्त्रणययुः एव प्वाययांवर्तवोऽनेन।
न्द्रयांधर्मणान्त्व भास्त्राणां च प्रसन्नम्।
प्राक्क्वणिविश्वसंयोगात्र इति।
तत्रत्तत्ततम भवन्ति भवन्ति भवन्ति भवन्ति।
ते सावत्रता भागवता हृदययते दिस्त्रोऽनेन।
स्वरूपस्तायं च भागवततानासूत्रस्माहारण्यमतिपादकानीति परस्तादु प्रकृतियित्वम्।

१३१। यदु पुनर्रक रोगाने ब्राह्मणे किष्मिति सात्वत्र-भागवते-कानितक-शध्रैरचरितेः नियमेन व्यपदेशा हृति तत्वरिमाजकनिगदादिये-धिष्यश्चोऽ।

यथायेव हि सार्वत्र ब्राह्मणे युधस्त्रा व रेषुधेव ब्राह्मणः कानित्वेदे युधविपि परिमाजकनिगदादियाध्याममितिविन्दते, तदनुस्त्र ब्राह्मणः। परिमाजकनिगदादियो अश्वेन भानिष्येताः, युधविपि यद्यदिने न नियुक्तः, नियुक्तः यद्यदिने न युधविपि, इति च तदेहानि स्विस्त्वितिः, " नियुक्तविविध मच्छातम्" " युधविपि वा तदपवत्ताः। हृति व्यासभिषेषात्।

† निरक्ष्यव नामवाक्या हृत्योः
१२२. वृद्धयों देवतापूजनैवेद्यमार्गानादिभिः।

दौराच्छायां यद्यपूर्वं तत्र भविष्यदीपसे।

न हि भागवतेतस्तर्बृत्तचयेॽस्वाचितो हरि।

द्या हि वहवस्वार्थः पूजयन्तोपि सात्वतः॥

केचिद्विः परं सतः सात्वतासुतिकर्षितः॥

याज्ञवल्क्य प्रमादवेद्यैवैद्युतिकारणारू॥

ते ताध्यतेत्तथा वाह्याः शाक्याः तात्विकति माधितुम।

न वल्वाध्वयनं कुर्वेशु ज्योतिः प्रम्परिप्रित।

यदि न वरिग्रहीयं पूज्यं विफला भवेत्।

पूजसारसुपायसितकृत्यस्मतः प्रतिवहुः॥

अर्थार्थो विरुग्धाः तस्य देवं स्नानितः।

अन्त्यथा पूजकस्येवं तत्र पूजापालं भवेत्॥

हर्षयमंवर्षिणी यद्य इत्याहितस्ततिदर्शनात।

कार्तिक इत्रवधुर्चनेन स्वर्य याद्यपायुर्स्तर्यारू॥

शवचिकत्वं दृशं कमः तदेव य निष्कृयते।

तथं यदादायमानमातिविलतं कारणति उत्तर धर्मं वह बुधितं इति तत्र तत्पत्रं यथा जग्नं न हेष्वत्वस्यमाय भुविन्क।

इति, भद्यापूर्वस्वाध्यायां ज्योत्योरपि श्रेष्ठस्मातः।

यो प्रितं प्रतिरूप्ताः दृश्याद्वितं च।

तात्विक गच्छति: स्नायविप्रेद्वितिद्रशनात।

१२३. यदृपि वृद्धरेषु देवपूजनाद्रूपेवकोशोपनीविविधत्वं देवताकथा

प्रातिरिकीं। तदुपि देवतानां दृश्यार्थार्थाद्वारे तत्कोशोपनीविविधवन्यन्ति

दशनयम।

तथा च भगवान्य व्यासः।

भयेदेत्तत्त्वमेव यथा यद्यावास्तुप्रजीवः। इति,
अधि भवति द्वाणिद्वयचनम्।

गृहयेँ याजिनस्तर्भें त्रीकाहीनाथ्य क्रेड्यम्।

क्षमेदयालका पतेस् स्मृता हार्स पुरा सुने।

तांत्र संवतसरादृष्ट्ये न सुश्रोता च संविरोधा।

तथा।

कल्पेद्भक्ता: केवित्त कर्मेदयालका अधि।

अध्र विवर्त्तुप्पूर्वयोग्या देवकन्मणि।

यें कल्पोऽक्रम प्रकृत्ति दीक्षाहिनाम विज्ञात्य।

गृहयं तथा यात्राौषू वा कल्पेद्भक्तान्त्र सै।

गृहयं तु यथिण दीक्षितेन विद्यान्त।

अन्येन धृत्येद्भयामरचः स्थामर्थे।

यञ्जनं सुर्यमैविन्दू गौणमेवान्वयं भवेत।

अन्यथा हुति-अनौसितेन्त्रेय:। तदेव स्यायति।

अनौसितेन विप्रेण चेनकेन विधानत।

गृहयं कस्तं कर्म तदांनत्यमुश्रुहितम्।

इत्यादिसुसमतिरत्यत्वोलयनात्। पश्चात्रसिद्धद्वीरसंस्कारस्विष।

धिरानानं ध्राङ्खानानं देवकोशोपजीवनवृत्त्यथेपुज्ञाविद्यकुपाप:हणवः

वैयतस्त्रावहायमि निष्क्रिये।

१३४. तथुन: शिश्रंप्रियविहिततिमोदितनिधोपोयोमादू भागवताना-

मिष्टिप्रस्त्वमिति।

तत्र दृश: किमिदं निर्मलं विशेषं चाभिमेतं श्रोत्रियस।

पुष्पिण्यातिप्रांत:। चेत्तु सर्वेस्तोकाविविधत।

पुष्पिण्यप्रतिप्रांत:। न हि लोकोद्विनासमावत।

विशिष्टप्रतिप्रियोस्पष्टमि। न युक्तस्तर्प्रसिद्धिह।

न द्वियस्यपितविशेषं। विशिष्टप्रियलिरविशिष्टिः। न चेत् विशेषं

निर्मापितं शक्यत।

किमिदि न शक्यते। यावतं देवोधरेन परितिमो विश्रेष्ठम्।

किमिदानं पश्चात्रसिद्धमपि समापणमहीतं भवत।

येन पद्मचरतत्रवर्धितमनृत्युपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुपापाधिकुर्वा।
विदेशणमंभित्ते, कथं हि तत्रामायणांसुपगमे तत्तत्तियादमायाया
देवतातवं, कथंसराय तदुत्तोश्रेण लिक्ष्य निर्माणविषेदमागः, न हि
काचिन्त्याय देवता नामस्ति, तेव हि इवः अभिज्ञेयोगितस्या प्रामाणिता-
च्छविद्याक्षमते सा तत्र देवता इति हि वः सिद्धान्तः।

अथ पश्चापास्तिकैवतोद्वेशः परिक्षणक्तवायुगमाद्रितंमल्यनिवे-
शमायं, हस्त कर्ति, तैरेव परमप्राणतत्त्वापि निर्माणविवेद्योगो-
च्छविद्याक्षमताः तद्देव पावनवत्मांहीनक्यतामः।

अथापाणवमेभि तैः पावनवुद्धा परिप्रेयीताशिति न तत्तवानस्तय-
महीनक्यिते, हस्त तश्चेवयते पश्चापास्तिकैव देववत्मान्वारोपेण तैः परिप्रेयीतिः न
tदुत्तोश्रेण लिक्ष्य निर्माणविवेद्यमायोक्त्रीक्वेवतामः।

पत्तुर्वं भवति पुष्पोददानविक्षुहःधमानस्तम्यान्यानिष्टेयात् स्वरं
रावुद्धारेन च विशेषणाल्पभवाः पर्यंत्तारुद्धारेन विशेषणानिरूढः
ब्यमेव परमप्राणतत्त्वापत्तात् तथा प्रामाणिता
युगच्छविद्याक्षमताः तथा परमप्राणतिः निर्माणविनिवेद्यमायोक्त्रीक्वेवतामः।

१३४। आह कथं पुनस्त्त्रामायणमहीनक्यितका पर्यन्त् निर्माण निवेद्यभु

न परिप्रेयीतिः

नितिथ्यते हि तद्वं महीनक्यानसाधिकमी।

वथा सेवकंमारीविरसंहितायामुनीरितम्।

नितितमिता तं यथवं पूर्णं पूजार्षणिः वा।

तत्विशेषणानिरूढः योगेकं तत्वप्रणेतृ वर्णियते।।

तथा प्रदेशान्तः।

निर्माणसं यक्षानिविवेद्यमुच्छितोगमुरोरं।

मासे प्रयोगशीती भूतवा जमध्यजाट्यं सदा॥

धातुकुश्यं ततः पील्व यूनो स्वयं महति मानवः।। इति,

तथेक्ययः।

चोपतीवेदशेषं न निर्माणानि भक्ष्येत्।।
तथा।

न चोपयोगोयोगानि निमाल्यानि कदाचन।

इति, तथा संहितानि।

निमाल्यानि न चार्मायथ नितेयेद्र च वज्जयैते।

इति, तदेवयमेकसंहितासमधिघातनि पेयस्य निमाल्योपमोगस्य
कथमिव पायन्त्वाहिनीकरं।

अवाह्य देवसुंदिद्रय त्यक्ष्याणि च पस्युः।

नादिकादशकारवायुयोगो न निन्यते।

तत्वेन्द्राय पय।

द्रशानांधिक्षे पूर्व स्वापयेचु विचक्षणः।

काठयोगस्मुद्री राजापहिनि चैत हि।

काठयोगातिरिक्त हि निमाल्यं परिचक्षते।

तत्तत्तवस्य चैवासी क्षिपेद्वृमी खनेचु वा।

इति।

उच्चयते नान निमाल्यमाराराहि प्रशस्ते।

किन्तू पूर्णपुजायां चिनियुक्तव्य वस्तुः।

नादिकादशके पूर्व पश्चात्वात्रानि विद्यायते।

स्वामान्ये निवेदितवर धृपौड़नादेः इत्यक्षत्व निमाल्यत्वेना
पनये प्रार्ते नादिकादशकपूर्वाण पूजायत्वा च्यांवं विचित्रायते इत्यना
स्वाधिक पूर्व स्वापयेत्विर।

तत्तत्त्वबशिष्यानि वर्गा।

हरिकुमारी-नैवेदय-पादाघुस्तिपादानिकम्।

न सिन्ये तवासिद्धां क न सुख्यं क चार्मायां।

अहो विखायोलोकासिद्धायस्त्विचित्तस्।

सितासितं वस्यो भन्ति सक्टबेन्नु विश्वसम्व।

ये हि सुप्रस्दिभु भूखान्तेंमेष निस्येनो।

तैवमान्य हि तत्तवे चैवचेतायमिनारिम।

अध्यापयो एति तद्तत्त्वम पुरोहिताः शुभामिश्व।

† न चोपभीयोगमात्रिति पा।।
तद्विषाधरसंहितायां

हदसीे सदमप्रको पोकेरसत्त्रु गुसरः हुस।
तणापि हदसेहतरां भानो दै वस्स तस्ततः।
पादोऽक पति शुभान्तिवधाते हदनुवेदिते।
शामादिके चोपसुके हुसमोगार्थमेव प।
अववह माहवीनानामकाना व पण्मुख।
निजिद् भगवन्यनन्दपूवमुकतं हि यत्त। हदत्
तथा प्रस्तुसातः।

कुदुम्म चन्द्रनवेदत। कादस्मुलेपनम्।
विश्वदेहपरापुरत् तश्चे पावनपावनम्।
हदति, तथा यशोद्वने।
विश्वदेहपरापुरत् पत्रणे यिर्सा वहेत्।
सोऽध्येशफलं श्राय्यं विश्वलोके महीयाः।

तद्विषाधरसंहितायां-

उपमुखस्य सर्वस्य गन्धपुपपादिकस्य प।
शमानासुपुलस्य वृष्णीपादिकस्य प।
दृष्टं त प्रयोक्तव्यं शब्दोप्यितिपितुः।
निमिन्दुस्त्रुत्वा देषीयं पावनं दृष्टं कित्ते।
ते यान्ति नास्क मृदास्तम्भावापि। हदति।

यानि पुनिन्दिषितमेवशर्शस्त्र समवाजिसासनस्ये निमिन्द्योप-
योगनियोधधर्माणि चब्बन। तानि पार्श्वेदेरपोपोथोत्थरकाद्भाष्यवेण
कृष्णवाणि।

यत्ते भगवद्येन त्यको जन्मदनान्तिकिम्।
पश्चाद्भोहय्यता याति विश्वसत्तेनविश्वात्।

* श्रीमद्दरामलः यत्तस्मि भगवत्ति शीघ्रमिर्दः—तस्वेदिष्ठमुक्त‌ दासस्तत्म यानि
ज्ञेयमह। हदति।
† निन्दासुभावाविभावानवैलिङ्गः।
‡ भगवििपत्तिपदानामाग्री विपालेशकुसुमोगान्तरस्ये निमिन्द्योध्युग्गि। हदति।
अत एव निवेद्यादि ततोपरिवर्तित सत्यपति ।
सैष्ट्यते तेन ततोपासुत्कर्ष्यव फार्णम् ॥

136. अपि च ।
देवतान्तरनिर्मात्र्म दिशेन्निर्दिष्टं विगहितम् ॥
हदं तु धृष्टकथेन लोकपानपदिध्यते ॥
वे नाम भगवन्च्छार्माणाएव नानुञ्जाते ।
न निरुपयितं दशमं तनिमत्यमितीर्थनिम्न ॥
निरस्पेधपि भगवभिमात्यमितिपावतम् ॥
समस्तेदिस्काध्यायायामनेरवस्थीयते ॥
शद्याप्पायके हार्द यथायान्त्र्य व्यवस्थितः ।
न चार्म शद्यो नान्तीति वचन्यं विधिरेतरः ॥

यथा प्रह्पुरणे च पद्यते ।
विष्णून्विवकं गुरुं मुनिनिर्मात्र्ममुन्यते ।
अन्य्जितेवथनिर्मात्रस्य शुक्ला चान्द्रायणक्षेर्वत् ॥
विष्णुदेहप्राप्तं मात्यं पापहरं गुरुम् ॥
यो नयिदेशर्वसा धेने त याति परमा ग्रिदिम् ॥

पतेन ।
निमोभवं निवेद्यतं शुद्धचा चान्द्रायणक्षेर्वत् ॥
इति सत्यमिति कद्वकायादिविषयमित्यायेदित्यम्, तथा महाभारते ।
हदइ ध्यायते हरिं तसी निवेद्यश्च समाहितः ।
मध्यमाक्षाविनितर्ग्निवीचारं मिर्तुं धुनः ॥
प्राणाय चैव पाणाय ध्यानाय च ततः परम ।
उद्दाहाय समानाय लवहिति चुहुद्वादु कथात् ॥
इति, तथा प्रदशान्तः ॥
निवेद्यतः यद्यं च तद्यथा, प्रह्पात्तिवेदे ॥
इति तथा महाभारते ।
प्रकाशाचिन्ने गुरुवासत्त्व प्रेतेः महात्तमः ।
प्राप्यं भगवत्कुलं गुरुं च चायमभोजनम् ॥
इति, तथा च महावनं दौनकं वैविव स्वयमश्रीयात् इति ॥
इत्यादिस्मृतिशतिसिद्धशुद्धिविध्यं नैवेद्यं महमयमेदिते यो विनिविदेते।

नास्तिस्मृत्यं स्मृतिवचनान्युपेष्मन्नात्र नस्तिदाहितिरसनेत्रेय युक्तमन्न।

१२७। नन्दु प्राणालिकोखवत्सल नैवेद्यं साधर्मं कथम्।

निरिद्भानं न विद्यानान्मित्य होमादिसारयम्।

न च द्रव्यालिकोखवत्सलं होमायेवचकदेते।

रागतं प्रात्मेवारं यस्ते नेत्यः नादेयते।

यथां मुस्यथाक्राश्वमो नैवेद्यायोपवार्तेः।

"सार्यं प्रार्थिन्द्रिजाति सत्तमेवैं श्रुतिभोजितम्।

नान्तुयं भोजसं कुयं" द्वितीयसे च तव।

नेयं देवो यस्तं प्राणसूत्रितं स्वतं।

घुम्भूतं शृङ्गो विभवार्तिषुपपरिवेंद्रवकं।

यथेव हि भगवत्स्तेविदितिमपि पुष्पशृंखलादि विनासोयनाय कृतमानं

नानौचित्यमाखिति।

यथा या होतुरुविद्धसं पद सूमरस्तो।

अध्याविदिविशिश्चत्यं स्यादेवसयं संविधयति।

अपि न।

मौद्योभोद्यं वन्यविश्वायं शास्त्रमेव तिथिनाम्।

तन्त्रेज्ञामिनं पूर्ते किं घरं विद्यधीमिति।

थापानानोत्तमत्सि सिद्धिकार्यान्निधिहोप्यः।

पदं प्रा लिकोखविसिद्धि नैवेद्यालिकोखवत्र॥

१२८। यद्युपकं गार्थां गार्थानित्याराध्यसांक्षकान्तस्वम्येवनादू भागवता

नामज्ञाणश्च कामान्यममिति सामा श्राकान्तमेवपराम्बध्यति। न युपकुयं प्रायं दोषं,

वदेते धंसपदस्यर्वः धारस्यशालाद्वादोऽसिद्धायामाणां कालाधुनिद्रायदशूक्तमाणं

गलीयानाश्रितांकं स्वरूपिते।

येः पुनः साविच्छुचनाम्बित्रिस्माहम्यानि एकायणाभिविद्यातः

सन्त्राशतिशतानं संस्कारानं दृश्यते तेजपि स्वप्नांशुकोकमयं यथा-
द्वजयिस्मानां न शाश्वाण्विको ननदुप्पाल्ये श्राहण्यातु प्रवेष्याने, अषेयांप्रथां प्रत्याख्यावित्तस्मानुदृढानिविद्वादाहस्यप्रस्थातु स्फूर्तिः हि जाति-चरण-गोरस्थाधिकारादिविषयस्य सय समाचारा उपभ्रंगोऽिते।

यवच सर्वंप्रलंक्तपर्यं नर्म तथापि न परस्परविक्षणाधिकारिः संबंधा धम्मः कविस्तुमुखिपते, विद्वान्गाद्व वध्यविहितविश्रुणुणादी-वध्यप्रमोगसाधनणाद्रतेविनिविद्धधिकारिः द्वीरेवस्यपर्यावरात्तन-श्रुतिविद्धिविद्वानं विनिविद्धिविद्वानं श्रुतिगमनोपाद्धया श्रुतिगमनगतांतः कोपायविद्धधिकारिः सक्रियो सुमुख्यो श्राहणा इति नोभ्येषाम्येन्यशाहाविहितकर्मम-ननुदानमाहात्म्यादायति, यथा चैक्सन्ताशाखाय अवर्ज्जेत्यात्यथा तथा कादारान्तगमानाये मयोक्तितमिति नेष प्रस्तुते।

प्रकृत्तानां तु

*धार्मिक अनुष्ठानाध्यायातीतेनेत्रे प्राणीतिः अनुजितं इत्यं वर्तति इत्यं वर्तति अवर्ज्जितीतेन अवर्ज्जावरणम् इत्यं वर्तति इत्यं वर्तति अवर्ज्जावरणम् इत्यं वर्तति इति वर्तति इति वर्तति।

† कामीराममादेन किं विरूपितमिति न विवृत्ति जानायथा: कामीराममादयान-निहितप्रये अन्वेषो चाटैदेवोऽयर्म इति न विवृत्तिस्मे नावर्तु।

‡ एकैते तेनाध्यायान्तरिक्षत्ववियतिः देवानवादवेनात्तृतेन समुपार्थि विम्यंविजिष्ठत्वम् यथा, ब्रम्हाण्व, ब्राह्मणाध्यक्षस्य यथा, शब्दात्मार्थस्थितानुसार कहि, इत्यं वर्तति इति वर्तति इति वर्तति इति वर्तति इति वर्तति।
भागवतानं साधित्रेषुवचनादिविवधीयरूपंसंवन्धत्वस्य सुवर्तमणिन्द्रज्ञवेन्द्रं तत्याः गुरुनितित्रात्सत्यत्वानिधिसंदेहं साधित्वे॥

१३९। तत्तत्त्वाशस्त्रायुक्तिकिंहिदशक्तरा कृत्वा तत्वीयं मथम् मित्रौपैक्षर्दमानं लाभत्वमतविन्दकाौऽधानुष्ठानति॥
प्रेक्षान्तस्तत्वां मुक्तुद्वराणं द्वारापि चत्तते
जीवात्मायुनिष्ठ्यायोगमाहिमस्तत्त्वश्रयः॥
आक्षण्य विचलसन्तु साधितमतमपविद्विदुप्रर्दिती
वामुगोदहसदुविदर्गधपरिपूर्वेऽर्द्धविधिसिद्धिः॥
श्रीमाधवसुनिद्वादितिधियो निर्द्धृतविधायिवोः
सन्तसन्त्रतागठायर्गुदीहवानवयोक्यः॥

इति श्रीद्यामुनिनिरहितोमतमाधवप्राण्यम्॥

हलेवानं भूयं सतिवता रहिलेवानं " इति श्रीकोषसम्बन्धानमाञ्जुरिनितिनमेवँ। यथं
श्रवाणधृतिकदिवसोऽथैतिहासिकानि श्रैवतात्साक्षरापाराक्रामार्नानासाहित्यादितिः परज्ञो
क्षेत्रालिपिमालिपिपाठाचयः। बिसु तद्र भवन्नाणात्पालितो द्विविद्विद्रामभौवं
भौप्रकाशानिपितिपतिपसुवृत्तमाध्यायां| विदुपापु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
महात्मः। इत्यदिना सहस्रनामायं एव गौणामठामोजिति न तद्यथत्वदूतवं
किंतु रवि-सबिदप्यः। बोधान्ता विज्ञाकर एव वर्धितर तथं भगवस्सरापणेश्मामाना
पीति च चण्डयु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
महात्मः। इत्यदिना सहस्रनामायं एव गौणामठामोजिति न तद्यथत्वदूतवं
किंतु रवि-सबिदप्यः। बोधान्ता विज्ञाकर एव वर्धितर तथं भगवस्सरापणेश्मामाना
पीति च चण्डयु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
महात्मः। इत्यदिना सहस्रनामायं एव गौणामठामोजिति न तद्यथत्वदूतवं
किंतु रवि-सबिदप्यः। बोधान्ता विज्ञाकर एव वर्धितर तथं भगवस्सरापणेश्मामाना
पीति च चण्डयु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
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किंतु रवि-सबिदप्यः। बोधान्ता विज्ञाकर एव वर्धितर तथं भगवस्सरापणेश्मामाना
पीति च चण्डयु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
महात्मः। इत्यदिना सहस्रनामायं एव गौणामठामोजिति न तद्यथत्वदूतवं
किंतु रवि-सबिदप्यः। बोधान्ता विज्ञाकर एव वर्धितर तथं भगवस्सरापणेश्मामाना
पीति च चण्डयु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
महात्मः। इत्यदिना सहस्रनामायं एव गौणामठामोजिति न तद्यथत्वदूतवं
किंतु रवि-सबिदप्यः। बोधान्ता विज्ञाकर एव वर्धितर तथं भगवस्सरापणेश्मामाना
पीति च चण्डयु। न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विषयातानि
महात्मः।
AGAMA PRAMĀNYAM

1. Homage to Viṣṇu, the sole cause of the origin, subsistence and annihilation of the world, the sole cause of perfect bliss, for whom everything is as instantly evident as a myrobalan in the hand.

2. Those of my contemporaries who are profoundly dishonest and will condemn a penetrating treatise, however great its merits, because they are envious, (may condemn it.) There are many others who have an excellent judgment of what is essential and what is not—honest students who do not cavil; and they will praise my work.

3. Even erudite scholars may err when their critical acumen is dominated by partisan views; yet, let the sagacious without envy study the Bhāgavata doctrine as I shall present it here.

4. There are certain people whose minds are confused by the noise of multitudes of sophisms and falsehoods which are borrowed from anyone that comes: and claiming superiority for their own studies and learning, and pretending to protect the Way of the Veda, they refuse to accept the authority of Pāñcarātra Tantra which, being composed by the Supreme Person Himself, leads to unparalleled beatitude.

And they contend:

It has been decided that Verbal Testimony is a means of knowledge in two ways: dependent testimony which depends on other authority, and independent testimony. These two kinds are thus distinguished:

No verbal assertion can be a means of valid knowledge if it has been formulated by a person;
for a verbal assertion to be authoritative, it must by definition be independent.

That is to say: verbal evidence which originates from a person carries authority only then when it is used to corroborate a fact which has already been truly established by other means of knowledge, and which enables the speaker to take this fact for granted. Now, Perception and the other means of knowledge which involve Perception, cannot produce the knowledge that the Pañcarātra Tantra does indeed set forth that the desired heaven, release and other supernatural ends can be attained by means of such ritual acts as Consecration and such devotional acts as worship of the Bhagavān etc., for this relation of means and ends is not of the order of Perception. For if we consider Consecration, worship etc. merely with the aid of Perception, we cannot say that they are means to realize the sumnum bonum.

Not only, therefore, is Perception of an ordinary kind unavailing, but there is also no way to know that there have been recently certain persons of superhuman sensibility who would have had perceptual evidence that such acts really are means of attaining the desired ends; for the sense-organs of such persons, too, cannot surpass the boundaries of sensitiveness as we know it commonly.

5. An objection may be raised here:

However, perception of a superior kind is possible, depending on its percipient. Perception, therefore, may become perfect if the percipient is perfect.

That is to say: a finite thing may be found to become infinite; for instance, extent becomes infinite
in space, which is infinitely extended. Similarly, we find that finite Perception is considerably widened in air-borne creatures, like crows, owls, vultures etc., so that Perception might conceivably become infinite in some being. This indeed is the uppermost limit of knowledge where it encompasses every knowable thing; for we know from experience that knowledges exceed one another as their contents exceed one another.

That is why the wise can say that there is Someone in Whom such finite qualities as supremacy, dispassionativeness, power etc. subsist in an infinite and unequalled condition.

Consequently, this Person whose immediate perception encompasses the entire range of things that are present in the world is hereby explained to be the Bhagavān who has immediate perceptual knowledge that Consecration, worship and so forth are dharma. So what remains unproved? (is improper).

6. This objection is thus refuted:

The supreme perceptual knowledge which you assume is just a fancy. Perceptual knowledge can never go beyond its own sphere and trespass on another.

For instance:

A superior kind of visual perception, as well as a superior perceptible object, must necessarily occur in loci where inherent relations of one kind, as between colour and coloured, obtain in one object.

No knowledge that is received through one of the senses can encompass all that is knowable through all senses. So how can perceptual
knowledge by itself make all things known, i.e. also things known only through other means of knowledge?

7. The objector resumes:

However, the sensitivity which we attribute to Perception is directed toward the perceiving of what exists at present.

Of course, if Perception did not have this function of perceiving what exists at present as its natural function, it would cease to be Perception at all. Therefore, it is not reasonable to say that a superior kind of Perception, defined as encompassing all objects, is a priori impossible because it is limited to being Perception!

8. The objection is refuted:

If from finite Perception you conclude to infinite Perception, then I ask you to explain: can a finite quantity ever attain to such expansion that it cannot be further expanded? You insist, as it were, on full maturity in a little boy! 'even as a boy, after attaining the full growth, cannot grow physically further?' There are two possibilities: either the infinite exists in the finite, or the finite gradually becomes infinite.

The former cannot stand, for there is no Perception to support it: we have never seen a bowl or a similar finite object which had the same expansion as space.

And suppose a finite quantity could assume inconceivable infinitude: why, then any single jar or pitcher could fill up the entire space within the Egg of
Brahmā, so that all other things would be pushed out and perish accordingly!

If you take space itself as the subject, you merely prove the proved.' In the alternative you cannot avoid the illogicality we have pointed out: as a matter of fact, never before has anybody seen a finite pillar which was pervaded by an infinite pillar! Consequently, there remains the defect of mutual exclusion.

Let us also consider your illustration, namely that in space we have an example of a finite extent becoming infinite. Extent is by definition a limited extension of space, a relative quantity, something that can be entirely circumscribed. Extent in this definition does not subsist in space as such, so how can you adduce it as an example? Besides, if one were to infer extent in space, one would simultaneously infer the possibility that space might be surpassed in extent by another quantity. And so the illustration again falls short of the thesis.

Nor is there any evidence for the thesis that a superior perception reveals that Consecration, worship etc. are actually dharma.

To sum up: For all these reasons it would appear to us that the supposition that some, otherwise unperceived, supreme spiritual being exists with a superior sensibility is very weak; and this being so, we conclude that Perception offers no authority for the postulated relation of means to ends; and since the authority of Pañcarātra is based upon the Perception of this supposed relation, its authority is entirely non-existent.
9. Not only is there no Perception, but there cannot possibly be an Inference to support the thesis in question, for it is wholly suprasensible: and Inference, of course, can only take place after an invariable concomitance has been observed by means of Perception. If no fires have ever been observed before, they cannot prove that smoke is invariably concomitant with them.¹⁰

10. Nor do we find scriptural evidence which sets forth that the performance of all the rites which are established in the Sātvata doctrine is mandatory; such evidence would have proved that the Pañcarātra Tradition, being based upon this mandate,¹¹ carried authority.

Nor is it possible, in the absence of explicit revelation, to infer such evidence from Scripture. For just as the relation of means to certain ends which are their fruits, e.g., heaven, as Pañcarātra maintains Consecration, worship etc. to be, does not allow of being inferred because no such relation can be verified by Perception, just so no scriptural authority to furnish the basis of such a relation can be inferred from Scripture.

Nor is any verbal testimony capable of providing valid knowledge that Scripture is the basis of the Tradition concerned. Verbal testimony is of two kinds, originating from a person or not originating from a person.¹²

Personal speech cannot be proof of it, for persons may lie in order to deceive their hearers. For even today, we find philosophers who pretend to be scriptural and yet expound an interpretation which is wholly unscriptural.
So we have our doubts whether the claim made by the authors of the Pañcarātra texts that their own compositions are founded in the Veda is really the result of an honest conviction that such is indeed the case, or nothing but the self-glorification of authors who write as their fancy takes them!

This argumentation by itself suffices to disprove the contended authority of Pañcarātra, for there is no eternal Scripture\textsuperscript{14} to support the claim.

Nor can Analogy prove that Scripture is its basis, for this criterion cannot be properly applied; for how could the proof we need, which cannot be found by the other means of knowledge, be within the scope of the mere knowledge of similitude?

Nor can it be argued that, since the Tradition cannot be proved by other means, Implication\textsuperscript{15} proves that Scripture is its basis. The argument is as follows, circumstantial Implication must prove the tradition, as it cannot be proved otherwise; the authors of the Pañcarātra, clearly have this tradition that Consecration, worship, etc. are dharma and this tradition is comparable to the tradition of Manu and others that certain non-Vedic rites, as the āśāka etc., are dharma; now there can be no tradition of a fact unless that fact has been cognized before; but here we have the tradition of a fact that cannot be proved by Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony or Analogy; therefore the cognition of the fact can only have originated from Scripture.

However, this argument would only prove its point if there were any authority for the assumption
of the three estates do not accept the doctrines of Traditions of this kind.

13. Objection:

Nevertheless, the fact that Bhāgavata Brahmins, who wear the hair-tuft, the sacred thread etc. prescribed in Scripture, perform daily the rites of Pañcarātra should then justify the presumption that these rites likewise ultimately derive from the Veda. On what grounds, then, are we to assume that this same Pañcarātra Tradition really has its origins in error, deceit and the like, the very negation of valid authority?

14. Refutation:

We reply: Well! So you really argue that the Bhāgavatas, who are hated by the three estates, are exemplary and hence authoritative?!

Objection:

But they are Brahmins, and Brahmins are considered to be the highest estate; why should they not be exemplary?

Refutation:

Brahmins? Far from it! We do not regard Brahmins as a distinct species, different from the species man, with specific characteristics which mere sensory perception permits us to recognize as present in some specific bodies and absent in others. Hair-tuft, sacred thread etc. which are prescribed for Brahmins and the other two estates, do not make a man a Brahmin! Nor do they demonstrate that a man is a Brahmin, for we see them worn illegally by blackguards, outcasts and the like. Therefore, the sole criterion by which we can tell whether a man
is indeed a Brahmin is acceptance of undisputed expressions by older persons, which give us irrefutable proof. Nor do ordinary people use without hesitation the term Brahmin to describe Bhāgavatas. There is also a distinct difference in the two appellations: here Brahmins, there Bhāgavatas.

15. **Objection:**

The people do not use the word 'Brahmin' to refer to Bhāgavatas. The reference is only difference as this much Brahmins and this much Bhāgavatas. Be that as it may, still, the appellations Sātvata, Bhāgavata etc. are also used to name Brahmins, by some sort of transference of properties, just as the word parivrājaka is used to designate a Brahmin.

**Refutation:** The argument is false.

Persons of certain inferior castes are commonly referred to as Sātvatas; the name is used to denote these castes, and not anything else. The grammarians have the rule that it is improper to use a certain word in its etymological sense if it can also be taken in a customary sense which is more common, e.g., rathakāra.

If there were no such rule, how could the word rathakāra give up its etymological meaning of "chariot-maker" to become the name of a particular caste, even to the extent of cancelling all connotations which we have learnt? Similarly, Sātvata refers to a person who has been born from a vṛātya vaisy and belongs to the lowest castes, and is thus excluded from the sacraments of initiation, etc. Manu says: "The issue of a vaisy vrātya extraction is called Sudhanvā or Bhāruṣa or Nijaṅgha or Maitra or Sātvata." It cannot
that cognitions are invariably true. But when certain notions which are produced by the false cognitions of people whose judgement is clouded by hatred, prejudice and obstinacy, cause such "traditions" to be written in accordance with these false cognitions, could these traditions possibly be true?

11. Here an objection may be raised:

However, the same arguments may be advanced against the authority of the traditions of Manu etc. The observation of the aṣṭākā rite does not produce any perceptual knowledge that this rite is indeed a means to realize the postulated end. Nor can it be inferred, because no relation is perceptually given. Nor is there any scriptural evidence for it, for it cannot be found. Nor again can such evidence be inferred from Scripture where it is not found explicitly, because no relation is perceptually given. Nor can it be proved, through Analogy, as there is no apparent analogue. Nor through circumstantial Implication, because of the reasons given above against the argument that it is otherwise unprovable. Now, if it is legitimate in one case to presume scriptural authority in support of it because there happens to be a well-established tradition about it among Vedic experts,—well, in Pañcarātra, too, great sages are traditionally known as the founders of the sacred transmission, sages like Nārada, Śāṅḍilya and others. The same objections and the same justifications can be advanced about both the tradition of Manu etc. and the tradition of Pañcarātra. Either both are authoritative or neither is. There are no grounds to show that the two traditions differ in some essential respect. Either we must reject the authority
of Manu’s tradition as well, or we must indeed show in which respect the Pañcarātra tradition is different from Manu’s.

12. This objection is refuted:

The author of the Sūtras, by making the Sūtra: “Tradition is also valid, because it has the same agent as Scripture”, has clearly indicated that in his opinion no essential difference exists between Scriptural and Traditional validity. Accordingly, we find that those who are qualified for the three Vedas perform equally for purposes of higher benefits both the ritual acts which are enjoined by Scripture (e.g., agnihōtra, pūrṇadarśamāsa, jyolīstoma, etc.) and the ritual acts enjoined by Tradition (e.g., aṣṭakā, ācamana, saṃdhyā worship, etc.), because they have been instructed in both varieties of acts by their fathers or preceptors. The firmness with which so highly qualified exemplary persons have adopted these traditional rites as incumbent upon the three higher estates goes to show that the knowledge that rites of this kind, aṣṭakā etc., obviously found to exist, are mandatory ultimately derives from Scripture itself. On the other hand, we find that those who observe the scriptural rites of agnihōtra etc. do not observe the Tāntric customs in the same manner as they observe such traditional customs as ācamana investiture with the sacred thread etc. On the contrary, the Vedic experts condemn those who do. It follows that the validity which we attribute to different Traditions “because”, as the Sūtra says, “they have the same agent as Scripture”, cannot well apply to heterodox Traditions as the Pañcarātra; for exemplary exponents
be disputed that Bhāgavata is another name for Śātvata; Śṛṅgi has it that “the fifth, called Śātvata, worships the temples and sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree; he is also called Bhāgavata.”

The Śṛṅgi thus describes which profession the descendants of the said vrātya vaiśya pursue—and with our own eyes we indeed see them pursue this profession. Thus Uṣanas: “They all live by the plough and the sword, the Ācāryas and the Śātvatas live on the worship of the Deity.” Similarly, in the Brahma Purāṇa—“He worships the sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree.” Elsewhere the same is stated thus: “The profession of the Śātvatas is to clean up the sanctuaries of the Deity and the eatables offered to the idol, as well as to guard it.” And, to dispel the last doubt about the sort of people they are, Manu declares: “Whether disguised or not, they can be known by their deeds.”

16. Their conduct, moreover, proves that they cannot be Brahmins. For a living they perform pūjā to the Deity, undergo their Consecration, eat themselves the food which is offered to the idols, observe deviating sacraments—from the prenatal garbhadhāna rite to the funerary rituals—, omit to perform the śrauta ritual and avoid contact with Brahmins. These and other habits show conclusively that they cannot be Brahmins.

Śṛṅgis declare that the reason of their disqualification for Vedic rites is this that they perform pūjā to the Deity in order to earn a living: “Those who from generation to generation have worshipped the Deity professionally are disqualified for the study of the Veda,
for participation in the sacrifices and for officiating in sacrifices." Their own Parama Saṁhitā states the same prohibition: "Whether in disaster or emergency, in terror or in straits, one must never worship the God of gods for a living." Such habits as wearing the garlands that are offered to the God and eating the food that is presented to the idol and other practices of that kind, which are condemned by all right-thinking people, shows plainly that they are not Brahmins.

Furthermore, we wonder how it can be presumed that the authority of these people proves that Scripture is the basis of their way of life: at the mere sight of them all respectable men perform expiatory rites such as cāndrāyona! Smṛti declares that if one sets eyes on a devalaka, it is necessary to perform an expiation. A devalaka is someone who lives on temple treasure and worships the idol for a livelihood. Thus Devala: "One who lives on temple treasure is called a devalaka." Likewise: "A Brahmin who has worshipped the deity for three years in order to make a living is called a devalaka and he is held to be unworthy to partake in any ritual." Those who have been known to worship the God as a hereditary profession are automatically regarded as devalakas. The rite of expiation is set forth in the precept: "A Brahmin who is taking his meal should not look at ordure, a pig, a eunuch, a sacrificial pole, a devalaka or a corpse; if he does he must observe the cāndrāyona." Atri, too, very explicitly declares that they are not Brahmins: "The Avālukas, Devalakas, Kalpadevalakas, Gaṇabhoga-devalakas and fourthly those of the Bhāgavata profession are corrupt Brahmins." Also the venerable Vyāsa:
"The Āhvāyakas, Devalakas, Nakṣatragrāmāyahajakas and Mahāpathikas are outcaste Brahmins."

Therefore, the fact that Pañcarātra recognizes the authority of the Bhāgavatas who by birth and by deeds have deviated from the Way of the Veda is sufficient ground to deny authority to the Pañcarātra Scriptures.

17. Furthermore, the class of texts with which we are here concerned are not valid means of knowing which acts are good and which are evil inasmuch as they are accepted by heretics, and thus are of the same kind as the Buddhist statements on stūpa worship.

Besides, their own texts relate that the instruction in all their dharmas presupposes the abandoning of the Way of the Veda; "having failed to find the supreme good in the four Vedas, Śāndilya learnt this doctrine....". But how can we presume that a certain text can teach that a certain object, which is known from the four Vedas, is man's supreme goal in life if he rejects at the outset the very authority of the Vedas as sources of knowledge about the means which lead to bliss? On the contrary, we find that Manu and other authors of Traditions declare that their works which expound as their teaching the means of attaining all kinds of desirable ends derive solely from Scripture: "The Veda in its entirety is the basis of the Law, as well as of the traditions and customs of those who are expert in Law"; "the Law is enjoined by Scripture and Tradition"; "it is entirely expressed in the Veda; for the Veda contains all knowledge."

Further, the assertion that those who have already been consecrated by the sacraments of Investiture etc. and are thereby qualified for all the Vedic rituals,
agnihōtra etc., must yet undergo another sacrament, called Consecration,\(^3\) in order to be qualified for the worship of the Bhagavān, demonstrates that the system is non-Vedic; for if it were Vedic, they would be qualified for Tāntric ritual by the regular sacraments.

Again, another indication of its non-Vedic character is the fact that the system is not included among the fourteen sources of knowledge, which all orthodox people recognize as giving authoritative information on the Law.\(^3\) If it were authoritative, then it would have been recognized as such by tradition; but as it is not so recognized, this proves that the Pañcarātra tradition is non-Vedic. For this reason the venerable Bādarāyaṇa, when he has occasion to refute the heterodox doctrines of Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda, the Buddha etc. as inimical to the Way of the Veda, also refutes the Pañcarātra in his Sūtra: "Because of the impossibility of origin."\(^3\) Therefore, as the Vedic experts regard the Pañcarātra doctrine as non-Vedic since it is not included among the Vedic systems and because of other reasons which will be advanced in the sequel, it cannot be compared with the Tradition of Manu etc.

In view of all this it is our opinion that such infrequent good rites—e.g., the worship of the Bhagavān—which are described by the Pañcarātricas (who teach a good many others, mostly black arts of exciting hatred, haunting a person out of his occupation, envoutement etc.) are merely added to deceive people about their real attentions and do not deserve our faith or consideration: they are like milk that is put in a dog’s bladder!
To sum up, it is not proper to assume that Pañcarātra is based on the Veda and therefore equally authoritative as the doctrinal works of Manu and others.

**DISCURSUS:**

18. At this point someone interjects: 10 If you please, by all means assume that the Vedas constitute the cause of the delegated and indirect authority of the Tradition of Manu etc. But is there any reason why we should have to depend exclusively on the Veda as the basis of the Pañcarātra tradition too? The same direct knowledge which is the very foundation of the authority of the Vedas themselves is also the foundation of the authority of the Pañcarātra doctrine; the authority of the latter is not based upon the relation of supporting authority and supported authority which characterizes typical śmārta injunctions, e.g., āṣṭakā and ācamana which have their common basis in the Veda.

In fact, the two traditions of the āṣṭakā rite and the ācamana rite are not interdependent, but they are equally and independently authoritative. Similarly, Pañcarātra and Scripture are not interdependent. If Pañcarātra collapses as soon as it is denied the support of the Veda, why then should the Veda not collapse when the support of Pañcarātra is taken away from it?

19. The Vedas derive their authority from direct knowledge which originates from a person and must therefore naturally derive from a person. Who can doubt it? For we perceive that words, from their very nature, depend for their composition on some entity that is different from themselves. How else
could they exist at all? If it is objected that the significance of the Book called Veda just consists in this that it does in fact exist as Word though nobody has composed it, then we reply; why, if this were true, then the significance of smoke on a mountain consists in this that it whirls irrepressibly sky-high without fire! It is utterly out of the question.  

20. Objection. But since the applicability of the dharma cannot be shown by any of the means of knowledge, how can a book on it be composed?  

Reply. Don't argue like that: for the Bhagavân who, of course, has an immediate intuition of dharma and adharma through the knowledge which is natural to Him has had this Book called Veda composed out of compassion for the world.

21. Objection. But does this intuition or perception also encompass dharma and adharma?

Reply. Certainly. How else would the Bhagavân be able to give rise to such effects as body, world etc.? For the maker of such effects must be one who is capable of perceiving their material and instrumental causes. Now, dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes of the world; this is also the consensus of the Mīmāṃsakas. Consequently we must postulate a certain person who has this perceptual knowledge; and that person must also be the one who created the Veda at the beginning.

22. If one contends that such entities as mountains, earth and the like are not effects, the answer is as follows:

The entities in question, earth etc., are effects, because they have a complex construction, like a king's palace.
Similarly, from the fact that they are made up of parts we conclude that they are subject to destruction.

Entities that can be destroyed are destroyed by someone who knows the means by which they can be destroyed, just as we can destroy clay vessels etc. when we know by what means to destroy them.

In the case of entities that are shattered, for instance, by a falling tree, that is without perceptible intelligent agency, the cause of their destruction remains dubious: but because of this very dubiety there can also be not positive certainty that the cause of their destruction is entirely occasional.

Motion, when there is mass, is sufficient ground to infer in this world that an entity which has mass and can move is subject to origination and to destruction.

It being thus established that earth etc. are indeed effects, on the grounds adduced above, it follows that the Bhagavān has knowledge of dharma and adharma which are the instrumental causes of origination and annihilation.45

Consequently, the entities here in question, earth, mountains and the like, have been created by a maker who possesses the described knowledge.

Everything that has origin and end is, in our experience, created by such a maker, just because it is subject to origination and annihilation, like a house.

23. Let it not be argued that there is no intermediate production of effects like body, world etc. between acts that bring about the desires of the person who undertakes them,46 for these acts are unable to
produce anything unless they are used as an instrument by a spiritual being, since they are non-spiritual themselves, like an adze: without the operation of a spiritual being—the carpenter—an adze is incapable of effecting by itself such objects as a sacrificial pole.

And we are not able to create through the instrumentality of *apūrva* factors: for before the actual fruition of the ritual act we cannot know their instrumentality, and it has been said that only a person who has actual knowledge of the material and instrumental causes can be a maker with respect to these causes. And there is no embodied soul which is known, or claimed, to be capable of having the required actual knowledge of the *apūrva* that is to arise from the act.

Therefore we must admit a Person of absolute omnipotence who is able to take in at a glance the entire Universe with dharma and adharma of all embodied souls, their experiencing of karmic results etc., and in whose nature such properties as unrestricted knowledge etc. subsist. As they say: “The unobstructed knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a universal lord and dharma are all four established together.”

Mantras, arthavādas, epic and purāṇa corroborate this point; e.g. “The one god, Prajāpati, creating heaven and earth, created the Vedas,” etc. At the moment of inception the great Grace of this Person who is the Bhagavān is evoked by a glance at the aggregate of individual souls who are almost in a state of non-spiritual stupor, their instruments for the experiencing of karmic results—body, senses and other organs—being completely dissolved. His Grace evoked,
he originates the entire universe and simultaneously He creates the triple Veda which states pellucidly the means by which the souls in transmigration can realize the objects of their desires. Then again, perceiving that they are in a pitiable condition, being immersed in the ocean of existence which is perturbed by wave upon wave of all manner of iniquities, His heart burns with supreme compassion and He promulgates, through Sanatkumāra, Nārada etc., the Pañcarātra Samhitas which constitute the sources of knowledge about the manner in which He should be propitiated to attain to perfect bliss. Forasmuch as the Tantras are therefore based upon an immediate cognition of the Lord and are consequently self-sufficient like the Vedas, can they belong in the company of any Tradition, that of Manu of anyone?

Refutation. 52
24. If this is true, then on what authority is such a creator of the Vedas known to exist? He is not directly perceived.

Nor can we infer from the fact that the Veda is word that it therefore must have an author, for that would entail the total reversion of your special contentions.

For an utterance that is perceived to depend for its composition on the agency of some being is also perceived to be uttered by no one but an embodied being.

Now for all embodied beings the body is the instrument for good and for evil; so the assumption that the Veda is utterance would occasion the inference that it has been created by an embodied being whose
happiness and unhappiness resulted from his good and evil karman, and who therefore cannot be God.

Moreover, in that case it would be impossible to establish the authority of the Vedas themselves; for if dharma—the Law—is not independent of other means of knowledge, there is no exclusive authority of the Vedas.33

25. Objection. But why should dharma be independent of other means of knowledge? For we have asserted that He has actual knowledge of dharma and adharma: how else could He produce the world of which dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes?

Reply. That has indeed been asserted, but the assertion is fallacious: for no creator of the entire universe can be found of whom this can be assumed.

To your argument that the world must be effected because it has a complex construction can be objected that empiricists distinguish three kinds of entities:

Those whose makers are evident to perception, e.g. pots and the like; those which are not found to be made at all;34 and those whose creation remained doubtful, like the earth etc.

In the two first-mentioned cases there is no room for God’s activity. As to the third, the earth etc. are not involved in a total origination or disintegrations, but merely, as now, subject to varying degrees of increase and decrease which are adventitious. To say that the Mīmāṃsakas accept origination and annihilation in this sense is to prove the proved.35

In our opinion, too, these intelligent agents bring about various results by means of sacrifices and other acts, in order to enjoy these results themselves; and
the assumption that they are indeed, as is proved for both of us, instrumental therein is quite correct, for we can have direct knowledge of these acts, sacrifices, donations and the like. However, the special power described with terms like apūrva can never be open to perception. How then can we have use for a supervising God?²⁶

26. Certainly, it is not true that an agent, for instance a potter, when he wishes to produce a certain product—pots—must first have direct knowledge of the power of their material cause—clay—and instrumental cause—stick—to produce these products before he can actually undertake their production. Else people who are unaware of the power of the requisite causes would never be able to employ these causes in order to produce the results they want. In the case under discussion the persons concerned do indeed know which causes are required to bring about the results they want, for they know these causes, such as sacrifices etc., through the knowledge they have obtained from eternal Scripture. Thus, aided by these causes, they render manifest such products as earth etc.

Also, there is no invariable rule that only an agent to whom the material and instrumental causes are fully known is capable of undertaking an action and nobody else. A man can still be an agent in the action of knowing without perceiving in his own mind the material and instrumental causes that go into the making of this action of knowing. Why, then, contend that the causes must be known first?

27. The contention that the entire Universe is subject to annihilation because it has parts is incorrect.
Such a conclusion is cancelled by stronger perceptual evidence against it. For the knowledge that does arise in the world of here and now is plainly this: 'Here is the meru; here is the sun; here is the earth.'

Recognition conveys to us the knowledge that these entities are related to different times; and certainly both in former and later ages there arise similar persons who have the same notion of these entities' present existence. To put it in syllogistic form:

The past has persons who recognize earth, sun and mountain, because the past is time, like the present.

The same syllogism can be constructed with regard to the future. This reasoning does not entail the fallacious conclusion that pots etc. are eternal, for in their case origination and annihilation are directly evident.

It does not follow that, when a certain fact cannot be proved on the strength of a certain ground, since this ground involves a contradiction, this same ground cannot prove the same fact when it does not involve a contradiction.$^{57}$

The other inference that has been given to prove that the world is subject to origination and annihilation, namely on the ground of motion when there is mass, is likewise incorrect; for this ground, too, is cancelled by the greater cogency of recognition. Consequently, inference cannot provide positive proof that the world is subject to origination and annihilation.

28. Further, you contend that there is a God, on the ground that the world is a product; but this ground precludes a specially qualified producer. For a product generally implies on the part of its producer a number
of properties which are natural to him and therefore indispensable for the precise knowledge of the concomitance between him and his product. Properties like being in possession of a body, having something left to desire, being deprived of omnipotence and omniscience, etc. How, then, can the fact that the world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the producer proposed for it possesses the postulated properties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient etc., properties, that is, which are the opposite of what would naturally follow? The production of a product requires the activation of the body, which requires on the producer's part an effort whose inherent cause is his relation with a body and is impossible of any but just such a producer. It follows that under no condition bodiless person can be an agent.

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argument, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses a body, then the question arises, Is that body itself subject to origination or not? If it be subject to origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, then your contention that whatever has parts must come to an end is not universally true. The solution of others, namely that God's special properties can be demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion, does not hold good either. For that rule holds only of a case where a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does not actually exist. In our case, however, the conflict is plain enough.

29. Objection. But if even a well-considered invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being, then all
logical process of deduction is done with. But if deduction can indeed convey true knowledge, that it must also convey that there is a producer capable of creating the entire universe.

REPLY. We do not say that your deduction fails to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that it also demonstrates without discrimination as many properties in this producer as, at the moment of grasping the concomitance, are known to obtain in any producer.

Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case where the term which we seek to establish through deduction can also be known through another means of knowledge, then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone. In the present instance, however, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance elicited through positive and negative consideration are indiscriminately established by the deduction.

A similarly occasional relationship between producer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person's action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must remain entirely conjectural.
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Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case where the term which we seek to establish through deduction can also be known through another means of knowledge, then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone. In the present instance, however, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance elicited through positive and negative consideration are indiscriminately established by the deduction.

A similarly occasional relationship between producer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person's action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must remain entirely conjectural.
30. Another question to be considered is from what point in space, at what point in time, and to what purpose a person who is satisfied in all eternity would produce the universe. Every agent, e.g., a potter, produces a product by means of certain instruments, while occupying a certain space at a certain time and aiming at a certain result which he wants. If the production of the world is purely sport and without ulterior motivation, since God does not want anything, beware, for this states clearly that the Lord is by nature independent from anything beside Himself. Yet willy-nilly, without regard for anything He might wish, He shoulders the vast task of creating, sustaining and destroying the world. Is He in creating the creatures prompted by His compassion? But why, then, does He not create them happy? If you reply, because God takes karman into account, then you deny his complete independence. Besides, if their karman provides sufficient causes for these creatures’ variety, why assume God at all?

Therefore, there cannot be such a person who is capable of creating the universe, of perceiving immediately dharma and adharma, and of composing the Vedas.

31. Moreover, if the Vedas were created by someone, this creator would be remembered: ‘He is the one who has composed them.’ It is not proper to assume that he has been forgotten, just as the digger of an exhausted well is forgotten. The latter is justifiable because the well no longer serves a purpose. But in the case of the Vedas, who, without remembering that
the author was reliable; would give credence to all the Vedic rites which are to be performed at the expense of great trouble involving the loss of various properties? Consequently, if it cannot be proved of the Vedas that they have been composed by a person, because this person, however worthy of remembrance, is not remembered, they can no more prove that God was their author than the Mahābhārata and similar books can. Therefore the Vedas do not originate from a person. In consequence, the contention that the validity of Pañcarātra is based upon the same immediate cognition which is the basis of the validity of the Veda itself is the contention of those whose discrimination has been warped by their bias in favour of their own conclusions.

32. Objection. But in what does this 'preter-personal' character of the Veda consist? If it consists in this that the Vedas are composed of eternal words, the same holds true of the Pañcarātra Tantra. Or if it is the eternity of the words that constitute it, again the same is true. It could not be the eternity of the word-sequence, for sequence cannot be natural to eternal entities. If it is said that it is the sequence of the sounds in so far as these sounds are pronounced in one particular sequence, then we reply that since a sequence of pronunciation is non-eternal, the sequence of the sounds pronounced cannot be eternal. So where does the difference lie between Pañcarātra and Vedic revelation?

Reply. The difference lies herein that in the case of the Pañcarātra the sequence is created by an
independent person, whereas in the case of the Veda, a dependent person invariably wishes to repeat the exact sequence which had been laid down before him by students who preceded him. A category of a different degree which is established on the strength of recognition should not be denied. And with this we conclude our lengthy disquisition.

33. The preceding has proved that the proposition that the Pañcarātra is authoritative because it is based upon an immediate cognition of a person categorically different from other persons, is not viable at all. Since there is no means of knowledge by which the existence of a person who has immediate knowledge of good and evil can be proved, it follows that this Tantra must have been promulgated by some human being with the purpose of deceiving the world.

34. Objection. This would be true if proof of the existence of the Lord could only be sought on the strength of logical argumentation. As it is, this is a fallacy, for the great Lord is known on the authority of the Upaniṣads. When we hear the multitudinous statements of the eternal Scriptures which set forth the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent supreme Personality who is capable of creating the entire universe, how then can we refuse to accept the authority of a tradition which derives from His immediate cognition?

35. To continue this topic, these scriptural statements do not exceed the bounds of their authority just because they are concerned with facts; for similar
statements made by persons concerning facts that are extremely remote from a connection with other means of knowledge cannot be denied the authority which is afforded them naturally.

Nor do statements concerning a fact lack authority because of the consideration that since either a proving or disproving factor may unexpectedly turn up there remains the possibility that this fact is thus repeated or reversed; for the same may equally well happen to a statement concerning, not a fact, but a kārya. A kārya, too, may be known from other means of knowledge, for it must be admitted that ordinary kāryas, like 'fetch firewood' are also known through other means of knowledge, as in the case of the cooking of the odana.

Or if it be claimed that, inasmuch as a kārya concerning a categorically different thing like the agnihotra etc. cannot conceivably find any other authority, therefore the verbal testimony which sets forth such a thing must needs be its authority,—well, then we may say that there is not a ghost of another authority for the Bhagavān whose form consists in unsurpassed knowledge, supremacy and beatitude; so that it should follow that everything is entirely the same in both cases, depending on one's particular partisan views.

Moreover, the theory is that since another means of knowledge can apply to a fact, a verbal statement concerning this fact cannot validly prove it: but why should not this other means of knowledge itself be the repetitious one since verbal testimony concerning its fact may conceivably turn up? or, why should other means of knowledge which themselves are liable to
various deficiencies entail the negation of a notion that arises from eternal Scripture untouched by all defects inherent in persons, merely because it is deduced that its validity is cancelled by a prior means of knowledge? This is absurd.

Thus, therefore, the imperfections that necessarily follow from the induction, e.g. absence of omniscience⁶⁷, possession of a body etc., find no room in the Bhagavân whose supernal manifestation of miraculous knowledge, supremacy and so forth is known from hundreds of fruits, just as cold can find no place in fire.

And, in consequence,

How can our tongue endeavour to state that the Tantra is false, while it is composed by the Omniscient One Himself who is known through the Upaniṣads? Alas for the fool’s grand exhibition of labour in Mīmāṃsā! How can a mind schooled in Mīmāṃsā be so mistaken?

36. Learned thinkers, whose intellectual powers command respect,⁶⁸ maintain that all Vedic testimony carries authority only concerning such kāryas as cannot presuppose any other authority. Since words are considered to have their true sense only when they concern such a kārya, it is impossible that any statement can be denotative if it concerns something else than a kārya. Therefore, when a man has observed that in an exchange between two adult persons a certain inherently related action of one of them takes place immediately upon his hearing a sentence uttered by the other, he concludes with certainty that the denoting
power of the sentence as inferred by means of circumstantial-implication terminates completely in the kārya that has been conveyed by that sentence. The very awareness of kārya is known to relate to one's own kārya; so the onlooker, observing the same process in the present case, realizes that the one person's action has been caused by the other person's variously differentiated behaviour: "Surely this person has been made aware by the other of this kārya that he proceed to his action immediately upon become aware of what he has to do." This leads the observer to the conclusion that if therefore the verbal statement is truly denotative in so far as it serves to convey a kārya whose specific motivation conforms to the entire statement, then whatever bits of meaning come to mind as a result of the addition or omission of words are denoted by these words only in strict accordance to this kārya, which thus constitutes the primarily known principal element of the statement. In such a statement the imperative and optative verbal terminations, which unvaryingly give rise to a knowledge of kārya, convey by themselves the body of the kārya, whereas the indicative etc. terminations are subject to a contextual relation with the kārya by describing consequent matters which required by the kārya, e.g. a person's qualification to accomplish it etc.

37. Take for example the statement that a son has been born to the person spoken to, a purely substantive statement; the aggregate of words which convey nothing more than this bare fact that a son has been born, is not definitely proved to possess the power
of denoting the postulated birth of the son by means of such resultant effects as cheerful looks or joyfully bristling hairs on the part of the father.\(^74\) For, it is impossible to establish definitely that the occurrence of a cause for various joys in future, past and present is really due to the denotative power of the statement. Therefore, also in the case when we have a verb in the present indicative collocated with words that have their proper signification (in that they refer to things that presuppose no other means of knowledge), it must be assumed that in it we have a substitute with a positive (i.e. injunctive) denotation of words without actually having explicit reference to a \(kārya\).\(^75\)

38. A person knows that a certain word has a certain denotation, when it is known what is the denotation, of the other words with which it is collocated.\(^76\) It is proved that words have the power of denoting things only in so far as they are contextually connected with a \(kārya\); consequently, their validity concerning an established fact is based on this that they give rise to the notion of \(kārya\).

It is contended that this denotation of \(kārya\) is only occasional in words,\(^77\) but this contention is incorrect; the ground for words to be denotative is that they deal with a \(kārya\), so that the contention suffers of the vice of being unproved. For a notion that arises from a verbal statement can never terminate in any object whatsoever that is not a \(kārya\).

The cognitions of contextual relations which arise immediately upon hearing a profane statement are said to derive, not from Verbal Testimony, but from
Inference. Thus it is right that these cognitions do not terminate in kāryas.

39. If it were not accepted that verbal statements always bear on kāryas, on what grounds then could an indicative statement like agnihotraṁ juhoti “he offers the agnihotra” be accepted as an injunction? Or if it be claimed that in this case, even though the statement as it stands has no complete validity, it is accepted as an injunction in order to ensure that it subserves a purpose, we reply that this claim is incorrect, since the operation of means of knowledge is not dependent on purpose, but rather is the acceptance of purpose dependent on the operation of the means of knowledge. It is not proper to assume that since one does not like to find rocks when one is looking for gold therefore one finds gold! As long as we do not assume that a statement is denotative only when it bears on a kārya, we cannot assume that a verb in the present indicative contains an injunction.

40. In the same manner the meaning of the upanisads must also be interpreted as being subordinate to such injunctions as “One must know the soul, meditate on it, etc.” which are expressed in different passages; this meaning, then, is that one must know the omniscient soul which is beatitude, i.e. an injunction. That the soul is the object of an injunction does not by itself however prove that the soul exists as an established fact; for there can also be an injunction that a certain thing be such while actually it is not so; for example the injunction, “Know your father in someone who is not your father,” or “Know that the
syllable OM, which is not the udgītha, is the udgītha."

All statements that set forth the reality and the eternality of the soul only serve to convey that there is a spiritual agent, who is required in order to experience the otherworldly fruits that are mentioned in ritual injunctions where the time of fruition is not specified.

Therefore, no verbal statement whatever is a means of knowing a thing as such. Thus, by denying that the arthavādas, too, can serve to convey knowledge of facts like Rudra's weeping, it is shown that they merely serve to give praise in contextual connection with an injunction, which may be comparatively remote.

41. To conclude, it follows that the postulated divine person, whose personality is the product of the baseless beliefs of people that have failed to consider the true denotation of preceding or succeeding statements, is eliminated, with which we conclude our extensive discussion.

42. It is proved now that the pre-eminence of that postulated person cannot be borne out by Scripture. Let us, further, suppose that Scripture can indeed convey knowledge of facts; even so, what possible basis is there for the assumption that there exists a person who knows dharma and adharma, when we take into account the cognition that arises from injunction? Omniscience is possible only if the omniscient person knows the objects exactly as they are known by means of the different means of knowledge; for there is no statement which declares omniscience by cancelling the normal means of knowledge. Even if there were such a statement, it would have to be explained as an
arthavāda since its word-meanings would not allow of mutual relation. A cognition about a sentence-meaning arises from the individual words and it presupposes in these words such properties as appropriateness etc. which are learnt through other means of knowledge; now we wonder how such a cognition could arise at all, if there were a conflict with these other means of knowledge that are required primarily for the cognition to arise! If a statement concerning an object that is contradicted by perception etc., were authoritative, who could then reject the identity of sun and sacrificial pole? And if there is a person who possesses this peculiar excellency, what happens to the authority of the texts which is sought to be proved?

43. Objection. However, those who follow the Pañcarātra clan have the tradition that this Pañcarātra has been composed by this person.

Refutation. But why do the Pāśupatas then not agree with their view? They, too, claim that the sovereign of the universe is the promulgator of their own system, and others have the same claims. Now they cannot all of them be omniscient, because then it would be impossible for them to set forth mutually contradictory teachings. The same ground which allows one among several discussants to prove an omniscient promulgator must hold equally for all of them. But which one among the many omniscient beings who propound mutually conflicting teachings while claiming each for himself the prerogative of omniscience, which one do we conclude is the one and only omniscient God? As the text says, “If there are several omniscient beings who propound incompatible
doctrines and if for each of them the arguments are equally valid, then whom can we elicit as the true and only one?" When each omniscient being is assumed on the basis of one's own Tantra doctrine since the various tantric doctrines are mutually in conflict, the result will be that none of them is authoritative.

44. Objection. How can the teaching of Vāsudeva himself, who is well-known in Revelation and Tradition, be brought to the same level as other Tantras? For the manifestation of His power has been revealed in the Puruṣa Hymn, "The earth sprang from his feet, the quarters of the sky from his ears;" and again, "The creator created sun and moon as before;" likewise, "He is Brahmā, he is Śiva;" "Viṣṇu's highest step;" "No one is his lord in this world, no one his commander; he has no sign." In this way, the statements of Revelation describe his manifestation characterized by His origination, maintenance and annihilation of the world. Similarly, the Tradition: "From Viṣṇu arose the world, in him does it subsist; he is the one who causes it to exist and to perish," said Parāśara; Manu, too, declared that He is the lord: "Nārāyaṇa is above the unmanifest, and the World-egg is produced by the unmanifest."

This Supreme Person who is continually praised for His knowledge and supremacy in the statements of Revelation and of the sages has created Pañcarātra. If this Tantra is then on a level with Tantras that are apostate from the path of Revelation, then one might as well reason that a soma-drinker is on a level with a wine-drinker, just because he is a drinker! Is this
Tantra not superior? Therefore, then, are the qualities of immaculate knowledge, supremacy etc. of the Bhagavān not currently attributed also to the Destroyer of the Three Cities in the texts of Revelation? Therefore, it is absurd to hold the equality of the Tantras promulgated by both. Or, since He is the God who is the cause of the origination, protection and destruction of the universe and for whom the entire Vedānta furnishes evidence to the exclusion of anyone else, how could He promulgate a doctrine that is outside the pales of the Veda?

45. Objection. Nevertheless, a fair number of śrūtis are found which ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to lord Paśupati as well: "He who is all-knowing, omniscient;" "The supreme great sovereign of sovereigns."

Reply. By secondary denotation these two words "omniscient" and "sovereign" apply not only to the one who actually is omniscient and sovereign, but also to others, not excepting God Siva, who are as it were all-knowing and supreme. Besides, if in the above quotation yah sarvajñaḥ sarvavit the word sarvajña were indeed used to describe the omniscient one, there would be tautology of sarvavit.

Consequently, the word sarvajña refers only to Mahādeva; and so the Skanda-Purāṇa, Linga-Purāṇa and other Purāṇas exhaust themselves in describing this all knowing and sovereign character of Siva. Therefore, since the Pāśupata Tantra has been promulgated by this Pāśupati, it acquires authority in this way; but
the reversion of the authority of all Tantras in consequence of their mutual contradictions applies to this Pāśupata Tantra too.

46. Further, granted that the Lord Vāsudeva is the Person known in the upaniṣads, how then can the theory be held of him that he has promulgated the Pañcarātra Tantra which conflicts with Revelation—of him who said, "Revelation and Tradition are my commands?" Thus we conclude that there has been a deceiver who assumed the name of Vāsudeva and under that name composed the Tantra under discussion.

Or else, suppose that Vāsudeva Himself, ruler of the entire universe, was the promulgator of this Tantra; they still say that Hari, whose personal manifestations are deceptive because of his power of illusion, has promulgated these unholy texts deceivingly under the guise of holy texts in order to destroy the whole mass of enemies of the gods. Now, has he indeed composed this Tantra, leading the faithful into the mysterious abyss of his grand power of illusion, or not? This is the question that now arises. How are we to resolve it? Or are we rather to understand that he composed this Tantra while he himself was in error, since it is not accepted by the followers of the Veda, just as the doctrine of the Jainas is not accepted? That the followers of the Veda do not accept it has been set forth at length above. Consequently, then, Pañcarātra Tantra is not authoritative because it derives from the cognition of an independent Person.

47. Nor is it proper to argue the validity of the Pañcarātra Tradition "like the Manu Tradition etc."
If the God has composed the Tantra after having, like manu etc., learnt the meaning of the Veda from a teacher who was satisfied with his pupil's obedience, then the assumption that He was independent is purposeless and false. It is not borne out by human experience that the Veda was immediately manifest to him, even though he never learnt it. The defects which the Author of the Vārttika enumerates, those of personal superiority and inferiority etc.,¹⁰² are all to be presumed in the case of Pañcarātra.

48. Moreover, the Saivite, Pāśupata, Buddhist, Jainist, Kāpālika and Pañcarātra teachings are traditionally known as heretical. On the basis of the distinction between Vedic and Tantric we arrive at the conclusion that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda. "Tantra is of four kinds: Saiva, Pāśupata, Saumya and Lāguṇa; thus are described the divisions of Tantra; one should not confuse them." Likewise: "There are three distinct doctrines, the Bhākta, the Bhāgavata and the Sātvata;" this description of the divisions of Tantra is also found in Pañcarātra.

49. Furthermore, that a doctrine destitute of all logic and embracing the view that the soul knows birth, which is rejected by Revelation and Tradition, should be Truth is a highly ludicrous contention. Thus we find the śruti, "Verily, this soul is unperishing, essentially indestructible; it is not conjoined with size;"¹⁰³ and, "This dies without the soul; the soul does not die."¹⁰⁴

Objection. This is all very well, but all that this statement says is that the soul is not destroyed, not that it is not born.
Refutation. No, by stating that it cannot be destroyed, it also decides that it cannot be born; it is impossible that an entity that has been born does not perish.

Objection. Nonetheless, from the emphasis which in the statement “only sat was here ...” is laid on the uniqueness of sat, it follows that there were no souls before the time of creation. Had the individual soul existed before why then this emphasis of “only sat” on sat’s absolute solitariness?

Refutation. The reply to this is that here the emphasis on sat’s uniqueness is with regard to the elements of wind, water and ether that were about to be created by sat. Were the soul excluded by this statement of sat’s solitariness, then the soul’s origin would have been described in the sequel, just as the creation of ether is described. This is not done; therefore the soul does not know birth, since in the sequel “That sat created fire, etc.” we do not hear of the creation of the individual soul.

Objection. However, in the text yato vā imāni bhūtāni etc. we hear that the souls too know origin, continuance and reabsorption. Here the word bhūta denotes the jīva, the individual soul; for thus we find the word used in the passage bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni. The verb jīvantī “they live” in the text can only apply to the souls, the expression tena jāyante “by whom they are born” evidently refers to these same souls.

Refutation. This is not right. The word bhūta commonly denotes only the elements ether, wind, fire, water and earth. If the word is used for something
else, it is used metaphorically. Of these elements, ether etc. which are primarily understood by the word *bhūta*, it is stated that they are variously modified and that they live. The verb "they live" describes a condition of being analogous to living. And if the word *bhūta* be used in the sense of individual soul, then too the statement declares that the soul is born only in the sense that its entrance into a body is a birth. Therefore, when the word *bhūta* refers to the individual soul, it can rightly be said that the souls are born, just as it is said that the cow, once born walks about. There are śrutis to this effect, like "For the soul, unborn, alone—" and we also have other śrutis which declare that the soul is unborn. Similarly, the word of the Lord: "Know that both matter and spirit are without beginning;" "this ancient spirit is unborn, eternal, everlasting;" "it is never born nor does it die" etc. Finally there is the syllogism: the individual soul in question never knows birth; for, while being substantial, it is bodiless, as it consists of spirit, like the Supreme Soul.

50. There are some who notice the logical defects inherent in the view that Scripture of a personal origin, which we have explained above, and having no other course open posit that Tantra too must be eternal. Against this position, we state that it is sublated by the fact that its author, who is patent enough and tacitly remembered, is not forgotten at all; and hence this position does not deserve our notice.

51. Besides, why has the argument about the Pāṣupatas etc. been swept aside with a stick? If one
replies, let the argument stand, we shall have the
defect of mutual exclusion. And Vāsudeva’s author-
ship of the Tantra, which is commonly known to
everybody, can no more be rejected than the prefer-
personal origin of the Veda. Or else, if someone says
that any of the three means of knowledge is in the case
of Pāśupata Tantra cancelled by non-appearance,14
reversion and dubiety, the answer is, your own postu-
lation applies equally well to the Lāguḍa doctrine15,
and once you know this, it is refuted. Your worship
better keep quiet.

52. To sum up. For the reasons set forth above
we maintain that the exposure of this Tantra’s incom-
patibility with Revelation, Tradition, Epic and Purāṇa
as well as with the conclusions of our logical demonstra-
tion, and the inacceptability of this Tantra to all
exemplary persons go to show that the Pañcarātra texts
must have been composed by someone who pretended
to teach a path that would lead to heaven and salva-
tion, but actually wished to deceive the world. Con-
cerning its apocryphal character, which we have now
exposed, we have the declaration: “The traditional
teachings that are outside the Veda and all other false
doctrines remain fruitless in the afterworld, for they
are considered to derive from tamas.” Those who
follow the Veda are forbidden to speak with those who
follow such evil paths: “The following are not to be
honoured even with a word: heretics, criminals,
impostors, crooks, thieves and hypocrites are not to be
honoured even with a word.”

53. In the manner16 presented above the prima-
facie case can be made that the Pañcarātra in its
entirety has no validity whatever as a means of knowledge. Against this prima-facie case we now submit that the Tantra in question must be accepted as valid, because it produces faultless knowledge, like the scriptural statements on the Vedic sacrifices jyotiṣṭoma etc.

54. Now, such defects as are elicited by the science of logic cannot be detected in this inference. Let us consider the Object of the Proposition. The Object of the Proposition is, by definition, the content of a certain thesis is proposed; it is a term which itself is established, and of which it is now to be proved that it is particularized by another term, which is also established. In the present case the term which particularizes the object is not unknown, for this term, sc. "validity," is for both parties established with regard to the valid means of knowledge, Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony etc. Nor is the subject itself unknown, for the Pañcarātra system is known universally. Nor is the Object to be proved already proved, for this Object, "The Pañcarātra is valid," is not proved for the opponent. Nor is this Object incompatible with Perception, since its opposite, sc. non-validity, is beyond perceptual verifiability. Nor is this Object incompatible with Inference, because no inference proving non-validity is found.

55. **Objection.** But such an inference is actually found: Pañcarātra Śāstra is non-authoritative, because it is non-Vedic, like Buddhism.

**Refutation.** We reply, What is this non-authoritativeness which this reasoning seeks to prove?
If it is defined by the fact that the Tantra does not produce knowledge, then this definition militates against Perception; for the knowledge which arises in a student, who is able to comprehend the relation between word and meaning, concerning the meaning of the sentences of Pañcarātra Śāstra he hears is perceptually evident. Nor is the predicate, sc. "non-authoritativeness," defined by dubiety, since then we have the same conflict with Perception; for the statement, "One must worship the four-armed Supreme Person in the centre of the lotus," does not occasion a doubtful cognition: "Must one worship Him thus or not?" Nor, in the third place, is the predicate defined by reversion, since there is no non-apprehension of what should be there, and since, the presumption of future reversion militates against Perception and would put an end to all operations. This point shall be discussed in detail later on.

56. OBJECTION. Still, the proposed validity of Pañcarātra militates against Scripture. Since in Pañcarātra Āgama we have its meaning conveyed exactly as it is, this conflict between Scripture and Pañcarātra is not vicious only if Pañcarātra is not authoritative.

REFUTATION. Why, if that were so, that would mean that if its authority is disproved by Scripture it is proved by Inference, and if it is proved by inference it is disproved by Scripture; which is a vicious circle.

57. Besides, what does this mean, "being non-Vedic, or outside the Veda?" If it means that
Pañcarātra is different from the Veda, we have an occasional application to Perception etc., which are also different from the Veda. If, in order to avoid this defect, the ground is thus specified, 'because, while being language, it is different from the Veda,' we have a hetvantaram deadlock, which, as they say, occurs when into a syllogism with an unqualified ground and additional qualification is accepted. Also, we then have an occasional application to the statements of Manu, which also are language and different from the Veda. If then, my slow-witted opponent, in order to remove this defect from your ground you claim that being outside the Veda means "not deriving from the Veda," then what do you, logician, think of it?

Well, by this definition of the ground we get the meaning, "something, namely in case there is question of language-statements, is non-Vedic, because it does not derive from the Veda." But then there is an occasional application to the Veda itself, which does not derive from the Veda! When the ground is re-defined as "because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a language-statement but not a Vedic statement," then again there would inevitably be an occasional application to statements of reliable persons which do not derive from the Veda and yet are valid, like "There are trees on the river-bank." If the reason is further corrected into: "because it does not derive from the Veda, namely, in case of a language-statement—but not a Vedic statement—and this statement concerns an action to be taken," then still we have a vicious applicability to such precepts as "One must eat little when one has indigestion." Again, if the ground is
then reformulated as "because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a statement specified by all the above specifications and also concerned with dharma and adharma," then this ground is partly impertinent, because Pañcarātra Śāstra does not deal with dharma and adharma exclusively, since the great majority of its statements concern Brahman. If then, the specification is added "...when it deals with objects that are outside the scope of other pramāṇas," then again the ground does not fully apply, for hundreds of śrutis demonstrate that the Perception of God encompasses all things related to dharma and adharma. We shall discuss this point presently;[121] this suffices for the time being to expose the baseless fancies of those who have not made a study of Akṣapāda's[122] system. Other conceivable inferences will be presented; and refuted, later on.

We conclude therefore, that the proposition "Pañcarātra is authoritative," is not in conflict with Inference.

58. Nor is it in conflict with Scripture, for hundreds of scriptural statements, like idaṁ mahopaniṣadām, will be adduced which set forth that Pañcarātra is authoritative. There are no grounds to suspect in our proposition anyone of the three kinds of contradiction of language-statements; namely, contradiction within the terms of the statement; contradiction with one's own thesis; or contradiction with universally accepted facts.

First, there is no contradiction within the statement. This type of contradiction is of three kinds: of
mere utterance; or utterance of property; and of utterance of substance. Firstly, the proposition is not contradicted by its mere utterance, for the statement of the thesis "Pañcarātra Sāstra is authoritative" does not cancel its own content, as does, for instance, the statement: "During my entire life I have kept silence." Secondly, there is no contradiction through utterance of property, as for example the statement: "All statements are untrue;" for the authoritativeness predicated of Pañcarātra does not cancel the proposition. Thirdly, there is no contradiction through utterance of substance, since in the given substance a connection with the given property is not contradictory: Pañcarātra is not contradicted by its property authoritativeness, as motherhood is contradicted by the property sterility. For upon the assertion of the authoritativeness of the substance in question, it is not contradicted by any particular substance named in Revelation, since the imputation of questionableness is secondary, as in the case of the assertion that certain acts of violence which are enjoined are against the dharma. There is, therefore, no contradiction by language-statement; so that we conclude that the proposition is presentable.

59. Nor is the ground affected by logical defects, like occasional application etc. The ground is not occasionally applicable to other terms. This fallacy of occasionalness is of two kinds, general occasionalness and special occasionalness. An instance of the first kind provides the ground in the argument: "The earth is eternal, because it is knowable." Of the second kind: "The earth is eternal, because it, possesses
smell." Our ground, namely, ‘Pañcarātra is authoritative, because it produces faultless knowledge’, does not apply equally whether it is authoritative or not, which would render the ground generally-occasional. For this ground, namely its being a cause of faultless knowledge, has not been found before in the alternative propositions that Pañcarātra is deceptive and hence non-authoritative. Neither does the ground have a specially-occasional application, because the illustration “like statements on Vedic sacrifices such as jyotiṣṭoma etc.” shows its connection with other instances on the same side of the argument.

Nor is the ground precluded, since there is no concomitance of its opposite; being a cause of faultless knowledge is not invariably accompanied by non-authoritativeness. Nor is the ground cancelled by lapse of time, since there is no conflict with Perception and in this it is analogous with Scripture.

Nor is the ground itself unproved or unestablished. If a ground is unestablished, this is because either its locus or its essence is unestablished. The first does not apply, for its locus is Pañcarātra Sāstra, which is proved to exist. Nor does the second apply: for there are three ways in which a ground may be unestablished as to its essence: through ignorance, through dubiety, or through reversion. Ignorance does not apply, as follows from the fact that the words describing the ground are pronounced. Nor does dubiety apply, for that the ground is correct is undoubted and self-evident to the defender of the proposition, while for the opponent the same is easily proved by the fact that
no defects are apprehended in it. That the ground would be unestablished through reversal is utterly out of the question.

60. OBJECTION. But how can we discard the supposition that the Pañcarātra texts are faulty? This supposition arises instantly since the texts are of personal origin.

REfUTATION. How do you avoid the same supposition in the case of the Vedas? There too it arises instantly, since the Vedas are language-statements. When you reply, it is avoided because the Vedas have no personal author, then you may realize that in our case, too, it is avoided, since the Tantras have been composed by the Supreme Person, who is omniscient and eternally satisfied, and you may keep quiet!

What I mean to say is this. Our position is that in language as such there are no defects that invalidate its authority; as language, language is authoritative. Its authority is in certain cases invalidated by defects in the character of the speaker, for instance in a language statement, “There is a herd of elephants on my finger-tip.” The statements in the upaniṣad portion of the Veda remove whatever suspicion we may have about any defects in the character of the speaker in the text collection here under discussion. For the Vedānta texts set forth that the omniscient Lord of the world is supremely compassionate; then how can we suppose Him to be deceitful etc.?

61. OBJECTION. However, I have said that language statements have no authority when they concern established facts, on the ground that when terms are applied to such facts they do not have proper denotative power.
Rebuttal. This view is not correct. Profane language, eliciting a fact by direct application, even though this fact is established, really operates its denoting power as fully as it does by applications which concern kāryas. Consider the illustration that has been given above. When certain manifestations (of joy) in a man’s face, which follow on his hearing the statement “A son has been born to you,” make it appear that the man spoken-to is happy, one instantly understands that his happiness is the result of his receiving from this statement a knowledge of an agreeable meaning, and one then infers that, for a medium-aged person too, this happiness derives from the statement. Thus one concludes that, since this happiness came to exist upon the existence of the statement, the statement itself has the power to convey an agreeable meaning. If there arises a doubt as to which particular ground of happiness among the many different grounds that may occur according to past, present and future, then consider this. A young boy, who wants to understand the meaning of speech, immediately upon hearing the same statement receives knowledge that a birth ceremony is being held. He thinks to himself, “There must be a reason for this.” Then he considers, “Is the agreeable meaning which has been understood from the statement the cause of this knowledge that a birth ceremony is to be held?” and he realizes that this meaning was precisely this that a son had been born.

And on that issue: Definite knowledge of the donation of words in a sentence is had through the words that are included or excluded. This being so,
words denote their meanings, whether these are established things or not.

62. **Objection.** However, the relation of cause and effect is not just known from the fact that one comes into existence upon the existence of the other, for that would mean over-extension. Nor does the realization that a birth ceremony is to be held follow invariably upon the knowledge of an agreeable meaning; for we find also that the same realization follows upon a feeling of distress, namely when the informed father is vexed by the trouble of maintaining his family.\(^{132}\)

**Rebuttal.** Don’t we find that the realization of a kārya is caused by a verbal statement, so that we can agree that, for example, the realization that a cow is to be fetched following a statement “Fetch the cow” is indeed caused by that statement? When you say that, since this realization cannot occur without a cause therefore the proximate statement must in that case be the cause of the realization, then I maintain that the same holds also in the case of “A son is born.”

It has been decided by our opponent that the verbal denotation of a meaning which causes an action to be taken is a result of the inclusion in the statement of a liṅādi suffix.\(^{133}\) He who maintains that all words only bear meaningfully on kārya, maintains in effect that padārthas\(^{134}\) exist only in kārya statements and that e.g. in the case of cows, horses and the like, which are related to bodies, their being a padārtha is ascertained by the inclusion or exclusion of the words denoting them in a statement concerning kārya. If he says, indeed, whenever their being a padārtha is significantly
construed, it is construed just as connected with kārya, we reply, Stop being obstinate; for verbal exchange is also possible through denotation of words that are connected with other things than kāryas.

63. It is necessary to accept the position that words are denotative of connected meanings, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain that they are denotative of meanings connected with kāryas. The definition 'the thing meant by a word is always connected with a kārya' fails to cover the defined topic completely; for it does not apply in the case of injunctive suffixes, since these suffixes denote their own meanings as connected, not with kārya, but with consequences of already established facts, such as proper qualification on the part of the person enjoined etc.\(^4\) Or if it is said that in their case there is denotation of connected meanings and in the other case denotation of meanings connected with kārya, we reply that this is a neither old nor young, argument;\(^2\) it is more appropriate simply to accept the view that there is denotation of connected meanings in general.

64. Therefore, the adherents of all schools should accept that words have proper denotation for the meanings they denote because these meanings are connected with other meanings that are required to complete the sense of the statement, are closely collocated and are appropriate. Even if the denoting power of language were to be understood only through its proper signification in kārya statements alone,\(^3\) even so it is correct when we decide the denotation of language to take the standpoint that kārya is just one of the inessential factors of denotation, like the identity
of the speaker, the extent of space in which a statement can be heard etc. The logicians hold the view that the meaning of a language statement cannot be known except by language statement. Consequently, there exists no inherent relationship with kārya as cause of denotation in uses of words that have their proper signification, just as is the case with floating precious stones on water. Just as this floating, however helpful it may be to determine the identity of certain diamonds, e.g. the brahmin diamond, serves no purpose when a stone is being transacted which has already been properly identified, similarly the kārya, however helpful to understand the proper signification of a word, serves no purpose once its proper signification has been identified.

65. Moreover, if words denote their meanings only as connected with kārya, then how can we know from them that, for example, there is a relation between a fruit and a river-bank, is in a statement: "There is a fruit on the river-bank?" If you say that a statement of such a substantive relation does not denote the relation it states through its primary sense, but through secondary sense, then, we may ask, where do statements then have their primary sense? If you answer: in a kārya which is not previously known through other means of knowledge, we reply: no, for then no use of words would be possible, since their meaning would not yet have been identified. Naturally there can be no knowledge of the meaning of a word when that word denotes a meaning not previously known through other means of knowledge, and no cognition can arise from words with unknown meanings, for that would entail over-extension.
66. **Objection.** My position is this. In ordinary language a statement is understood to have its proper signification when it bears on a kārya that is to be accomplished with a certain action. In Vedic language a statement enjoys a special power of denotation which transcends the transitory root-sense of the word "sacrificing", and it has this power of denotation because it is the means of realizing a certain fruit and acquires this power on account of the collocation of words describing this fruit; whereas in ordinary language, since there verbal exchange is possible also to the unsophisticated, this determination of the nature of word and meaning is not attended to.

**Refutation.** This position is just wishful thinking; for a language statement, even if understood in your way as bearing meaningfully only on a kārya to be accomplished with an action, does not by that token set forth a permanent kārya, since that would mean over-extension. If we cannot know the true connection of words even when the usage of our elders, through which the denotations of these words is understood, takes place in accordance with these words, then we can never know their connection! If a language statement has lost its postulated true denoting power because it is impossible, it does not thereby acquire another denoting power. In such cases we surely must assume lakṣaṇā. For when certain words are collocated that have incompatible meanings, these words do not therefore denote something else altogether, for then all word meanings would become unreliable.

67. Besides, we do not admit that the fact that a word has the power to communicate a kārya that is not
previously known through other means of knowledge proves that there actually exists a relationship between itself and the fruit of the action it enjoins. The only relation proved of it is that with injunction, not with instrumentality. That in a statement there subsists a relation with a ākārya which transcends the root-sense of the verb cannot be proved except by the relation of kārya with the fruit of the act, and the latter relation cannot be proved without the former. And therefore there is a vicious interdependence that cannot be refuted. If there is no factor which activates the person who, according to the injunction, is specified by the heaven that is to be achieved, the injunction itself cannot be the means of achieving the desired heaven. The root-sense of the words being transitory, the statement itself cannot function as this means. Therefore the assertion that a language statement communicates as its proper meaning a kārya which exceeds this transitory root-sense, cannot be correct. A person is not specified by heaven as the object to be achieved, but it is the person who desires heaven who is enjoined upon to accomplish the act. Heaven cannot be the specification of the person’s qualification, because heaven is yet to be achieved. Only something that has already been achieved, that actually exists, can specify the person upon whom an act is enjoined, for instance, the real fact of his being alive etc. Consequently only his desire can specify his qualification for the act.

68. Furthermore, precisely how is heaven, which in your opinion functions as the specification of the person enjoined, an object to be realized, a sādhyā?
If its being a sādhyā means that it is fit for a relation with a sādhana, it is impossible for heaven to be siddha, as long as its relatability obtains, since it cannot become siddha in the meantime. The only authority that exists for heaven becoming siddha in the end is the injunction itself, while the only authority for the injunction is just this that heaven does become siddha. This is plainly a vicious circle. If heaven is the sādhyā, the injunction is not the sādhyā. It is not possible to combine two sādhyas in one sentence.

69. Objection. Indeed, the unity of a sentence is broken up when it contains two sādhyas that are independent, but not when the two are interdependent. And here the two sādhyas are interdependent since the realization of heaven is contained in the realization of the injunction. That is what the Author says: "When the niyoga is realized, everything else in accordance with it is also realized;" and: "Why should the realization of the fruit not be held to be subservient to the realization of the injunction?" Therefore there is no conflict here.

Refutation. No; unless heaven is realized, how can the injunction be realized? Without the realization of heaven neither the qualification, nor the object, nor anything else required by the injunction is realized.

70. Objection. In the case of the qualifications for periodical rites the injunction does not require the realization of any fruit. Nor does an injunction to one act fail to apply to a person who really desires another fruit. The pre-eminence is really the injunction's; a person is enjoined upon by the injunc-
tion to any act in the same way as he is enjoined upon to perform the periodical acts. For the injunction draws unto itself the desirous person who himself thinks that the heaven which he desires is the principal object, in the same way as the injunction to perform the periodical acts activates a person, even though he does not desire anything, to these acts which bear no fruit at all.

Besides, a person who is desirous of heaven also opens and shuts his eyes; for you these actions do not subserve his realization of heaven. Why not consider the sacrificing an action of the same kind? There are some who do not accept that it is a means of realizing heaven.

71. Refutation. If that is the view, we ask: Are the sacrifice etc., which are to be grasped by the cognition that they are such means, eliminated from the injunction? On this point: When the injunction does not mean to convey a relation between the object to be realized and the means of realizing it, then all acts are fruitless.

Therefore, it is sound to maintain that from the injunctive suffixes there results first the cognition that they are indeed the means to realize the desired object, and that subsequently the desire for this object prompts a person to undertake the act of realization. But it is improper to maintain that the primary denotation occurs in the expressing of a meaning that was previously unknown, and that the denotation in the expressing of any other meaning is secondary. We conclude that ordinary, non-Vedic statements give rise to cognitions concerning meanings that are just so established by these statements.
72. OBJECTION. But these cognitions do not arise from the denoting power of language, but result from Inference. For these statements, though their denotations in conveying certain meanings are consciously known once their proper meanings have been learnt, do not furnish complete certainty about their meanings merely upon being heard by a listener, when they are accompanied by doubt which is created by the listener's observation that in one case or other statements have deviated from their proper meanings. And, unless there be complete certainty, the meaning will remain unknown; for no knowledge can arise in one's mind from uncertainty.

If the meaning of a statement is not known, the listener wants to discover it: "The speaker uses words whose meanings apparently admit of being connected; and reliable persons do not use words whose connections are unknown;" and the listener realizes that therefore the speaker has knowledge of such a connection. If the knowledge of connection is thus inferred, the meaning discovered by the listener does not require the authority of verbal testimony. Consequently, since ordinary language statements are dependent on the speaker's cognition, they terminate in that cognition through Inference alone.

73. REFUTATION. This view is not correct; for a word conveys its right meaning as its natural function, and the observation that in one case the statement happened to be untrue under the influence of defects in the speaker's character should not give rise to a general suspicion which would cause all statement to give up its natural capacity of conveying its meaning.
The suspicion that a fire may not burn in other cases because in one case, when obstructed by mantras, it fails to burn, does not make fire fail to burn! And the fact that the sense of vision may give rise to a cognition which does not correspond to reality—e.g. that nacre is silver—as the result of some optical error does not signify that the visual sense cannot produce true cognition of the visible presence of a pitcher etc.

Therefore, a statement does indeed instantly convey a certain meaning to the listener if he knows the relation between the words and their meanings. It does not require knowledge of the basis. Before there is complete knowledge on the part of the listener about the basic knowledge of the speaker, and, further, when the meaning has been expressed, the question rises: "How does he know this?" and Inference proceeds to resolve that question. You want to infer: "Did the speaker know something?" or wish to infer his knowledge of the connection of the different meanings. But the mere knowledge that the speaker knew something is not enough for utterance and action concerning a statement—meaning to proceed. Inference of a cognition concerning the connection of different meanings is impossible without a prior cognition of such a connection. This being so, the meaning of the statement must be known first. For cognitions whose particular objects are not connected, are not connected themselves. Nor is a particular meaning established by cognitions that are inferred to be such. If you say that any word combination which is able to convey a certain connection produces knowledge of just this connection, I maintain that the connection of the particular meanings must be
known previously; unless a connection has already reached the level of cognition it cannot give rise to being expressed in a statement.

74. To conclude, the cognition of an established fact in statements like "there is a fruit on the river-bank" is strictly of verbal origin and does not arise from inference. Therefore the position that statements produce valid knowledge only if they deal with a previously unknown *kārya* is taken only by people whose judgments are stultified by their continuous preoccupation with their own theories. In the manner set forth above it is true that statements may bear meaningfully and informatively on other meanings as well.

Consequently, all the statements of the Upaniṣads which set forth the existence of a categorically different Person (e.g. "He is the overlord of the Universe, sovereign of all. He commands all the world". "All this is manifest to Him etc.")) are authoritative as to what they state, since they produce indubitable and unreversed knowledge of their contents.

75. Nor do statements concerning established facts lose their authority simply because of the consideration that repetition or reversion might be anticipated on the strength of our assumption that either a corroborating or an invalidating cognition about the same facts could conceivably occur; for the same thing would also apply to statements concerning *kārya*. Besides, a *kārya* can also be known through other means of knowledge, e.g. the *kārya* that firewood is to be fetched; for it has been admitted that that *kārya* can also be known through another means of knowledge as
in the case of the cooking of the *odana*. Or if a statement which sets forth a kārya about a categorically different act like the agnihotra is held to be authoritative because no other authority for it can be conceived to exist,—why, since there is not a ghost of other authority for the existence of the Bhagavān whose personality consists in unsurpassed knowledge, sovereignty and beatitude, it is all the same, depending on what partisan view one takes!

Moreover, if a cognition concerning a content that is also known through another means of knowledge does not recognize its own content as authoritative, since it has already been taken care of by another authority, this non-authoritativeness of its content is beyond experience for it is a mere matter of assumption. Therefore it must be maintained that all indubitable and unreversed knowledge is authoritative, regardless of whether its content is established, or yet to be performed, or anything else. Hence we reject our opponent's position.

76. The objection that omniscience is acquired by means of the regular senses is incorrect, because śrutis contradict it: “He sees without eyes, hears with ears; he who does not see with the eye, who sees the eyes, has neither effect nor instrument;” knowledge, strength and action are natural to Him,” etc. These śrutis do not speak metaphorically, for there is no authority for this assumption. Metaphorical usage is assumed when the primary meanings of the śrutis make no sense. Since the primary meaning here makes sense, the assumption of metaphorical use is baseless.
77. **Objection.** But in this case we have in fact reason to cancel the primary meaning, because the primary sense militates against other means of knowledge.

**Refutation.** What other means of knowledge? Not, to start, Perception, for we see no Perception occur which shows that the said Person is non-existent. If you retort that non-existence is decided by the non-apprehension of what should be there, we reply that this does not hold in our case since the object, that is the said Person, is actually apprehended through Scripture itself, which is the highest-ranking among the assembly of the means of knowledge. Nor does it militate against Inference; for how could an Inference which disproves that Person arise at all, slow-moving as it is, when its object is instantly refuted by the rapidly arising scriptural cognition? Moreover, if this were so, the relation of sacrificing etc. to heaven, *apūrva*\(^{136}\) etc., would logically be contradicted by the fact that sacrificing etc. are actions, when Scripture did not cancel such reasoning. True, the identity of sacrificial pole and sun, which is asserted by Scripture, is cancelled by another means of knowledge, namely Perception alone, because the difference between a piece of wood and the disc of the sun is indeed obvious. Besides, in this case it is legitimate to assume metaphorical usage, for the statement of this identity is an *arthavāda*, since it forms one single statement with the proximate injunction about the unction of the sacrificial pole.\(^{137}\) There is no other injunction to which it could be accessory as an *arthavāda*. Alternatively, inasmuch as the human importance of a
statement would be lost if there were no injunction to connect it with, an injunction may be supplemented and then the arthavāda is regarded as accessory to that supplemented injunction.

78. The objection\textsuperscript{153} that as long as statements fail to prompt the operator of the means of knowledge to being active or to prevent him from being active, they do not communicate self-sufficient information, does not hold good. For, we find that statements have human importance also outside any connection with an injunction; in such a case it will be as in the statement “A son has been born to you,” and the like. Nor need an injunction be supplemented in these cases. For without an injunction, too, joy arises from the information that a son has been born. Likewise, a statement which is self-sufficient in merely expressing particular actions which questioners want to know in exchanges of question and answer—e.g. “Which action?” “Cooking!”—do not require the supplementation of an injunction. In the upaniṣadic texts the knowledge of brahman is declared to be rewarded by great bliss: “the brahman-knower becomes brahman”; \textsuperscript{159} “the brahman knower attains the supreme”; \textsuperscript{160} “the sāman cantor attains with brahman all that he desires”; \textsuperscript{161} the human importance of statements without injunctions is quite clear from these and other scriptural words.

To sum up, when it is established that the Bhagavān is the treasury solely of beautiful qualities of direct universal cognition, compassionateness etc., qualities which are true and natural to Him, and which we know from hundreds of quoted śrutis, then it
is also established that the Tantra which is based on His universal cognition is authoritative indeed.

79. **Objection.** Granted that, as you have described it, there exists some Person who is endowed with natural omniscience, as it is known from the upaniṣads, yet, unless it is absolutely certain that this Person is indeed Hari, Pañcarātra will not be authoritative.

**Refutation.** This is a worthless remark; no experts in the Veda dispute that the Supreme Soul, cause of the entire universe, is Vāsudeva. For He is revealed in the upaniṣads as the Supreme Soul: "Truth, knowledge, infinite; that is the supreme step of Viṣṇu. Vāsudeva is the ultimate matter, the ultimate spirit" 162 "He was alone beyond who became this world"; "higher than whom there is nothing at all" in accordance with the subject expressed in these statements there are passages like: "From whom these beings ..." "Sat alone, my son ..." Therefore Viṣṇu's perfect knowledge is established by the upaniṣads. And it is not declared in śruti that the origination, subsistence and destruction of the world are caused by anyone but Him. Hence there is a consensus that He is the supreme omniscient soul.

That He is the Supreme Soul we learn also from the statements of Dvaipāyana, Parāśara, Nārada and other great seers. Thus: "Know thou, O tormentor of thy foes, that the entire world rests on Viṣṇu. The Great Viṣṇu creates the totality of creatures, moving and unmoving. In him they go to their reabsorption, from Him they originate." "The glorious Sage Nārāyaṇa, without beginning or end, is the sovereign
Lord. He creates the creatures, those that stand still and those that move. That He is the Supreme Brahman is also learnt elsewhere. Keśava, O best of the Bharatas, the Blessed One, is the sovereign, the supreme soul, the entire universe: thus it stands revealed in many places of the Scripture. For those who seek to know the supreme principle by means of many-sided reasonings Hari alone is the Principle, the great Yogin, Nārāyaṇa the Lord.

Likewise in the Dānadharmā, "Padmanābha is the Supreme Soul, the highest One, the pure One, the Refuge. This is the secret doctrine of the Veda; dost thou not know, sacker of cities? By His grace do we all cause the worlds to exist. And the trusted ones, and the first among the immortals, and the gods are held to be His representatives. If Viṣṇu is indifferent, no good will come to us."

Thus Rudra's word. Similarly, in the Mahābhārata and Matsya Purāṇa, "He who amongst them is the Supreme Soul, He indeed is the eternal, unqualified, perfect One; He is to be known as Nārāyaṇa, for He is the world-soul, the Spirit."

Likewise in the Varāha Purāṇa, "Who, excepting the Lord Nārāyaṇa, is superior to the God whose conduct has become the life-order on the earth?"

"There has been no God greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of the Vedas and the Purāṇas, O excellent ones."
Likewise in the Linga Purana,

"Janardana is the sole Spirit, the highest One, the Supreme Soul, from whom Brahma was born; from Him Rudra and from Him all the world."

Likewise Parasara's word,

"The world has originated from Viṣṇu and on Him it rests. He is the maker of its subsistence and its destruction."

Likewise in the Mānavadharmaśāstra,

"Nārāyaṇa is higher than the unmanifest; the World-Egg originates from the unmanifest. Within the Egg are all these worlds as well as the earth with her seven continents."

Therefore, the study of these and similar śrutis, smṛtis, epical texts and purāṇas proves that Vāsudeva is the universal cause, the Supreme Soul.

80. Nor do the śrutis declare that Rudra is the Supreme Soul, or that any other deity is. On the contrary, the followers of the Ekāyana sākhā say that he has an origin, and the same is found in the Veda itself: "Darkness was here....from which Rudra is born; that is the greatest in all the worlds, that indeed is the oldest in the worlds." "Similarly, Rudra's position is clearly known to be a result of his karman: "He obtained his greatness by propitiating Viṣṇu." "From the forehead sprang a drop; from that Rudra was born."

These and other śrutis declare that Rudra was born. This being so, the statements that in appearance convey the greatness of Rudra and others really serve as laudatory statements, like the śruti: "the ear is
Consequently, the passages in the Purāṇas which declare Rudra etc. to be the Supreme Soul have not their primary meaning, because they are in conflict with Perception and Scripture.

81. Concerning the objection that the assertions of the doctrines of the Tantras are to be rejected since their greatness is set forth only in non-Vedic Tantric texts, we say that Viṣṇu is stated to be the Supreme One in the texts of the Way of the Vedic doctrine. For example in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa,

"The Supreme Soul, the Basis of all creatures, the Supreme Lord is called by the name of Viṣṇu in Vedas and Upaniṣads."  

In the Varāha Purāṇa,

"The Supreme Brahman is Viṣṇu; the triple division in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine is here set forth; the ignorant do not know this. There has been no god greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of Vedas and Purāṇas, O excellent ones."

Likewise in the Matsya Purāṇa,

"In those aeons where sattva prevails, the greatness of Viṣṇu is declared. In aeons predominated by tāmas the greatness of Fire and Siva is expounded."

Likewise in the Liṅga Purāṇa,

"For there is no other recourse ordained but Viṣṇu; this the Vedas constantly declare; no doubt about it."

Likewise in the Vāyu Purāṇa,
“The Spirit that belongs to the Way of the Veda is explained to be the thousand-armed supreme lord of creatures.”

Likewise in the Bhāvīṣyat Purāṇa,

“Viṣṇu is traditionally known to be the Supreme in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine. ‘Viṣṇu is the greatest among persons, the most exalted Supreme Person.’”

All this has already been explained in great detail in the Puruṣaṁiṁśaya and is therefore not further enlarged upon here. Therefore, how can our tongue endeavour to say that the Tantra which is revealed by Viṣṇu who is known from the Upaniṣads is false? For He is such that He has an immediate insight into the dharma of Consecration, Propitiation etc., by virtue of the omniscience that is natural to Him.”

82. Considering that the sensual pleasure to be had from attainment of heaven, the birth of a son etc. is inseparable from various forms of misery and does not continue for long, the supreme sages Śaṅḍilya, Nārada and others have rejected this pleasure, which in their view was really misery, and in order to attain the release left their dwellings to become mendicants; and they have decided definitively that He has created the Pāñcarātra Sāstra which sets forth the knowledge and manner of propitiation of Himself which constitute the sole means of attaining the unparalleled beatitude they sought.

83. This argument cannot be extended to other Tantras, for in the various authors of those Tantras error etc. is possible. It is impossible that Perception
or another means of knowledge forms the basis for the other Tantras, and they themselves do also not claim that Scripture is the basis. Besides, because they communicate a meaning that is incompatible with the conclusions of the Upaniṣads the view that these Tantras are based on Perception or Scripture is sublated.

For there are four kinds of followers of the way of life set forth in those Tantras, the Kapālikas, Kālamukhas, Pāśupatas and Saivas. The Kapālika doctrine is described as follows: the reward of release is attained by knowing what the six mudrikās are and by wearing them, not by knowing Brahman. As they say, "He who knows the identities of the six mudrikās and is expert in the supreme Mudrā, and meditates upon the self in the vulva posture, attains nirvāṇa." The six mudrikās of the Kapālikas are stated to be the earring, necklace, pendent, head ornament, ashes and the sacrificial theread: there are two more subsidiary mudrās described, namely skull and skull-staff. One whose body is marked by these mudrās will not be reborn in the world." Now, the śrutis do not bear out their view that the knowledge of such paraphernalia, the wearing of them and the concentration on the body in the immoral vulva posture are means to attain release, for the śrutis expound that release is attainable only by one who has renounced all sensual desires of this world and the other world and who concentrates on the soul Vāsudeva as the cause of the entire Universe: "knowing Him one goes beyond death; there is no other path to tread etc." The same is true of the Kālamukhas who teach that certain practices, which are condemned by all the
śāstras, like eating from a skull, bathing in and tasting of ashes of cremated corpses, carrying a lagūḍa staff, putting up wine-cups and worshipping the deity in them, will secure all material and immaterial desires: these teachings are outside the Veda.

84. Also some of the teachings of the Pāṣupatas and the Śaivas in which compatible and incompatible elements are indiscriminately mixed are likewise outside the Veda. The Pāṣupata system is as follows: there are individual souls which are called paśus, cattle, and their overlord is Śiva, the Lord of Cattle. To assist the souls Śiva has composed the Pañcādhyāyī.180 There the five Categories are explained, namely, Cause, Effect, Injunction, Yoga and the Cessation of Misery. The Cause is of two kinds, material and instrumental. Rudra is the instrumental cause and a sixteenth part of him is the material cause. The Effect comprises the elements from Mahat181 to earth. The Injunction is stated to comprehend principally a number of rites, secret practices, bathing and lying in ashes etc.182 The Yoga is said to be concentration and the muttering of formula, OM etc.183 The Cessation of Misery is held to be release; thus the five Categories are enumerated.—The term “cessation of misery” means total and final cessation of misery. The system holds that this cessation or release is defined by the annihilation of all the qualities of the differential soul.

This conception of God is held by the Śaivas as well as the others. And this view of God is entirely, incompatible with Scripture, for it is revealed in śruti that the Supreme Brahman is both the material and the
instrumental cause of the Universe. Also, it is repeatedly revealed in the scriptures that release consists in perfect bliss. As the authoritativeness of these Tantras is already vitiated by their mutual contradictions, it is not really necessary for them to be rejected with the stick of the Veda.

85. Moreover, the Saivas etc. accept stages of life etc. that are outside the \textit{varṇāśrama} system that is proved by the Veda and are consequently outside the Veda. As they say, "merely by entering Consecration one becomes instantly a Brahmin. A man becomes an ascetic by accepting the Kāpālika vow."

86. Let it not be said, How could Rudra, who is very trustworthy, promulgate such a vast collection of texts which are not authoritative? Nor is it right to hold that these texts are based upon the recollection of an author of the same name as Siva, because the ground is overextensive. For the theory that the author was in error and could be in error, because he was not Siva but some other person with the same name, can only follow if the Veda sublates the system; this latter ground is sufficient to prove the lack of authority of these texts and entails no overextension to other texts. And error is not entirely impossible in the case of such persons as Rudra etc. Or else one may reason that since Rudra may have composed such a system for the purpose of deceiving the world because he is known as a promulgator of deceitful doctrines, it is not even necessary to assume error on his part. For thus it reads in the \textit{Varāha Purāṇa},

"For Thou, strong-armed Rudra, must cause deluding doctrines to be expounded, the deceptions of
jugglers and the like as well as conflicting practices. Having shown that the fruit can be won with little effort, you must delude all these people quickly."

Similarly, the venerable Rudra himself shows in the same Purāṇa that the Saiva and the like scriptures which are there being discussed are apostate from the Veda, that only apostates from the Veda are qualified for these doctrines and that their only purpose is just to deceive them. "I have propounded this śāstra as though it were correct doctrine in order to deceive those who have deserted the Way of the Veda." From that time onward, O excellent Ones, the people who believe in the scriptures promulgated by myself do not respect the Vedas. Thus the Pāṣupata and like doctrines are active in the Kali Age."

Likewise he shows that the worship concerning himself as it is propounded in the Pāṣupata Tantras and other such Tantras is different and does not form part of the worship of the Bhagavān: "The said act of worship concerning me which is being observed is really outside the Veda. This ritual called Pāṣupata is the lowliest and deceives men. Only the lowest people worship me with exclusion of Viṣṇu." The large numbers of statements like the preceding ones will not be written out here, because they are too numerous. It is clear enough that those who follow these scriptures are outside the Veda, as is stated in the same Purāṇa: "He cursed those who kept the observances of hairtuft, ashes and skull, Be you outside the Veda and disqualified for Vedic rites. In the Kali Age all those who assume that appearance, wearing hairtuft and carrying a laguḍa stick, exhibiting arbitrary observances and
carrying false lingas about, all these hair-tuft wearing devotees of Rudra are consumed by the fire of Brahmā’s curse.” These practices are well-known in the Saiva scriptures: “Rosary, and bracelet in the hand, a hair-tuft on the head, a skull, bathing in ashes etc.”

Similarly, he declares in the Āditya Purāṇa that along with relinquishing the Bhagavān they relinquish the Veda: “Others, those that wear ashes and hair-tufts as described have formerly been made to relinquish the Veda as well as God Nārāyaṇa on account of Gautama’s curse.”

Moreover, those fools who pass censure on Vāsudeva are to be regarded as heretics, for thus it is declared in the Liṅga Purāṇa, “Those who consider the Supreme Person to be equal (to Siva) are to be regarded as heretics who are expelled from the Way of the Veda.”

To conclude, it is these followers of other Tantras of whom it is said, in the smṛtis: “Heretics, criminals etc.”, that they should not be honoured even with a word; and the declaration “Which are outside the Veda...” refers to them. Consequently, since it cannot properly be said of the other Tantras that they are based either on Veda or on Perception, another cause must be assumed for them.

87. Objection. If it is true that for these Tantras another basis must be assumed, let the defect be granted. But is in your own view knowledge not self-proved?
Refutation. Certainly; but this self-validity of knowledge is here negated by these two defects of sublation, namely, sublation through Perception and through Scripture, for both these defects are plain in their case. The equality of Pañcarātra Tantra and those other Tantras which has been postulated on the ground that both happen to be Tantra, while in fact one of the two is incompatible with Scripture and plainly shows a different provenance, would mean that Brahmin Murder and Horse Sacrifice are on the same level because both are actions: For in the case of Pañcarātra Sāstra we have positive certainty that it is based on Scripture and Perception.

88. Objection. I made the objection that if its being based on Scripture follows from its being established by the Veda, then it cannot be assumed that the author was independent.

Refutation. No. Surely, we can assume no independence in man, but for God it is revealed in Scripture, e.g., “To Him all the world is manifest...” “From fear for Him...”

89. Objection. But if the Pañcarātra traditions are really derived from the Veda, then how is it that no recollection of the Vedic words which furnishes this basis has persisted among the Pañcarātrikas, whereas the meaning of these words apparently does persist? It is not right to contend that only the recollection of the meaning is important because that has purpose while the recollection of the actual Vedic statements is to be disregarded because it is purposeless; for it is not proper to forget that from which the meaning’s authority derives.
Or if, in order to justify this oblivion, the standpoint is taken that the doctrine is based on a Vedic sākhā which has been lost or which is always deducible, then whatever doctrine a person adopts he can always make authoritative simply by attributing it to a lost sākhā; however, it is hard to prove what a lost or deducible sākhā actually contain.

Or if these traditions are based on an extant sākhā, then others would know it as well as the author, and hence his taking the trouble of promulgating these texts would be purposeless.

Refutation. The reply to this is as follows: The Bhagavān, who has an immediate presentation of the entire collection of the Veda by virtue of the perfect knowledge that is natural to Him, observed that his devotees were not firm enough in their minds to retain and transmit the lessons of all the various sākhās which consist of widely scattered injunctions, arthavādās and mantras of many different kinds, and having observed this he was moved by his compassion to condense the meaning of the Veda in an easily comprehensible way and to teach it so. On this showing nothing is unestablished. As they say “The blessed Hari took the essence of the Upaniṣads and condensed it, the Sage, out of compassion with his devotees for their convenience.”

The other objections made, which are equally applicable to all Traditions of Manu and the others, are easily answered by all those who have made a diligent study of the commentaries on the Tantras and are not further enlarged upon here.
90. Objection. The thesis that the Pāñcarātra Tantras are based on the Veda is disproved by the fact that we find in these very Tantras a condemnation of the Veda. For it is said that Sāndilya, failing to find a meaning of human importance in the four Vedas, learnt this Sāstra.

Refutation. This is the objection of someone who does not know the distinct meaning of the statement. For this censure does not mean to censure something deserving of censure, but rather to praise something else than that which is censured. For instance, in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa the censure passed on the pre-dawn oblation "Morning upon morning they speak untruth,"196 is understood to praise the post-dawn oblation. It is as in the Mānavadharma-śāstra: "The Rgveda is of gods and deities, the Yajurveda of man, and the Sāmaveda of the deceased; therefore its sound is impure;"197 here the censure of the Sāmaveda serves to praise the other Vedas. Or as in the Mahābhārata: "Formerly the assembled seers placed the four Vedas and the Mahābhārata in the balance, one at one side, the other at the other side. And since in bulk and in weight the latter preponderated, it is called the Great Bhārata for its bulk and weight."198 This is said, not to belittle the Vedas, but to bestow praise on the Mahābhārata. In this same way the above statement must be taken as praise of the Pāñcarātra. Just as the censure of the pre-dawn oblation etc. does not really intend censure, since elsewhere in the same texts they are praised, so will it be in our case too. In Pāñcarātra, too, we frequently find praise of the Veda; for example: "Nothing that
is made up of words is superior to the Veda, thou who art seated on the Lotus. That is said by the Upanisads which set forth the knowledge of truth" etc.

91. Besides in the quotation it the meaning is not that there is no purpose of human importance in the Vedas but simply "failing to find the purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas..."

Objection. However, the principal connection in this sentence is between "failing to find" and "a purpose of human importance;" not between "purpose of human importance" and "in the Vedas."

Refutation. Don't argue like that, for there is no negation in the sentence. For it is not so that this purpose of human importance is absent from the Vedas; hence the sentence "failing to find that purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas, and desirous of finding it, he learnt the Pañcarātra Sāstra," conveys that both Revelation and Pañcarātra have the same meaning.

92. The further objection that Pañcarātra is non-Vedic because of the injunction that those who are qualified for Vedic sacraments etc. must undergo such sacraments described as Consecration because they are propitiations of the Lord, does not hold good. For such statements as āgnavaistūnam.. which enjoin the sacrament of consecration upon those qualified for Initiation etc. as accessory to the ritual of the jyotiṣṭoma etc. do not therefore become non-Vedic.

Or if the ground for its non-Vedic character is the injunction of sacraments other than the Vedic ones,
the ground is inappropriate, because of the circular argument it involves: only if the non-Vedic character of Pañcarātra Śāstra is proved, it is proved that these sacraments are really different; and if the latter is proved, it is proved that Pañcarātra Śāstra is non-Vedic.

Moreover, the ground is either that the Pañcarātra sacraments are different from all Vedic sacraments, or that they are different from some Vedic sacraments. Not the latter alternative, for this would mean that the sacrament of Initiation etc. is non-Vedic because it is different from the sacrament of Tonsure; nor the first alternative, because it does not escape the said defect? for the sacrament of Initiation is not different from all Vedic sacraments; and we have said that the difference (of Pañcarātra sacraments) from Vedic sacraments is disproved on the ground that Pañcarātra Śāstra is Vedic.

93. The objection that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda, because like the Pāṣupata Tantra it is not included among the fourteen sciences which are held to be authoritative of dharma, would also have an occasional application to the texts of the Bhārata and Rāmāyaṇa composed by Dvaipāyana and Vālmiki.

94. The objection that Pañcarātra is non-Vedic because it is rejected by the blessed Bādarāyaṇa is incorrect. For how could the blessed Dvaipāyana be thought to reject the Bhāgavata doctrine, while he himself is a supreme Bhāgavata, model for all the world? It was he who said, "This has been extracted from the Bhārata in its full length of one hundred
thousand ślokas after it had been churned with the stick of thought, as butter is extracted from curds, and curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the Āraṇyaka from the Vedas, and the amṛta from the herbs: this Mahopaniṣada which is consistent with the four Vedas and the demonstrations of Śāmkhya and Yoga is called the Pañcarātra. This is bliss, this is brahman, this is the sumnum bonum. Being consistent with Rk, Yajuḥ and Sāman and the Atharvāṅgirasas, this discipline will of a certainty be authoritative.”

And in the Bhīṣmaparvan too: “Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Ėudras as described are all to worship, serve and honour Mādhava according to the Sātvata ritual that has been promulgated by Śaṃkarṣaṇa, at the end of the Dvāpara age and the beginning of the Kali age.”

Also in the Śāntiparvan: “Certainly, the Vaiṣṇava must undergo Consecration with all effort: for Hari will be particularly graceful to one who has been consecrated and to no one else. One should consecrate a Brahmin in spring, a Kṣatriya in summer, a Vaiśya in the autumn, a Ėudra in winter, a woman in the rainy season according to the Pañcarātra doctrine.” And likewise: “It has been made commensurate with the four Vedas on the great Mountain Meru.”

Now, how could Dvāipāyana reject the Pañcarātra, which is his own supreme doctrine, comprising the sense of the Upaniṣads, as follows from these and a hundred direct and circumlocutory declarations made with full respect?
95. **Objection.** But then how to explain the sūtra utpattyasaṁbhavaḥ?²⁰³

**Reply.** What is the intention of the sūtra?

**Objection.** The following: Since it is expounded in the Bhāgavata Śāstra that the individual soul has an origin, and since this is impossible as it militates against Scripture and Logic, therefore this Śāstra is erroneous.

**Reply.** If that is the meaning of the sūtra, then how can the sūtra be intended to reject the Pañcarātra Śāstra? For the Pañcarātra Śāstras do not accept that the individual soul has an origin, which assumption would have justified the sūtra's rejection.

**Objection.** But is it not their assertion that Vāsudeva is at once the supreme material cause and the supreme spirit; that from him the individual soul Saṁkarṣaṇa is born, from Saṁkarṣaṇa the mind called Pradyumna, and from the latter the ego called Aniruddha?

**Reply.** No. The personal manifestation of God is described as being constituted by vyūhas,²⁰⁹ and the word "individual soul" is assigned to one of these vyūhas for practical purposes, in order to prove clearly the differences that exist within the Adorable One, which differences are in accordance with those of the varṇas. It is as they say: "The four vyūhas are to be worshipped successively by the four varṇas successively." Besides, the words 'individual soul,' 'mind' and 'ego' do not denote these tānmātras²¹⁰ themselves, but refer to a person who is the superintending deity of these orders and whose personality is entirely different
from the order he superintends. Birth is described as the acquisition of various bodies, as is said in the statement \textit{toyena jīvān} in the Yajurmurdhan.\textsuperscript{211}

Besides, the Author of the Sūtras has already discarded the \textit{sṛuti}, \textit{smṛti} and profane views concerning the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul in the sūtra \textit{carācaravpaśrasyas tu syāt tadvapadeṣo bhāktas tadbhāvabhaśvitāt}.\textsuperscript{212} And since, moreover, the origination of the individual soul out of Brahman has been rejected in the sūtras \textit{nātmā śruteḥ nityatvāc ca tābhyaśi},\textsuperscript{213} it does not occasion a renewed exposition: an issue which does not need being made a topic would then be made a topic.

96. This also explains the sūtra \textit{na ca kartuḥ karāṇam};\textsuperscript{214} for it is not said here that the instrument, sc. the mind, originates from the agent, sc. Saṃkarṣaṇa. For we have already stated that these names solely refer to the persons who superintendent these orders but are themselves different from them.

\textbf{Objection.} Then why this sutra at all? For we do not find that instruments, like a hatchet, originate from an agent, like Devadatta, so that an instrument out of an agent makes no sense.

\textbf{Refutation.} Well, then you reject the general view that all instruments, vital airs, mind etc. have their origin in Brahman which itself is without the entire collection of all instruments and rests solely on its own power; this view is stated in the text: \textit{“From it springs the vital air, the mind and all the senses.”}\textsuperscript{215}

Or if you do agree on this because it is clearly proved in Revelation, I ask you why you don’t agree.
on it because it is clearly proved in Pañcarātra. It is not a very proper procedure to deny things that are proved by smṛti; since both śruti and smṛti spring from perfect knowledge, they are equally valid.

97. Objection. The sūtra vijnānadibhāve vā tadapratisedhalē is explained as follows: The Author raises the question which one of two alternatives may be true: Are these four equally and independently sovereign, or has one a quaternity of personalities which he has assumed at his own desire? and then he points out the defect: if they are equally sovereign, none of them can be effects because they are equal; when they are different forms of one, what is the purpose of this division?

Refutation. That is not correct, because an alternative is impossible. For no one who holds that there is a God theorizes that the world has several Gods, least of all the Pāñcarātrikas who hold that "Vāsudeva is the ultimate material cause". But this one Bhagavān, who has divided Himself into four for reasons of sport, protects the entire world. And this position is not unjustified, because it is justified in the same manner as the appearance of second-born and first-born brothers like Bala and Bharata. For just as the Bhagavān, who has created the variety of phenomena of ether, 'Wind, Siva, Brahma etc. for His sport, and whose sole motivation is the sport of his unfathomable power, has voluntarily assumed the personalities of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata, Satrughna etc., without there being the possibility of logical conflict in the same manner the divisions of
Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, too, are unconflicting.

98. Furthermore, vipratiṣedhāt may mean either "because of conflict with Revelation", on the basis of the citation "failing to find in the four Vedas...", or "because of mutual conflict between the Tantras themselves". The former alternative, incompatibility with Revelation has already been refuted as being without valid basis. Mutual conflict between the Pāñcarātra Tantras themselves, whose terminological precision has been perfected by the rules of logic governing principal matter, generality, peculiarity, quality and the like, does not exist. On the other hand, statements that lack the corroboration of logic can have no cogency; as the maxim says: "A statement must have precision perfected by logic before it can communicate its meaning."

Consequently, the Author of the Sūtras gives the lie to those exegetes who, by superimposing on the Pāñcarātra Tantras (whose validity he strongly affirms as no less than that of the Vedas, in such assertions as "idam mahopaniṣadam," etc.) the non-existent doctrine of the soul's origination, explain that the sūtra means to reject the Pāñcarātra Tantras. Enough of the book!

99. The meaning of the sūtras is this. First the Author has set forth that the doctrines of Kapila, Kāśyapa, Buddha, Jina and Paśupati, who oppose the Author's own accepted doctrine, are unnatural because they conflict with Revelation and logic. Now, in order to remove the suspicion that the Pāñcarātra
Tantras (which are his own accepted doctrine) are equally unnatural with the other doctrines because their usual enumeration on an equal plane with the others has made them closely associated with them in people's thinking, he elicits their validity.

In the first two sutras the *prima-facie* case is laid down: the Pañcarātra likewise has no validity, *ut pattyasaṃbhavāt*, i.e., on account of the impossibility of Saṃkarṣaṇa's origination which is taught there. Why should it be impossible? Because it cannot be established in either of two possible cases; either the four Vyūhas are equally sovereign, or else one God exists in four persons; and in either case there is impossibility of origination. If they are equally sovereign, they cannot be created because they are equal; if only one being is admitted no origination is possible either, since a distribution within one being of creating and created parts is inconceivable.

100. Similarly *na ca kartuḥ karṇaṁ*: Pañcarātra has no validity for the further reason that it is impossible that the instrument, sc. the mind called Pradyumna, originates from the agent, sc. the individual soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa, for the hatchet does not originate from Devadatta. Or there is this alternative explanation of *na ca kartuḥ karṇaṁ*: and for the further reason that the instrument does not originate from the agent Saṃkarṣaṇa, since according to the text: "From it spring the vital air, the mind and all the senses," it is revealed that all instruments really originate from Brahman.
101. Then follows: \textit{vijñānādibhāve vā tada-pratipṛṣedhaḥ}. By the particle \textit{vā} this prima-facie case is now reversed. What has been said, viz., that there is no validity since in neither case origination of \textit{Sanākaraśāna} etc. is possible, is untrue: it is not contradictory that \textit{Sanākaraśāna} etc. have originated. Indeed, it would be contradictory if they were not \textit{vijñānādi}.

\textit{Vijñānādi} is a dvandva compound: "knowledge and beginning," that means: Brahman; thus \textit{vijñānādibhāve} means \textit{brahmabhāve}. Inasmuch as they are Brahman (\textit{brahmabhāve}), the origination is not contradictory. That is to say: by virtue of the fact that the unique Supreme Soul \textit{Vāsudeva}, whose omnipotence is unbounded, enters into them through His \textit{māyā}, a cause-effect relation is justified. The objection that the mind cannot originate from \textit{Sanākaraśāna}, on the authority of the śruti that the mind originates from Brahman, is invalidated by the fact that he, sc. \textit{Sanākaraśāna} is \textit{vijñānādi}, i.e., Brahman.

102. Furthermore, what is being said in the argument \textit{na ca kartuḥ karaṇam}? Is it that the instrument of a certain action does not originate from the agent of that same action; or that no instrument of any action whatever originates from any agent whatsoever? If the first view is taken, we have a conflict with Inference, because the argument contains the fallacy of proving the proved. The mind, originating from the agent \textit{Sanākaraśāna} cannot be the instrument of \textit{Sanākaraśāna}'s action of originating it, since it itself is the object of the action; nor can it be the instrument of the action of being originated, since it itself is the
agent of that action. If the alternative view is taken, we have a conflict with Perception, because we see that for instance a pitcher, though it be the instrument of an action of fetching water, yet originates from the agent of such an action, the potter. This the Author says in the sūtra vipratisedhāt: ‘because there is conflict.’

103. As to the other explanation that has been given of these two sūtras, since it is vijnānādi, i.e. “a ground for validity”, the denial of the validity of Pañcarātra is not justified, because it entails over-extension. The invalidity, which is defined by the non-origination of knowledge through repetition or dubiety in the Tantras, is rejected, because knowledge is actually had from them. In order to remove the suspicion of untruth occasioned by the speaker’s character, the word ādi is used to convey the intended meaning that the Tantras are in fact spoken by a trustworthy person.

Consequently the meaning is this: He always has direct knowledge of the entire world by virtue of the omniscience which is part of His nature; He bestows man’s wishes upon him, when He is satisfied—and he is satisfied by meditation alone; Him the experts in the Veda describe as eternally satisfied in all His desires: how then can there be defects in Him like error, deceit etc.?

104. The ‘impossibility of origination,’ which has been stated in the first two sūtras, is thereupon denied for Saṅkarṣaṇa and the other forms of God in the sūtra vipratisedhāt. This means either; “Because there is conflict with the Bhagavān’s perception which is
inferred through Pañcaratra;” or “Because there is conflict with śruti which is inferred from the same Tradition.”

105. Or there is another interpretation: since the sūtras intend to illustrate the rules of exegesis, the author first assumes that there is a conflict between śruti and Pañcarātra, though in fact there is no such conflict, and then reasons this out as follows: suppose that Pañcarātra is in conflict with the veda, is this sāstra then, like the statements of Manu etc., valid or invalid? This question is thereupon answered: “It is invalid, because of the impossibility of the origination of valid knowledge concerning a conflicting sense; and this impossibility itself is proved on the ground that there is independence of something that is dependent.”

Thus the sūtra utpattyasambhavāt means: “because it is impossible that a valid knowledge originates, since, as long as the dependent Pañcarātra Tradition does not start proving the validity of its own sense by establishing the validity of its basis, the cognition which originates from the independent preterpersonal scripture determines the Tradition’s sense as being different, and consequently conflicting with itself. For Pañcarātra conveys that scripture is its basis only as long as the sword of direct scripture does not cut its root.

106. Objection. But why should the Vedas themselves be independent, since their validity, too, depends on the direct cognition of the Bhagavān, because this cognition is their cause? Just as the Pañcarātra Traditions are dependent on His cognition, so are the Vedas too dependent on His cognition.”
REFUTATION. To refute this view, the statement is made: "The Vedas are not the product of a maker, i.e. the Bhagavân. Karana here in the sense of "things that are made or produced," by the rule "suffix-ana in the sense of the object of the action." This then means that the Vedas are preterhuman.

107. Viṣṇanādi-bhāve vā tada-pratīṣṭedhāti. If, on the other hand, it is not true that the Pañcarātra Śāstra is invalid, then what? tada-pratīṣṭedhāti, i.e. non-rejection of the origination of valid knowledge (namely, even when partly conflicting, the conflicting statement may be valid optionally), because it is based upon the direct cognition of the Bhagavân in whom error and deceit are impossible as He is a source of viṣṇāna (viṣṇanādi-bhāve): Viṣṇāna means "knowledge par excellence in which no mistake is possible. For since all other authors of Dharmashåstras are not omniscient, as they are involved in saṁsāra, and since therefore they are also not entirely self-sufficient, various lapses are conceivable in their knowledge. Whereas in the case of the Bhagavân, whose supremacy is natural and unlimited, His knowledge is the immediate insight in all dharma and adharma, which is natural to Him and true, as is known from hundreds of śrutis; it is this knowledge which in the śūtra is described as viṣṇāna. When such knowledge is the 'beginning,' i.e. the basis, there is non-rejection, sc. the śāstra is valid.

108. Objection. But how can it be assumed that the Tantra, which conflicts with scripture, has validity? For if it is valid, it becomes optional beside
scripture; and optionality is deficient in the case of the Tantras by eight defects. Option is assumed when there is no invariable rule that something should be such and not otherwise, because there is no reason to reject, in one case or another, an alternative statement; for instance: "He must sacrifice with rice," beside "he must sacrifice with barley." In the latter case it is impossible to eliminate one or the other because neither of these statements is characterized by independence. In the former case, however, there can be no such option between scripture and Pāñcarātra, because the two are not equal; for the Vedic statement is independent, because it is preterhuman, whereas the Pāñcarātra statement is dependent. So how can they be alternatives and optional?


Objection. How can a statement deriving from a person be independent?

Refutation. Let us ask the logician to explain this: must dependence on something else be assumed for a statement to be informative, to give positive certainty, or to state the truth about its content, or to serve a purpose of human importance?

All four are impossible. When the statement is heard, "One must worship the Bhagavān with the attendance due an emperor,"224 nothing else is required for this statement to be informative, because the meaning of the words has already become known from other contexts. Nor does this small measure of dependence prove the weakness of the statement's
validity, for the same weakness would follow for śruthi too. 223

Nor is anything else required for the statement to give positive certainty; for the statement “One must worship...” does not occasion doubt whether one must or must not worship, since that would entail a negation of the direct declaration of the real sense.

Nor is anything required for the statement to be true to the facts, for the knowledge produced by the statement does not require anything outside its own cause 226 to be true to the facts, because secondary validity is inappropriate and not admitted. 227

Nor is it necessary for the statement to be dependent on something else in order to serve a purpose of human importance, for the proof of this purpose follows from a consideration of the entire body of doctrine. In this case, those who have undergone the afore-mentioned sacraments have knowledge of the content of the statement when they have heard the doctrine, and hence they perform the “five-times-a-day” 228 rites, which form this content, and hence they attain to supreme perfection; this is learnt solely from the Śastra itself.

110. Or if the objection is raised that, granted the self-validity of Pañcarātra, this validity is not complete as long as it has not been made certain that there are no defects, after it has been made certain that the speaker is reliable,—I reply that this view is not correct; knowledge that there are no defects does not completely establish validity, since the validity arises from the cause itself of defectless knowledge and not from the defectlessness of this knowledge.
111. Nor is positive certainty about such of the speaker's qualities as his reliability required for his statement to be defectless, because the statement's defectlessness is proved solely by its being defectless. As the Author of the Vārttika declares, "Then the qualities (of the speaker) do not exert any influence (on the validity of his statement) because (its defectlessness) is already known." The same Author also shows that, even when there is certainty about its defectlessness, the existence of qualities (like reliability in the speaker) is helpful: "When defectlessness is known, they are helpful by merely existing."

Nor does the validity, when it has been established require something else in order that consequent actions of acceptance, rejection etc. proceed, because action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire. As they say, "Action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire."

Moreover, in the case of the self-valid Vedas, too, we find this same dependence in that their validity would not be completely established as long as there were no certainty of their defectlessness after the certainty about the non-existence of their author.

112. Objection. But when the non-existence of their author is proved without effort by the non-apprehension of what ought to be there, the question of the non-validity does not arise for the Veda, for defects are impossible without something or someone in which they could reside. As they say: "In that case (the Veda) the absence of non-validity follows quite naturally from the absence of an author; therefore its validity cannot be questioned."
Refutation. Why, in the case of Pañcarātra too no question can arise about its validity, since the absence of defects is easily proved by the fact that the omniscient and omnipotent God is its speaker; so the argument is the same.

In other words, in both cases of self-validity there is positive certainty that there are no defects; in the case of the Veda because there is positive certainty that no person is involved who could possess these defects; in the case of Pañcarātra because there is positive certainty that its speaker possesses virtues which preclude defects. It is here as in the following two cases of absence of heat: there is no heat in ether because it is certain that there is no locus for heat in ether; nor is there heat in cold water because there is coldness which precludes heat.

113. Moreover, neither dependence nor independence is by itself a cause of invalidation. The independent cognition that some substance is silver while in reality it is nacre is invalidated by the cognition: “This is not silver;” this cognition itself is considered as dependent. The cognition “This is that flame,” is found to be invalidated by the inferential cognition that arises from the disappearance of oil; the latter cognition itself is dependent because it arises from a sense-perception. The simple truth therefore is that which is susceptible to invalidation is invalidated by that which is not so susceptible; in our present case there is no such susceptibility either of Scripture or of Pañcarātra.

114. Or if you think that it is impossible to give positive certainty that the Tantra is promulgated by
Vāsudeva, as it is in conflict with Scripture, I ask you: Why then does the knowledge arise that Scripture is preterpersonal, while it is invalidated because it conflicts with Pañcarātra? They accept it that the Veda is preterpersonal just because it is Veda; but then one can equally claim that Pañcarātra is promulgated by Vāsudeva just because it is Pañcarātra. If the preterpersonal origin of the Veda is proved by the fact that there is no recollection of an author, then why not agree that Pañcarātra is promulgated by Vāsudeva just because there is recollection of his authorship? For there exists a strong transmission of the recollection, extending to women and children, that Keśava is the author of the Pañcarātra. So great a faith do people have in His authorship that they erect monuments according to the precepts of Pañcarātra, donating elephants, horses and great wealth in various fees.

In the Skanda Purāṇa it is said that “Kapila is the promulgator of Sāṁkhya, Keśava of Pañcarātra.” Likewise in the Mahābhārata: “Nārāyaṇa Himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañcarātra. This great Upaniṣada, consistent with the four Vedas, as well as with the doctrines of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, called Pañcarātra, which was revealed by Nārāyaṇa’s tongue, has been taught to the sages by Nārada as he had seen it and heard it in the abode of Brahmā.” From these and thousands of other statements in the Purāṇas, which are supported by the rules of interpretation, the conclusion follows naturally that Pañcarātra was indeed composed by Vāsudeva Himself. On the other hand, some experts dispute that the Veda is eternal.235
Therefore, the real ground for the thesis that
the validity of the doctrine of the Bhagavān and
that of the Veda is above question is this that both are
causes of defectless knowledge. Consequently, because
both are equally exemplary, they are optionally valid.
It is with this view in mind that the wise Author of the
Sūtras has explained: *vijñānādibhave vā tadapratisedhah*.

115. **Objection.** However, granted that error
is made inconceivable by the Bhagavān's omniscience,
yet, since He is also omnipotent, He can also have
composed the Pañcarātra in order to deceive. Now,
when people, considering this possibility, are confused
in their minds as to which view they should take, that
this Sastra has been promulgated to deceive them, or
that it has been stated according to the truth with
complete attentiveness of mind, what way is there to
resolve their dilemma? We should prefer to decide
that since it militates against Scripture it results
in disaster.

**Refutation.** To this objection the Author replies
*vipratisedhāt*, i.e., on account of the contradiction of all
śruti, epic, purāṇa and worldly experience. If, without
any reason, merely because the Bhagavān is omnipotent,
the question is raised if He might have intended to ruin
His devotees, why, then one could also raise the
question whether He would not hurl even the virtuous
into hell by a whim of His omnipotence and con-
sequentially the whole world would fall into inactivity!
Besides, we could also raise the question whether
He did not wish to deceive people, because He is
omnipotent, and thus created in the beginning the
Vedas themselves with false meanings, which are also
suprasensible, took away from Brahmā etc. also the power of recollecting that He was the creator of the Vedas, and from then onward set in motion the transmission of Vedic instruction until the present day: how can we be sure about it?

Or the position can be taken that since there is no evidence that, while He is indeed omnipotent, He acted up to the full measure of His omnipotence, since there is no purpose for Him to deceive people because He is satisfied in all His desires, and since He is not in the least affected by defects of partiality and cruelty etc. because He abides with natural affection for all living beings; and since, if He had composed the Pañcarātra in order to deceive, it would be impossible to demonstrate that the wise men who, up to now, learn its instructions and perform the contents of these instructions have forgotten the defects of its author, it must follow that such a suspicion does not arise; and if this view is taken, all this will equally apply to the Vedas as well.

Therefore, what possible purpose could He who is satisfied in all His desires, who is omniscient and a treasury of compassion have in deceiving the poor people who have failed to understand the meaning (of the Veda)? Or how could the supreme sages everywhere praise the Tantra as being equal to the Upaniṣads, if it had been composed in order to deceive? For thus the saints declare in Vārāha Purāṇa, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Bhārata etc. that this Tantra is an equally esoteric doctrine as the Vedas; and we declare the same. "Through Veda, Pañcarātra, through devotion and sacrifice, O Brahmin, I can be
attained, and not in any other way, even in hundreds of lacs of years. If one among thousands will grasp the Pañcarātra and, at the expiry of his karman, will die my devotee, the Vedas and the Pañcarātra will dwell in his heart forever. This supreme Pañcarātra doctrine of mine, which is not difficult to grasp, that you shall reach to all the world by my grace, doubtless. The Yogins mediate upon the Eternal One with Purāṇas, Vedas and Pañcarātras, and worship Him with the proper rites. Thus Śāṅkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Veda and Āraṇyaka on the other hand are one and the same; all together they are the members that constitute Pañcarātra, O excellent one. He who sees through Veda and Pañcarātra sees truly; this great Upaniṣada, consistent with the four Vedas...." Since the number of these and similar statements is infinite, we stop here. If you still raise the question if there cannot be ruin in such a Tantra, then there can be no faith in anything. It is with this view in mind that the Author sets forth: vipratiseddhāt.

Therefore, even if there were a conflict between the Bhagavān's doctrine and the Veda, there still would be option between them; but we have already expounded that there is no conflict between them at all.

116. Objection. However, how can the venerable Author of the Bhāṣya state that those parts which are in conflict are invalid: "If there be conflict, it is carefully eliminated."

Refutation. This statement means that those of frail minds, who are not strong enough to plunge into the deep ocean of rules of interpretation, must not be
disrespectful to the Veda. This is comparable to the venerable Jaimini's exposition that the fruits of acts serve to increase people's faith in the acts.

117. The contention has been voiced that Pañcarātra is invalid because "it is accepted by those who are outside the Veda." But why could one not equally well contend that the Vedas are invalid because they are accepted by those who are outside Pañcarātra?

Furthermore, what exactly does this mean, being "outside the Veda," and what means "accepted by those who are outside the Veda?" Does "being outside the Veda" mean "being different from the Veda" or "doing what is forbidden by the Veda" or "being hostile to the Vedas?"

Likewise we must inquire whether "accepted" means "learnt" or "known" or "observed." In all cases the ground proves to be defective.

First of all, if "outside the Veda" means "different from the Veda," and "accepted" means "learnt," then the ground proves to be occasional, since it equally applies to the Vedas themselves: the Vedic statements, which are valid, are "learnt" by members of the three estates, which themselves are "different from the Veda." If you take "accepted" to mean "known," you do not get rid of the same defect. If the term "outside the Veda" means "different from the Veda," and "accepted" means "observed," then there would likewise be an occasional application of the ground to the Vedas themselves. If "outside the Veda" is taken to mean "performing forbidden acts," the ground has an occasional application to those statements of the Veda which enjoin expiatory
ceremonies. For since statements enjoining expiations, e.g. "One must sacrifice with the kuśmāṇḍa verses,\textsuperscript{241}\footnote{241} whose content is to be "learnt", "known" and "observed," by those who perform forbidden acts, are authoritative, it would follow that the ground "because they are accepted by people outside the Veda" is occasional.\textsuperscript{242}

Nor are the Pañcarātra Tantras invalid because they are "accepted" by people hostile to the Veda, for the ground is unproved. Besides, acceptance by people hostile to the Veda does not by itself refute the validity of what is accepted. If it did, the Path of the Heretics would be unbarred; for they endeavour to uproot the validity of the Veda. Thus the naked Jainas could effortlessly render the Vedas untruthful simply by "accepting" the Vedas in some manner by way of deception.

118. Objection. A consideration of such statements as "He should never use the Veda, except at a funerary offering,"\textsuperscript{243}\footnote{243} shows that the defect affects only the unqualified students, not the defectless Vedic statements themselves.

Reply. Then the defect affects only the unquali­fied students in the case of the Tantras under discussion as well, and not the defectless Tantras themselves; so everything is the same, depending on what partisan view one takes.

Or if it be held that "outside the Veda" means "unqualified to perform Vedic acts," and that Pañca­rātra is invalid, like the caityavandana statements,\textsuperscript{244}\footnote{244} because it is accepted by those who, being unqualified, are outside the Veda, the following distinction must be
considered: is the ground here that the Tantras are accepted by people unqualified for all Vedic rites, or by people who are unqualified for some Vedic rites? This point should be clarified.

Now, the first alternative cannot be adopted, because the ground is not proved. For there is no human being who is not qualified for any śrauta rite whatsoever, e.g. non-violence etc., because his humanity as such provides his qualification. Otherwise caṇḍālas etc. would do no wrong if they committed such crimes a brahmin-murder, theft of brahmin-wealth, miscegenation with caste-women, study of the Veda etc., simply because they were not qualified to observe these prohibitions. If a man does something he should not do, he commits an offence. It follows that everybody is qualified to these Vedic rites, which shows that the ground is not proved and that the illustration falls short of the means of proof.

Nor can the second alternative be adopted that the Tantras are invalid because they are accepted by people who are unqualified for certain Vedic rites, because that would entail the conclusion that all Vedic statements are invalid. For every man has some Vedic rites for which he is not qualified: the brahmin is not qualified for the Royal Consecration, the kṣatriya not for the ritual drinking of soma. Consequently, this ground has an occasional application to the Vedic statements, which are accepted by qualified persons belonging to the three estates, and is therefore inconclusive. As to the illustration, the view that heaven is attained by worshipping a caitya is not invalidated by its being accepted by heretics, but by the deficiency of its cause.
119. We have already said that Pañcarātra has been accepted by the Vedic, and among all orthodox pre-eminent, sages Bhṛgu, Bharadvāja, Dvaipāyaṇa etc. And in the present day we can also observe how exemplary persons of great learning, believing that these rites are most effective in attaining bliss, perform the rites of temple-building, erection of idols, prostration, circumambulation and particular festival ceremonies, just as they perform the agnihotra and other rituals enjoined directly by Scripture. And it is improper to maintain that their conduct has no foundation, for that would entail that such śārta rites as crepuscular worship, aṣṭakā etc., are similarly without foundation. It has been said that the conduct of exemplary people is authoritative,246 and also that even when they do not know the cause of their custom, they do know what is proper custom.

120. If the ground for the invalidity of Pañcarātra is that it is accepted by Bhāgavatas,247 well, then the scriptural statements of the Ekayana śākhā and the Vājasaneyaka śākhās and the means of knowledge Perception, Inference etc., would also be invalid since the Bhāgavatas accept those too! This same ground, moreover, namely that Pañcarātra is invalid because it is accepted by the Bhāgavatas, suffers from two defects; it is both specially-occasional and unproved.248 Why is Pañcarātra rendered invalid by their acceptance? If it is because they do not belong to the three estates, then the Atharvanic statements whose content is accepted and observed by rathakāras, niśādas and other groups which do not belong to the three estates (Statements like “The rathakāra must add fuel,” “With
that he must sacrifice for the chief of the Niṣādas,” etc. would also be invalid.

Or, be it granted that the acceptance of certain rites by outcastes renders them invalid; yet, in view of the fact that the eminent brahminhood of these Bhāgavatas who follow the doctrine of the Bhagavān is evident by all criteria of knowledge, their acceptance of Pañcarātra rather confirms its validity. He says: By the same means of knowledge by which the brahminhood of one set of people is evident the brahminhood of another set of people is evident.

121. Objection. But when one sees the small sons of the twice-born who wear the customary hairtuft, sacred thread, palāśa wood stick and muṇja grass girdle, one knows, the moment the eyes fall on them, that they are brahmins.

Refutation. And in our case, when one sees learned people who day after day study the Vājasaneyaka and Ekāyana sākhās, wear prominently their sacred threads, upper garments and hairtufts, impart teaching, sacrifice, receive priestly stipends—does one not instantly know that they are brahmins? If it be held that outcastes, low-caste people etc., may also illegitimately sacrifice, teach, carry palāśa sticks etc. and that they behave as though they were legitimate brahmins, and that therefore neither costume nor conduct provides positive certainty that a man is a brahmin, then the same applies to other priests than Bhāgavatas.

Or be it granted that there are cases where people illegitimately display the marks of brahminhood; still,
though there may be doubt about the legitimacy of these marks in others because of their resemblance to pretenders (just as when there is a doubt that one may be mistaken about real silver too because one has mistaken nacre for silver), then there can be certainty of their being genuine brahmins in all cases when no misapprehension occurs, because otherwise doubt would conflict with Perception and lead to infinite regress.

122. Or if it be held that the others are genuine brahmins because they recollect those gotras which are peculiar to brahmins, the same applies to the Bhāgavatas; for the Bhāgavatas have the tradition: “We are descendants of Bharadvāja, of Kaśyapa, of Gotama, of Upagāva.”

Nor is this recollection or tradition of gotras unfounded or merely contemporary, for the same can be argued for all tradition of gotras. If there were doubt about descent since error could conceivably occur, this would confuse the whole world about the authenticity of their brahminhood. After all, anyone may fear that he really is a caṇḍāla if he suspects his mother of having had a lover; and how, my excellent opponent, can you be quite sure yourself that your birth entitled you to Veda-study? Therefore if the brahminhood of Bhāgavatas, which is completely established by the recollection of the various gotras which has been passed on in uninterrupted transmission, stands unchallenged, then there is no difference whatever in this between the brahminhood of Bhāgavatas and of others.

123. Further, if some who believe in the Supreme Person are monotheists and others who believe in
petty godlings are polytheists, is then the same authority stated for the brahminhood of the ones as well as of the others, or how else is their brahminhood known if not by that same authority? If this is the question, then listen: there remains a criterion to determine brahminhood in either case, either Perception, or Inference, or Circumstantial-Implication.

124. Objection. But how can Perception convey that they are brahmins? For when we are close to two individuals whom we have not seen before, one a brahmin, the other a kṣatriya, of the same age and the same appearance, we do not immediately observe the distinction that one is a brahmin and the other a kṣatriya in the same way as we instantly observe the differentness of a goat, an elephant, a buffalo etc. Nor is it proper to maintain that the visual sense conveys the brahminhood of a nearby individual in dependence on our recollection of his father’s brahminhood etc.; for that recollection itself is impossible without a previous immediate cognition, just as the recollection of the son of a sterile mother is impossible. Nor can we know from Inference that a man is a brahmin, for we do not find a concomitant mark. And such qualities as tranquillity, self-restraint, austerity, purity etc., cannot be taken as marks of brahminhood, because they are available only in the case of a good brahmin and because they are not exclusively confined to brahmins. Nor can Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof of brahminhood, because it is not lacking in season and the fact that the sentence-meaning of the statement, “In spring the brahmin must add fuel to the fire,” is otherwise unestablished does not there-
fore by Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof that a man is a brahmin; for knowledge of that sentence-meaning presupposes knowledge of the word-meaning of brahminhood etc.

125. Refutation. All this does not make for a defect in my argument. There is no invariable rule that Perception becomes manifest only at the first contact between sense and object and not otherwise. Perception is that which illumines the unmanifest while there is continuity of the operation of the senses. Thus there can be Perception of brahminhood; for when we keep our eyes open we note, immediately upon observing the particular differentiae of the genus brahminhood, that the brahminhood is quite clearly noticeable in those who belong to the families of the different gotras—Vāsiṣṭha, Kāśyapīya Saṭhamaṛṣaṇa etc.—, who are pure in their conduct, and who display the sacred thread, upper cloth, hairtuft and muñja grass girdle. Nor does it run counter to ordinary experience that the eyes can convey brahminhood in dependence on the observation of the peculiarities of genus. In every case the sense becomes the cause of the rise of determination of sense-object when favoured by the accompanying circumstances of place, time, configuration etc.251 It is the natural function of the sense-organ as such to relate itself to these accompanying circumstances. As the author says: "No organ of knowledge, whether in Veda or in ordinary process, becomes efficacious in determining the object that is to be realized through the accompanying circumstances unless it is favoured by these circumstances."252 Consequently the visual sense, when favoured by the recollection
of genus, gives knowledge of brahminhood without the object giving up its perceptuality. So it is evident that the visual sense can be the instrument of knowledge of genus in dependence on a variety of accompanying factors. Gold becomes manifest through its colour from copper etc., ghee is differentiated from oil, through its smell and taste; fire, which is hidden by ashes, is perceived through touching the ashes. Sound may provide us with proof that there is a horse in the distance; a pitcher etc. are known through their configuration; brahminhood through descent, and also through conduct in certain particulars, which is completely protected by the king.

It has been contended that when we see two individuals of the same age and appearance, the difference between the two does not immediately appear to the eye; but the perceptuality of their differentness is not refuted by just this. In this case the non-perception of their differentness is caused by the defect of similarity. The difference between nacre and silver, which are similar in appearance and configuration, may not be immediately visible, yet that does not mean that their difference is not visible at another time; and the same holds for the difference between brahmin, kṣatriya and vaiśya.

Or else, brahminhood is that which arises from the differentiae of genus, and such a product can empirically be known just like any other product by a process of positive and negative consideration, e.g. “what are the specific characteristics to which the elders apply the term brahminhood, or to which characteristics is the term applied?” It has been said
often that it applies to those who possess recollection of gotra, Vedic ancestry etc.; let us not start discussing this question again, or we must repeat our old argument: it is established that the Bhāgavatas are brahmins, because they possess gotra etc.

126. The objection was made that the Bhāgavatas are born from a vaiśya vrātya, on the authority of the two statements: “The fifth one, the Sātvata, must worship the sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree;” and “he is also called a Bhāgavata; he is born from a vaiśya vrātya.” To this we reply: precisely what do we learn from these two statements? Is there a simple connection of names, or must an invariable rule be stated?

It is impossible to make it a rule that the words Bhāgavata and Sātvata denote a vaiśya vrātya, for that is not known from the text, and it involves overextension. In the statement, “the fifth one, Sātvata,” we do not find a denial that the words Bhāgavata and Sātvata denote other meanings, for that would mean ignoring the explicit and inventing the unstated. In our statement the fifth one, who is born from an vaiśya vrātya, is understood to bear the name of Sātvata: “The fifth one, Sātvata ...”, since the word ‘fifth’ is the operative term as it is mentioned first. And if the fifth is the Sātvata, the Sātvata is not necessarily also be the fifth, namely the vaiśya vrātya. For when the stated subject (e.g. a mountain) is possessed of fire, the predicated fire does not necessarily possess smoke. Consequently the consideration if a smṛti statement of this kind cannot give certainty that the words Sātvata, Bhāgavata etc mean vrātya.
127. If it be argued that since these two words also may denote another caste (namely of the vaiśya vrātyas), then the mere fact that certain brahmins are denoted by these words proves that these brahmins belong to that caste, even though they follow the doctrine of the Bhagavān, it would also follow that, since we find the collocated word ācārya also used to denote the issue of a lowly vaiśya, therefore an eminent brahmin who is an ācārya imparting teaching of the Veda with its ancillae and its esoteric teachings is thereby denoted as being a vaiśya vrātya! If, on the other hand, even though a true brahmin is denoted by the word ācārya which denotes a vrātya, there still can be no suspicion that he actually is a vrātya, because there is positive certainty of his brahminhood which is clearly proved by other means of knowledge, and because it is possible that the word ācārya is used figuratively (ācārya as one who “accumulates”—ācinoti the pupil’s knowledge) for a Brahmin teacher, then in our case, too, the same argument can be made, namely thus: even though they are denoted by the terms Sātvata and Bhāgavata, which denote another caste, yet there can rise no suspicion that they actually are vrātyas, because the brahminhood of these followers of the Bhagavān’s doctrine is firmly known from the recollection of completely obvious clans, Vedic ancestry etc., and because it is possible that the terms Sātvata and Bhāgavata have a figurative denotation of sattvavat and bhaga-vat.

In other words, the fact that the same word denotes both classes of people does not mean that therefore both belong to one and the same caste, lest the
true brahmin be not made into a low-caste man because he is also denoted by the word ācārya. We find that the word hari also means 'frog.' Does it follow that a lion is a frog because both are denoted by the same word? Then word itself would be horned, since 'word' is denoted by gauḥ!"

Consequently, just as the words sudhanvan, ācārya etc., which denote more than one meaning, are also used for someone born from a vaisya vrātya, so also the words Bhāgavata and Sātvata.

128. The contention that when the conventional meaning and the etymological meaning of a word collide, it is right to assume the conventional meaning of the term, in this case of the terms Bhāgavata and Sātvata, is not correct; for when a denotation is appropriate which is the composite of the denotations of the component elements of the words, then it is not right to assume a non-composite denotation. For he who theorizes that the words sātvata and bhāgavata have their conventional meaning in denoting someone born from a vaisya vrātya, must also theorize that the words sātvavat and bhagavat, which are the stem and the taddhita suffix built on the stem, have a different meaning in a sentence like, "having observed the sātvata rules, a man becomes a Bhāgavata because of the merits he has won in a previous existence." This goes to prove the assumption that in this case the word may have a double meaning by etymology alone, because it is possible for it to be used in the sense of "issue of a vaisya vrātya." And it is possible that those vrātyas too, despite the fact that they fail to
worship the Bhagavān directly, yet may be denoted by the words sātvata and bhāgavata, because of their work discipline of cleaning up Vāsudeva’s temple, clearing away the bali offerings, guarding the idol etc., for it is taught that the cān suffix may occur in the sense of a simple relation, “this is of that.” And it is declared that the issue of a vāiśya vrātya has the work discipline of cleaning the Bhagavān’s temple etc., “and (the task) of the sātvatas is the cleaning of the deity’s temple, the eating of the offerings, the guarding of the idol;” and “he must worship Viṣṇu’s sanctuaries.”

129. Herewith is also rejected the contention that the Bhāgavatas are vrātyas because they would have the same profession. For it is one thing to clean the temple, clear away the bali offerings, guard the idol, and quite another thing to perform the variety of actions that are daily observed by the Bhāgavatas: the cleaning of the way to the idol, the preparation for worship, offering, daily study, and meditation. It is as it is in the case of the jyotiṣṭoma etc. In the jyotiṣṭoma, too, a carpenter has a task in making the various receptacles, soma-cups, soma-decaners, ladles etc., while the officiating priests have their tasks in reciting various different mantra recitations, representing the deity, pressing of the soma etc. And this occupational similarity, limited as it is, does not raise the question whether the priests have the same caste as the carpenters! So here, too, there is a difference between those who perform the pañcakālikā ritual, which is established by the Bhagavān’s doctrine, and the low-caste people who do the cleaning-up of the temple and are also called temple-guards.
130. Further, the contention\(^{266}\) that, if the words *bhāgavata* and *sātvata* have their etymological meaning, this entails that the word *rathakāra* in the injunction "the *rathakāra* must build a fire"\(^{267}\) denotes someone belonging to the three *varṇas* on account of its etymology of chariot-making,\(^{268}\) is not correct. For in the case of *rathakāra* it is correct that the term refers to someone belonging to the three *varṇas*, because otherwise the springtime etc., which are given in the statement on the origin of this fire-building, would be invalidated, and because usages of a word in the sense of different castes, which is given in the mantra "*saudhanyanā ṛbhavaḥ sūracaksasaḥ*"\(^{269}\) would be invalidated.\(^{270}\) Despite the fact that *rathakāra* is also a name for another caste—as learnt from the *smṛti* "the *rathakāra* is born out of a kariṇī by a māhiṣya"\(^{271}\) (so that the *rathakāra* is born from an anuloma marriage of a kṣatriya man and a vaiśya woman), nevertheless, since, on Sankha’s evidence\(^{272}\) that the *rathakāra* is not forbidden to perform rites of sacrificing, fire-building and initiation, there is no conflict of qualification for rites that can only be realized through knowledge of the Veda,\(^{273}\) and since the word *rathakāra* (in its etymological meaning) is inappropriate for members of the three *varṇas* because they are forbidden to follow an artisan’s profession, therefore we can only conclude that in both cases different castes are denoted by the term, and so there is no conflict.

Moreover, when knowledge of the thing meant by a word is obtained from the denotation of the separate members that compose the word, then the Author of the Sūtras rules out the validity of a denotation in
which the meanings of the component members are lost, namely in *proksaniśu arthasaṁyogāt*.274

Therefore, those eminent brahmins are called sātvatas and bhāgavātas who because of their pure character (sattva) devote themselves to the Bhāgavān who is the Supreme Person. Later on we shall show that other smṛtis set forth the eminent brahminhood of the Bhāgavātas.

131. The further objection,275 namely why these people should invariably be denoted by the exclusive names of Sātvata and Bhāgavata, if their brahminhood were the same as that of others, can be answered thus: there is no defect in that, for it is as it is in the case of the names *parivrājaka* and *nigadu*. Certain brahmins are called bhāgavātas, just as certain brahmins are called *parivrājakas*, and certain *yājulu* formulae *nigadas*, though both are equally brahmins and equally *yājulu* formulae; namely in the statements: “The brahmins should remain, the *parivrājakas* must be fetched;”276 “the *yājulu* formulae take place, not the *nigadas*; the *nigadas* take place, not the *yājulu* formulae;”277 and this is so because of the interpretation: “the *nigadas* are the fourth mantra collection, or the *yājulu* formulae, because they are identical.”

132. The contention278 that the Bhāgavātas are bad brahmins because they perform pūjā to the God, partake of the offering substance etc. for a livelihood, is countered in the following manner: Surely not all Bhāgavātas worship Hari for their profession, for many Sātvatas are found who perform pūjā for themselves. If there are certain people who, while being Sātvatas,
follow a reprehensible profession and perform sacrifices for respectable Bhāgavatas professionally, this fact alone does not mean that one may say that they are not brahmins. A vedic priest who officiates as an adhvaryu at a jyotistoma does not thereby lose caste. If the priest were not to receive fees, the pūjā itself would remain fruitless; they take fees in order to realize completely the excellence of the pūjā. At the conclusion of the worship one must give gold to the priest according to capacity; otherwise the fruit will go to the pūjā priest himself, as is shown by the smṛti: “A sacrifice for which a small fee is given kills (the sacrificer).” It is however prohibited that a covetous Vedic priest officiate as a priest after he himself has put up his demands for a fee, c.g. in the statement: (“There is an error called ‘garbage’”). When the sacrificer appoints as a officiant priest who covets the office, thinking either “He should give me (a fee)” or “He should choose me.” “This is as far from the sacrificer as garbage; this does not benefit the sacrificer.”

The donation of the sacerdotal fee which is purified by faith is felicitous for both, as according to the smṛti, “He who receives the offering and he who denotes it both go to heaven.”

133. The statement that professional worship of the deity and living off the god’s treasure makes a man a devalaka must be taken to refer to the professional worship of, and the living off the treasure of, other deities than Vāsudeva. Thus the blessed Vyāsa: “A devalaka is he who lives on Rudra etc.” And there is also Sāndilya’s word: “All those who perform sacrifices professionally and are also not consecrated
are the only ones who are traditionally known as *karmadevalakas* in this world, O sage. One should not touch them or consort with them for a year.’” Likewise: “Certain people who are *karmadevalakas* and *kalpadevalakas* are unqualified for ritual before the deity for a period of three years. Those brahmins who, without being consecrated, perform rites set forth in the Kalpa, either professionally or for the fame of it, are *kalpadevalakas*. One must have pūjā offered by another professional priest who has been properly consecrated; one is unable to worship the god oneself. This is the principal offering; in another manner it is secondary.” ‘In another manner,’ that is to say, when it is done by a non-consecrated priest. This the author elucidates: “The rite performed professionally by some priest who has not been properly consecrated is called of the lowest degree.” By considering these and a hundred similar smṛti statements we can be sure that living off the deity’s treasure and professional pūjā offering of brahmins who go without the sacrament of consecration as established by Pañcaratra renders them sub-Brahmins and devalakas.

134. As to the statement that the Bhāgavatas cannot pass for exemplary persons because they make use of flower and food offerings, which practice is abhorred by exemplary persons, to this we say: what does the śrotriya mean by left-over flowers and left-over food? When he takes it only as the flowers and the cakes, he is contradicted by all the world, for nobody approves of wasting flowers and cakes. Also, a particularized prohibition is not in order, because it is not established. No notion of a particularized
thing occurs when the particularization is not determined; and here it is impossible to determine the particularization.

**OBJECTION.** Why should it be impossible, since the particularization is that it is forbidden to use food what has been offered up to the deity?

**REPLY.** Are you now accepting the validity of Pañcarātra? For only when one admits that there is a deity present in the idols that are erected with the sacred formulae enjoined by Pañcarātra Tantra can one postulate that the particularization of the prohibition lies in the offering-up to the deity. For unless the validity of the Tantra is admitted, how can an idol which is set forth in the Tantra be a deity, and, a fortiori, how can the substance that is offered up for this deity's sake be nirmālya and nivedya. For a deity does not exist by just being a deity; only that deity which is known to be correlated with an oblation on the authority of scriptural testimony is the deity to that oblation; that is your own doctrine.

Or if it be held that something is nirmālya and nivedya because it is admitted by the Pañcarātrikas that it is offered up to the deity, well, in that case you must also admit its purity because the Pañcarātrikas accept also that the utilization of nirmālya and nivedya is perfectly pure.

Or if you do not accept this peculiar excellence, since in your opinion the Pañcarātrikas have accepted as pure something that is really impure,—well, in that case you must accept it that the substance which is offered up is not really nirmālya and nivedya, since then
you opine that the Pañcarātrikas have adopted someone who is not really a deity by mistaking him for a deity!

In other words, inasmuch as the offering up of mere flowers, cakes etc. is not approved, and because it is impossible to particularize the prohibition of utilizing these substances according to the terms of one's own doctrine, therefore the particularization must be determined in the terms of the others', i.e. the Pañcarātrikas', doctrine; and thus the offering up becomes greatly purifying. And inasmuch as therefore the utilization of nirmālya and nivedya becomes most purifying, it must needs be accepted by those who admit the validity of the Pañcarātra Tantra as well by others who do not.

135. Objection. But how is it possible then that even one who admits the validity of Pañcarātra should reject nevertheless the nirmālya and nivedya? For in the Tantras the tasting etc. of the nirmālya is prohibited. For instance, it is said in the Sanatkumāriya Saṃhitā: “The offering that is proffered (to the deity), flower or fruit, is called nirmālya; that must be avoided meticulously.” Similarly in another passage: “When one has eaten nirmālya, or the food-rests of someone who is not one’s guru, one must observe a milk-vow for a month, continuously recite the eight-syllable formula, and drink the pañcagavya, in order to be purified.” Likewise in the Indrarātra: “One should not live off the Supreme God, nor eat the nirmālya offerings.” Also: “And the nirmālya offerings are never fit for consumption.” Similarly in another Saṃhitā: “One should not eat the nirmālya offerings,
nor smell them, nor step over them.”—How then can one accept the purity of the utilization of the nirmālya when we thus know from several Samhitās that it is prohibited?

**Refutation.** To this he says: The utilization of a proffered substance which has been offered up to the deity is not condemned if it is done within a period of ten nādiṅkās. Thus in the same Indrarātra: “The wise one must let the offering-cake stand for ten nādiṅkās. This period of time has been prescribed both for night and for day. They condemn the nirmālya that has stood for more than this period of time; thereupon he must throw it in water, or in fire, or bury it in the ground.”

**Objection.** But what is said here is not to praise the tasting etc. of the nirmālya, but to prescribe that the substance of the cake pūjā is thrown away after a period of ten nādiṅkās. In the statement: “He must let the offering cake stand for over ten nādiṅkās,” the injunction is laid down that when the proffered flowers, cake etc. in general have been taken off as nirmālya, because they have now fulfilled their ritual function, they must be kept by way of accessory pūjā rite for a period of ten nādiṅkās. And consequently even a study of the conclusions of your own Tantras shows that the touching etc. of the turmeric powder, the food offerings and the water used to clean the idol’s feet is not established by Tantric doctrine. Now, where are you!

**Refutation.** Where are you, loquacious debaters, witless fools who have been swallowed by your own tongue which plays around with a grain of
knowledge! Your objection looks black and white at once, like the moon with its spots. This prohibition applies only to fools like you, since all this is indeed to be observed by Vaiṣṇavas who are qualified to do so, and thus it is capable of wiping off a multitude of sins in the same way as the drinking of soma at a Vedic sacrifice; for it is not to be touched by others, just as the puroṭāsa cake is not to be touched by dogs! Thus in the Īśvara Saṁhitā, “It is difficult to find in this world a true votary of the lord, my son, and, among those who are, it is even more difficult to find a disposition which is truly pure enough for the foot-water, or to use the garlands etc. which have been mentioned in the doctrine. Therefore, O six-faced One, all this which is purified by the formulae and the glance of the Bhagavān is forbidden to those who lack this disposition and are not votaries.” And in another passage: “The saffron, sandal, camphor and oils that have been taken off Viṣṇu’s body are supremely purifying.” Likewise in the Padmodbhava: “He who wears the powder that is taken of Viṣṇu’s body on his head obtains the fruit of a Horse Sacrifice and glories in Viṣṇu’s heaven.” Similarly in the Īśvara Saṁhitā, “No blame should be put by statements arising from ignorance on all that is used, the perfume, flowers etc., (the water) of the idol’s bath etc., and the curds, milk etc. Those who condemn this divine purifying agent because they consider it nirmālya, those witless detractors of its power will go to hell.”

The above statements which to the consecrated prohibit the use of nirmālya at the time mentioned in the time instruction must be understood to mean a
time subsequent to that when the (offerings to) the chief of the Bhagavân’s retinue\(^\text{294}\) is being used. Since the garlands, sandal etc. which are offered up to the Bhagavân, later on, after the Višvaksena offering, become unfit to eat, therefore the Sātvatas use the nivedya etc. before that time. Consequently the use of the nirmālya is a cause of excellence for the Sātvatas.

136. Moreover, it is our postulation that the exemplary people hold the nirmālya of other gods in contempt; this is postulated like the drinking of soma (which is good) because it is Vedic (in contrast to the drinking of liquor which is evil). So I have said that those who do not accept the validity of the Bhagavân’s doctrine are unable to determine what is nirmālya. When it is properly determined (namely according to the Bhagavân’s doctrine) the Bhagavân’s nirmālya proves to be extremely purifying, as is demonstrated by the statements of all Vedic teachers. In a matter for which the only means of knowledge is verbal testimony, it must be so as verbal testimony says that it is. Unless one is deaf, one cannot say that there is no verbal testimony concerning it.

For instance it is said in the Brahma Purāṇa: “The nivedya of Viśṇu is declared by the sages to be pure and fit for consumption; one who eats other nirmālya and nivedya must perform the cāndrāyana in expiation. The mālya which is taken from the body of Viśṇu takes away evil and is holy. He who wears it on his head goes to supreme bliss.” It follows that the smṛti statement that a man who eats nirmālya and nivedya must perform the cāndrāyana\(^\text{295}\) should be taken
to bear upon the nirmālya of Rudra, Kāli etc. Thus in the Mahābhārata: "Meditating in one’s heart upon Hari, one must offer food to Him with full attention, thereupon pick up this food again with the middle-finger and the thumb, and then sacrifice it bit by bit, saying: “Prāṇāya svāhā, Apānāyasvāhā, Vyānāya svāhā, Udānāya svāhā, Samānāya svāhā.” Likewise in another passage, “what has been offered to the god must be given to a brahma-carin.” Thus in the Mahābhārata: "The saintly knowers of the Pañcarātra ate in his house that which had been left over by the Bhagavān, as a means to attain to bliss, as supreme nourishment.” And likewise the blessed Saunaka: “He himself eats the nivedya.” He who condemns Viṣṇu’s nivedya, whose purity is proved by hundreds of similar smṛtis and which dispels the fear of rebirth, really ignores the statements of the smṛtī because of his heterodoxy and ought to have his tongue cut off.

137. Objection. But how can the nivedya be a means for the prāṇāgniḥotra? The exemplary people do not approve of a means for homa etc. for which no building bricks are used. Nor can a substitution of another substance do duty as a homa, because he lives off food that has been obtained according to taste. Nor can a substitution of another consumption be made to replace the nivedya, for scripture enjoins upon the twiceborn a meal in the evening and a meal in the morning, as follows from the prohibition: "One should not take food in between."

Refutation. That is no defect, since the multitude of deities, like prāṇa etc. are revealed to be parts of Viṣṇu, in the same way as Viśvaksena, the chief
of Viṣṇu's retinue. For just as the flowers, cake etc., though proffered to the Bhagavān but actually given to Viśvakṣena shows that He is familiar under various guises, or just as at a sacrifice the soma juice that is left over by the hotar is pure to the adhvaryu, so it is also with the nirmālya. 298

Moreover, only scripture can be our criterion for what is to be eaten and what is not to be eaten. When it says that something is fit to be eaten, what injunction are we to invent ourselves? Just as the same rule governs both the periodical and the desiderative agni-hotra, so the same rule governing the eating of the nivedya applies also to the prāṇāgni-hotra.

138. As to the remark299 that from the observance of different sacraments, from conception ceremony to cremation, it follows that the Bhāgavatas are not brahmīns, here again ignorance is to blame. It is not your Honour's fault that the Bhāgavatas, who have the Vājasaneyasākhā in the transmission of their family line, observe the sacraments of conception ceremony etc. according to the manner laid down by the grhyasūtras of Kātyāyana etc. Those who perform the forty sacraments which are enjoined by the Ekāyana scripture while giving up the dharmas of the Veda, from the recitation of the gāyatrī onward,300 they properly follow the rules laid down by the grhyasūtras of their own sākhā and do not abdicate their brahminhood because they fail to follow the rites of a different sākhā; since otherwise it would follow that other brahmīns too would forfeit their brahminhood because they fail to perform the rites enjoined by other
people's śākhā. For everywhere among brahmins we find customs that differ according to birth, cārana, gotra, qualification etc. Even though one ritual is understood for all śākhās, still all the various dharmas relating to mutually different qualified performers do not all together accumulate in anyone place. And the Aspirants who are distinct from those brahmins who are qualified for rites of the aindrāgneya etc., which are means leading to the enjoyment of rewards like heaven etc., as enjoined by the three Vedas, and who themselves are qualified for the rites of the Ekāyana, rites which alone are the means of attaining to the Bhagavān, viz. knowledge, cleansing the way to the Lord, preparation of worship and oblation, as enjoined by the Ekāyana scripture, are brahmins too. It follows that the non-observance of certain rites enjoined by different śākhās does not mean that either one forfeits his brahminhood—that the Ekāyana śākhā is preterpersonal scripture has been enlarged upon in the Treatise on the Validity of Kāsmīra Agama, and is therefore here not further discussed. But since it is quite obvious that the Bhāgavatas, which we are discussing here, are connected with the dharmas of the three Vedas, like the sāvitri recitation, there is no possible support for the suspicion that they are really vrātyas because they would have abandoned these Vedic dharmas.

139. May Nathamuni be victorious, he to whom the Three Principles are immediately evident by virtue of his own miraculous power, he by whose pupils the arrogance of the rivals of the Sātvata Doctrine is terminated after their own view was rent to pieces by
variously apposite arguments, he whose spirit is for ever the abode of the feet of Mukunda.

May, for the length of this Aeon, play on the pious, enchanting and irreproachable sayings of the extensive collection of prose and verse compositions which eclipse the cleverness of the befuddled, conceited and witless assembly of the evil crowd of the rivals of the Sātvata doctrine, whose spirit has been increased by the glorious Nāthamunindra, and by which all the unholy powers are cleansed.
NOTES

1. To Yāmuna, God's omniscience consists in this unlimited percipience, so that, as he will argue below (§ 109), the validity of Pañcarātra does not rest only on Scripture, but also on Perception.

2. In the pūrva-pakṣa the principal opponents introduced are what one may already call śārta brahmins, and among them especially the orthodox followers of Mīmāṃsā. No Vedānta opposition will be discussed.

3. śabda, and its synonyms, have been translated variously as Verbal Testimony, Verbal Evidence in general, or Scripture in particular, depending on the context.

4. prāmāṇa has generally been rendered with "means of knowledge," sometimes with "criterion."

5. jagati or loka: "in the world of experience, in common experience."

6. Punctuate after iti which closes the question introduced in prṣṭo vyācaśām; abhi-ni-viś "to stick to a partisan view (in the teeth of contrary evidence)." I take bāla iva as sandhi for bāle iva, the meaning being that the objector takes the view that something limited (the boy) is really unlimited (mature adult).

7. siddhasādhana, one of the defects of an argumentation by which proof is sought of that which is already proved or established. Space (ākāśa) is, by definition, unlimited and cannot illustrate the thesis that something finite can be infinite.

8. vibhu in the sense of "omnipresent, infinite."

9. namely, the Pañcarātra postulation that such tantric ceremonies as consecration (dikṣā), etc. are means leading to the summum bonum.

10. In the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke, as in the case of the kitchen.
11. Yāmuna throughout treats Sātvata and Bhāgavata as synonymous.

12. pauruṣya and apauruṣya; the latter has in the sequel been rendered with "preterpersonal." Person here does not mean only "human person" but "any being endowed with personal features, including God."

13. "Eternal Scripture" (āgama) is preter-personal scripture, since any verbal statement originating from a person is cotemporal with that person, and the pūrvapaksin does not admit the existence of an eternal personal deity.

14. arthāpatti, throughout translated "circumstantial-implication". It is a kind of inference by which is established something that must be established, yet is not established by another means of knowledge; for example: "Deva-datta, who is well-fed, does not eat by day:" since he cannot be well-fed without eating at all, it is deduced, by circumstantial implication, that he eats by night.

15. namely, the relation of being a means to a certain end.

16. KMS 1.3.2 api vā kārtaṇānyāt pramāṇam anumāṇam syāt "smṛti is authoritative, because both smṛti and Veda have the same agent performing its mandates."

17. The morning and evening oblations, the New and Full Moon oblations, and the soma sacrifice, examples respectively of nitya (daily recurring), naimittika (occasional) and kāmya (desiderative) rites.

18. aṣṭakā is the name of the 8th day after Full Moon in the winter and śīra months, on which an oblation is performed for the deceased (Manu 4.119; 150).

19. the crepuscular observances.

20. the point is taken up in detail infra §§ 119 ff.

21. respectively yoga, whereby the component parts of the word are given their own meaning; and rūḍhā, the total meaning of a word that has become conventional and does not necessarily correspond to the meanings of its
component parts. *Rathakāra* means by *yoga* "chariot-maker, cartwright," by *tūḍhi* a caste which is not at all characterized by this profession.

22. *adhyayanasiddhahusāgavabhangapāpi*. Such a "connotation" is, for example, that the *rathakāra* in the literal sense of cartwright is disqualified for Vedic ritual, because a cartwright is a *śūdra*; on this point see infra.

23. *upanayana*, which is the first step to his acquisition of Vedic knowledge.


25. the term "by royal decree" shows that it is a *caste profession*. Quotation not identified.

26. not found in *Aṣṭānasūtradhyāya* (AAS 48).

27. unidentified.

28. unidentified.


This point is detailed upon infra §§ 134 ff.

30. unidentified.

31. unidentified.

32. not in *Devalasūtra*.

33. unidentified.

34. not in *Aṣṭānasūtra*; *Avaluka* is unknown to me, kalpa-devalaka can be explained as a professional kalpa priest, kalpa either in the sense of ("unorthodox" ritual)," or 'astrological mansion'; gani-bhogadevalaka is likewise obscure, but probably refers to unorthodox priest engaged in gani worship.
37. namely, दीक्षा.
38. namely, the four Vedas, six Vedāṅgas, the Purāṇas, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Dharmasastra.
39. BrS. 2.2.42.
40. A Naiyāyika. Traditionally, Nyāya does not accept the Mīmāṃsā view that the Vedas have not originated from a person.
41. The argument is thus: The Veda is of personal origin, because it is language; language is invariably found to originate from persons. The Naiyāyika compares the Mīmāṃsaka’s view in the terms of this argument with the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke.
42. अवतारा “descent, emergence.” The meaning is as follows: Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a certain end by suprasensiblc law. Since the process (the means-end relation) is suprasensible, there can be no other authority for it than Scriptural authority.
43. This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits (phala) brought about by observance or non-observance of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation.
44. cf. Udayana, Kuśumānjali4.1.
45. Since they are products, they have been produced by a person (God) who knew the means by which to produce them (dharma and adharma).
46. This is the Mīmāṃsā view which holds that the dharma and adharma as instruments in creation are always the dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being whose body is itself the product of dharma and adharma and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, control them. The Mīmāṃsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction, but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.
The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally. No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act, by either beginning or ending the universe. On this cf. Prakaraṇapancikā, p. 137 ff. for the Prābhākara view, and Ślokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 47-116 for the Bhāṣṭṭa view.

47. lit. "that which is unprecedented, not known before, sc. by other means of knowledge;" in Mīmāṃsā it describes especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act which makes it produce its result.

48. The argument is that one cannot know that the act will indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized; thus the act's power—apūrva—cannot be known beforehand as the instrument of effectuation. By the Naiyāyika's definition only one who knows what instruments are effective in production can actually produce.

49. unidentified.

50. mantra and arthavāda: the terms indicate that the Naiyāyika continues to address the Mīmāṃsaka, for these of course are Mīmāṃsā terms, mantra being the Vedic formula used at the ritual, arthavāda the descriptive, non-injunctive passages of Brāhmaṇa and later Vedic texts.


52. Yāmuna concurs in the Mīmāṃsaka's refutation of the Naiyāyika's views, to the extent that he too rejects that the existence of God can be proved by reason; but he will counter the Mīmāṃsā assertion that God cannot be proved at all, that in fact there is neither room nor purpose for a God in the universe. For Yāmuna, God has all the characteristics He has for the Naiyāyika, but he proves them from Scripture, not reason.

53. That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates knowledge of apūrva facts, e.g., that a soma sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertaining to dharma.
51. the individual soul.
55. supra note.
56. Since the apūrva power is suprasensible, it can never be perceived, and the assumption of a God who 'supervises' and controls this power because he perceives it is absurd.
57. read na labhyate 'virodhe' pi; the meaning is this: when a certain fact (the eternity of pots) cannot be proved by a ground (recollection) because this ground contains a contradiction (it is recollected that pots having existed cease to exist), this does not prove that the same ground (recollection) cannot prove the eternity of earth, mountains, etc., when there is no contradiction contained in it (nobody has recollection of a vanishing mountain).
58. adhikaraṇasiddhānta is a conclusion which, as soon as one thing is established (e.g., that there is a world creator), establishes another topic discussed (e.g., omniscience). On this question, cf. Tarkabhasa 43.
59. It is the contention of Mīmāṃsā that words and their capacity of conveying meaning are eternal.
60. Sequence, of course, supposes priority and posteriority of the entities in sequence, while eternals are co-eternal.
61. kramaṁantarajāti; the difference resides in the createdness of the Panca-rātra and the uncreatedness of the Veda, which introduces a difference of degree between the word sequences of both corpora of verbal statements.
62. This is Yāmuna's objection, which states the extent to which he concurs in the preceding Mīmāṃsā argument against Nyāya.
63. This starts the discussion of the Prabhakara theory on the limitations of the validity of verbal statements. First general Mīmāṃsā views on the subject are discussed.
64. The validity of tabda lies in its communicating contents that cannot be known through other means of knowledge. What I translate as 'facts' are more literally 'established
entities,” established, that is, by other means of knowledge than tabda. A scriptural statement of the kind “grass is green” is not strictly valid in the sense that, in order to know that grass is green, we need a scriptural statement to that effect. Another proving factor, e.g., the means of knowledge Perception, may turn up conceivably and thus make the scriptural statement superfluous; or we may find that grass is not invariably green, but changes its colour, which would reverse the scriptural statement. Scriptural validity, i.e., Scripture’s being a means of knowledge, is to the Prabhakara Mimamsaka, its being the sole means of knowing a particular thing. To the Prabhakara this validity is ideal in the case of injunctions concerning actions which, suprasensibly, lead to a certain desired end.

65. The injunction concerning the odana oblation includes an injunction concerning the preparation of the odana and the fetching of firewood for the cooking. Since experience shows that for a cooking fire one needs firewood, this karya is not strictly known on scriptural authority.

66. This objection ignores the priorities among pramāpas, or means of knowledge; for the Prabhakara, Perception, etc. are prior to, take precedence of, Scripture in case of perceptible, etc. contents. Generally Perception is prior to Inference. To Yāmuna, therefore, no priority of Perception to Scripture is given, which is expected since in his view Scripture may also be an account of (God’s) Perception, as in the case of Pañcarātra.

67. This sums up the conclusion of the refutations of both the Naiyāyika’s and Mimamsaka’s views: the defects consequent upon the Nyāya proofs of God are avoided on the basis of scriptural examination, since Scripture can indeed validly pronounce on God.

68. The Prabhakaras, who are notorious for the gaurava ‘complicatedness’ of their argumentations.
69. "Denotation, denoting power, denotativeness" in the following Prabhakara discussions have to be understood as the power of verbal statements to provide unprecedented and non-superfluous knowledge concerning their contents. In the Prabhakara view, a verbal statement by itself is denotive only in injunctive forms, while substantive statements have denotation either through contextual connection with injunctive statements, or (but this is not strictly "true" denotation) through repetition of otherwise knowable facts. This view, which has obviously been developed for scriptural statements in the first place, is thereupon extended to ordinary language as well, and is thus expressed in the following theory about learning language which is here understood. A child learns what certain sentences 'mean' by observing the action which his elders take upon hearing these sentences. When he knows no language meaning (vyutpatti), he may acquire knowledge by first hearing one adult tell another to "get the cow," and subsequently observing that the other is getting the cow: by associating the two events he knows that an order to get the cow was the content of the first adult's statement "get the cow." A remark without consequent action (e.g., "It is hot today,"') cannot convey any such knowledge to one who does not know language. The process of the child knowing the sentence meaning is here described as arthapatti "reasoning by circumstantial implication;" since there is no other ground for the second man's getting the cow, it must have been the first man's statement.

70. Thus Šalikanātha, Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 182: niyojyāh sarvakātye yāḥ svakhyatvena budhyate.

71. That is to say that the denotativeness of the words composing the statement is dependent upon the injunctive denotation of the statement as a whole.

72. The līnādi verbal terminations of Sanskrit to which in English correspond verbs compounded with auxiliaries like "should, must, to be to, ought to."
73. For example, a sentence: "He desires to go to heaven," which has the verb in the indicative, followed by a statement "he should sacrifice with a soma sacrifice," where the verb is injunctive, is truly denotative in spite of its indicative form, since it is obviously subordinated to the injunctive sentence, to which it describes the performer's qualification: only one who desires to go to heaven has title to, is qualified for, the performance of a soma sacrifice.

74. This is an example like "it is hot today;" the young father's happy countenance is not considered an action.

75. E.g., the sentence "he who desires to go to heaven offers the soma sacrifice," is an injunctive statement in indicative form.

76. This is the Prabhakara view of the denotativeness of single words, summarized in the formula anvītābhidhāna, which is short for kāryānvītābhidhāna "denotation of words syntactically connected in an injunctive sentence."

77. This point will be taken up and confirmed infra § 64.

78. E.g., a statement "there are fruits on the river bank" does not by itself, self-sufficiently, create in the hearer the knowledge that there are fruits on the river bank; the means of knowledge here really is inference, since the hearer must infer that the speaker knows what he is talking about, that he knows that fruit means 'fruit', river bank 'river bank,' etc.

79. This is again the Prabhakara view. The Bhāṭṭa view is somewhat different; according to the latter the upaniṣads are arthavādās (subsidiary substantive statements laudatory of elements of injunctions) to the eternality of the performer's personality (ātman), which eternality is presupposed by the efficacy of the injunction: e.g., the injunction "he who desires heaven must offer with the soma sacrifice" supposes the immortality of the performer.
80. Ch Up. 1.5.1.

81. In this the Prabhākara concurs with the Bhāṭṭa. Injunctions without time of fruition specified are not guaranteed to bring about the desired effect during the present lifetime of the performer.

82. I read *ata svārtha-vādānām*.

83. On this point see KMS 1.2.1. with Śabara’s *bhāṣya*.


85. i.e., the appropriateness or propriety of a word in collocation with other words; in the sentence “his mother is barren,” ‘barren’ is obviously inappropriate.

86. The identification is considered an *arthavāda*, i.e., laudatory of the sacrificial pole.

87. The relation between God and the texts has to be proved. I read *jādi ca* for *api ca*.

88. unidentified.

89. RV. 10.90 14

90.

91. Mahānār Up 11.12.

92. Kaṭh Up. 3.9.

93. Śvet Up. 6.9.

94. Viṣṇu Pur. 1.1.31.

95. Not in Manusmṛti; reference perhaps to Manu 1.9–10?

96. I read *tathāpi*.


98. Śvet Up. 6.7.

99. unidentified.

100. supra § 12.

101. supra § 11.

102. Kumārila, Ślokavārttikā 2.114.

103. BĀ Up. 4.5.14.
NOTES

104. Ch Up. 6.11.3.
105. Ch Up. 6.2.1.
106. Ch Up. 6.2.3.
107. Taitt Up. 3.1.1.

The whole sentence includes *tena jīvanti*, on which the present exegesis of bhūta is based.


109. namely, that they are born (*jātāni*) and die (*prayanti*).

110. Śvet Up. 4.5.
112. Kaṭh Up. 2.18.
114. sc. of knowledge.
115. here used as synonymous with Pāṇḍupata.
116. I read *rityā*.
117. *pratijñārthaḥ*, the object or content of the *pratijñā*, which is the first step of the five-membered syllogism, e.g., “the mountain has fire” (*parvata syāgnimattavam*). It does not therefore coincide with the Subject. In the proposition both S and P must be siddha, established as existing somewhere; a non-thing like a hare’s horn can be neither S nor P.

118. this “non-apprehension of what should be there (*yogānupalambha*) is the criterion by which we know the absence of a thing. Here it is the absence of truth in Pañcarātra that needs be proved by *yogānupalambha*, if the objector’s contention that Pañcarātra is invalid through reversion be correct.

119. I have difficulty in understanding the argument unless I assume an illogicality. By stating as his ground “since in āgama we have its meaning exactly conveyed as it is” the objector not only agrees with the preceding argumentation that on inferential grounds Pañcarātra is not
invalid, but even goes so far as accepting that it is valid in other words, confuse non-invalidity with validity. Then, because of this validity (svārthaśya tathātvavabodhanāt), there arises a conflict with a deviating statement of the Veda which has its own validity; since only one can be true, it follows that when Pañcarātra is true by inference, it is untrue by Veda. But I don't see how the objector can reasonably infer the validity of Pañcarātra, since its meaning or content is admittedly suprasensible. Yāmuna himself has not argued that Inference proves the validity, but that Inference cannot disprove the correctness of the thesis.

120. a hetvāntaram constitutes on the part of the debator a confession of importance since the ground which he gave does not hold and he has to produce a different ground. By the rules of debate this means a defeat.

121. infra §§ 76 f.

122. The founder of the school of logic.

123. The Vedic injunction na hīnyāt sarvabhūtim "one should not injure any being" raises the question of the validity of injunctions which do require injury to beings. But this is a secondary question which does not affect the validity of the Veda as a whole. Similarly, the thesis "Pañcarātra is valid" is not disproved by the possible mention in the valid Veda of something that conflicts with something in Pañcarātra. So far the argument is not for validity but against invalidity.

124. Since pots are knowable, the ground would also apply to prove the eternality of pots and all things that are knowable.

125. Since only earth (as an element) possesses smell, this ground has no general applicability.

126. Like the ground "because it is knowable" which applies to things regardless of whether they are eternal or not.
127. Obviously, if the ground were not known, it could not be stated.
128. This objection seems to speak to the summary denial that the ground is unestablished through reversion.
129. Be it repeated that the validity, authoritativeness, etc. of Verbal Statements (i.e., tabadpramāṇya) is founded on the basic assumption that statements truly and accurately communicate their things-meant (arthā), that a word accurately conveys its meaning. Among these things-meant Yāmuna includes facts as well as kāyaṇas, hence the following debate with the Prābhākara.
130. supra § 37.
131. Yāmuna here takes up the Prābhākara’s theory that a child learns the meaning of language through the action his elders take on hearing a statement, so that the denotativeness of language is defined by its injunctiveness. He uses the Prābhākara’s example of the factual statement: “A child is born to you.” A child who does not know language has no way of understanding the meaning of this statement because the young father’s happiness conveys nothing specific. But, asks Yāmuna, suppose the same child has witnessed his father reception of the cheering news and the subsequent preparations for a birth ceremony. Since one follows immediately upon the other, the child associates one with the other and can thus understand the meaning of the statement, though the statement itself was no injunction, but a communication of an established fact.
132. Then, one may suppose, the child would not so readily associate the birth ceremony with the previous communion.
133. supra § 36.
134. The things-meant or denoted by the word.
135. Yāmuna’s argument is that the injunctive, etc. terminations of the verb denote the injunction as their thing-meant (padārtha); but what makes this injunction
"meaningful" is not that it is an injunction, but that it is connected with someone who is qualified to accept the injunction, e.g., in the injunction svargakāmo yajeta. The injunctive yajeta has no meaning or purpose unless there is a "desire for heaven;" the meaning of the injunction thus is connected with the consequence of this desire of heaven, namely, that somebody who has this desire is prepared to do something about it.

136. ardhajarati is a half-old woman; the ardhajaratiyanyāya is used to indicate that the opponent wants to have it both ways and that consequently his argument, like a half-old and half-young woman, is useless either way.

137. Misra's text here has yady api pravrityanupapattisamadhi-gamanīyaiva sabdasaktis "the denoting power of language is to be known only through the impossibility of operation," which makes no sense. The reading must be corrupt, in anupapatti we may find a corruption of vyutpatti, in pravrtyi perhaps a corruption of kāryārthe or kāryārtha—. I read conjecturally kāryārthe vyutpatti-samadhi-gamanīyaiva, which gives the required sense.

138. This holds for those statements which are not verifiable by other means of knowledge, for if they are verifiable, they are no means of knowledge in their own right.

139. read na hi kriyakārye vyutpannaḥ sthāyi kāryam.

140. sthāyi; the Prabhakara view is that the kārya has a lasting efficacy beyond the inevitably transient action it involves; for the kārya must remain in order to effect the fruit of the action at any time after the completion of the action.

141. Yāmuna objects that we cannot have two altogether different denoting powers in language, one to convey a transitory thing, another to convey a non-transitory thing. The only possible explanation is that of lakṣāṇa "figurative usage," which remains related to the mukhyā vr̥tti "principal usage." But he will deny the entire construction (67).
142. This is the Prabhakara view, which holds that in the injunction niyoga svargakāmo yaṭe taḥ śādyā (object to be realized) is not svarga, but the entire niyoga (cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 190), so that the statement of the injunction would become the means (śādhana) to realize that śādyā, sc. the injunction.


144. Nothing can become a fact (siddha) as long as it is still to be made a fact (śādyā) by a ‘factualizing’ means (śādhana); thus as long as it is related with such a means it cannot be a fact.

145. This is the principle of ekavākyatā: a statement can contain only one injunction, otherwise there is vākyabheda: what should be one sentence is split up into two.

146. Quotations not identified; but for the argument, see Prakaraṇapañcikā, p 183 ff.

147. No specific fruits are attached to niṣṭya rites.

148. māhāmya, which corresponds to prādhānya, pradhānataḥ.

149. BĀ Up. 5.6.1.

150. Not to be found in the major Upanisads.

151. supra §35.

152. supra §42.

153. read ity asat for iti yat.

154. Śvet Up. 3.19.

155. Śvet Up. 6.8.

156. cf supra note.

157. supra note 86.

158. supra §36.

159. This must refer to the śruti sa yo ha vai tat param veda brahma veda brahma bhavati (quoted Rāmānuja, Vedārthaparastā, sarndra, 91), which I have been unable to locate.

160. Taitt Up. 2.1.1. brahmavid āpnoti param.
161. This must refer to Taitt Up. 2.1.1 sośnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipascītā, but sa sāmagaḥ is obscure, unless one may regard it as a corruption of vipascītā.

162. Partial quotations from Taitt Up. 2.1.1, Mund Up. and an unidentified source.

162a. Nṛsiṁhapūrvatāpāni Up. 2.4 (which reads purastād for parastād) and Śvet Up. 3.9.

163. not identified.

164. not identified.

165. Could this refer to Varāha Purāṇa? Cf. infra.

166. Viṣṇu Pur., 1.1.31.

167. Not in Manusmṛti.

168. A little known Vedic branch (if it was a Vedic tradition), from which certain Vaiṣṇava sects derive their authority; cf. infra §138.

169. These quotations could not be identified.

170. BĀ Up 4.1.5.

171. Viṣṇu Pur. 6.4.40.

172. cf. Varāha Pur., 72.4, which reads padyate in b.

173. cf. Varāha Pur. 7026 na tasmāt parato devo bhavitā na bhaviṣyatī. It is clear from several quotations from this Purāṇa that Yāmuna’s text had different readings, not all of them better.


175. The Linga, Vāyu and Bhaviṣyat quotations could not be verified.

176. Title of one of Yāmuna’s treatises.

177. read sa hi saha jasamāneśanarākṣālktadākṣāṣārādhanādīdharṣaḥ.

178. External signs worn by Śaiva sectarians.

179. Śvet Up. 3.8.

180. “The Doctrine of the Five Chapters.”

181. The highest material evolute; the śloka is out of order.
182. The text reads gūḍhācāramukhasmasānabhasitāvasānāḥ paraḥ, which is a corruption; I read, wholly conjecturally gūḍhācābhasmasānatayanādikriyāparaḥ.

183. The text reads yogo dhūraṇam uṣyate hdi dhiyāṁ onkāra-pūram tathā, and seems out of order. The sense is clear however.

184. corresponds to Varāha Purāṇa, 70.36 tvam ca rudra maḥā-bāho mohatāstrāṇī kārayāl alpāyasaṁ darsayito mahāyātu maheśvaraḥ.

185. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.41, which in cd reads nayasiddhānta-saṁjñābhir mayā ṛātraṁ tu darsitam.

186. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.38, which reads in cd tāstresvabhirato loko bāhulyena bhaved ataḥ.

187. nearest is Varāha Pur., 70.42, tadā pāṣupatam śāstraṁ jāyate vedasaṁjñātam.

188. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.21, yad vedabāhyan karma sācchāstram uddyā sevyate l tad raudram iti vikhyātām tan nestam gadasitam Ṛṣyaṁ.

189. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.40, mām viṣṇor vyatīrīktam ye brahmaṁ ca dvijottamaḥ bhajante pāpakarmāṇas te yānti narakam naraḥ.

190. not identified.
191. read yesām for esām.
192. not identified.
193. supra § 52.
195. supra § 12.
196. Aitareya Br..
197. Manusmṛti, 4.124.
198. Mahābhārata 1.265 s.
199. supra § 17
200. supra § 17
201. āgnāvāiṣṇava, name of a sacrificial cake offered at the dikṣāniyěstit.
202. supra §17.
203. The author of the Brahmasūtras is identified with Vyāsā-Dvaipāyana, composer of the Mahābhārata
204. Mahābhārata, 12 340 (129.76) ff.
205. Mahābhārata, 6.66 (3012).
206. Mahābhārata not identified.
207. Mahābhārata not identified.
208. BrS., 2.2.42.
209. ‘Divisions’ of the Supreme God as Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.
210. tanmātras here in the sense of the “higher evolutes.”
211. toyena jīvān visasarja bhūmyām, MahānārUp., 1.4.
212. BrS., 2.3.16 (17). Translation: “A word descriptive of moving or unmoving beings, has not a secondary meaning [in referring to Brahman], because such a being’s existence depends on Brahman’s existence.”
213. BrS., 2.3.17 (18). Translation: “The ātman is not born because there is no śruti to that effect, and because of its eternality, which is proved by the śrutiṣ.
214. BrS., 2.2.43.
215. Muṇḍ Up., 2.1.3.
216. BrS., 2.2.44.
217. BrS., 2.2.45.
218. In BrS., 2.2.
219. asāmañjasya, taken from BrS., 2.2.37.
220. supra §§96, 97.
221. i.e., as a tatpuruṣa compound “the beginning (source) of (valid) knowledge:” vijñānādibhūve “since He (God) is a source of valid knowledge.”
222. cf. supra §18.
223. karmanī nyuḥ Pāṇini.
224. not identified.
in order to understand any statement, one must first know the meaning of the words that compose it; this may be called dependence, so that to this extent any statement is dependent for its informativeness on other and prior knowledge; but this must also apply to Vedic statements.

If the cause (here: God) is above suspicion, the statement will be accurate.

guṇataḥ prāmāṇyasyāyuktatvād anabhuyapagamāc; my understanding is that a statement has its validity by itself, and no secondary validity in the sense that its content must first be validated by some other means. The validity itself must be proved (namely by the character of the personal author or by its preterpersonal origin), but once proved, the statement itself is valid.

Vaiṣṇava rite observed five times a day: pañcakālikā.

Ślokavārttika, 2.6 7 ab.

ib. 2. 67 cd.

not identified.

this speaks to 108, that the independent cognition cancels the dependent cognition, if there is conflict between them. Yāmuna makes the point that this is not invariably true; that neither dependence nor independence is a cause of invalidation, sāpekṣanirapekṣalve is a dual and requires the correction of kāraṇā into kāraṇe, if my understanding of the text is correct.

namely, because it requires another cognition in order to be denied.

namely, in the example of the burning lamp: is it the same flame that burns at six o'clock and at seven o'clock? We don't see the flame change or be succeeded by another flame. Only inference shows that since there is a different amount of oil in the lamp at different times, it is different oil that is burning as a flame, so that the flame is really different. The sense perception is of the varying amounts of oil.
235. The Naiyāyikas.

236. Since Brahmā is the creator of the world, he can know whether there were Vedas or not before creation; by taking away Brahmā’s memory, God in His omnipotence could start the myth of the preterpersonal origin of the Veda.

237. not identified.

238. not identified.

239. Sābarabhāṣya and KMS.

240. supra § 17: vedabhāvyagṛhitatvāt. I have rendered grhita by ‘accepted’ to cover approximately the variety of meanings that Yāmuna detects in the word.


242. People who do prohibited acts follow Vedic expiations; but if acceptance by people who commit forbidden acts is sufficient to deny the validity of what they accept, this means that the validity of the Veda would be denied.

243. Manusmṛti.

244. supra § 17: this Buddhist injunction is outside the Veda in one sense.

245. For the observance of a prohibition is as much a ritual action as the observance of an injunction.

246. supra § 14.

247. supra § 16.

248 supra § 59.

249. Quotations not identified; the groups enumerated are śudras, and yet by Vedic injunction have to observe, i.e., to accept, the few Vedic injunctions addressed to them. Do they by their acceptance invalidate these injunctions?

250. not identified.

251. read desakālasamsthānādīti.

252. not identified.

253. supra § 15.
254. i.e., is the same name used for several groups or only one?

255. The argument is: if S is P, then P is not therefore S. The example is 'parvato 'gnimān dhūmavattvāt' if we interchange S and P, we get parvato dhūmavān agnimaṭtvāt, but this is not true, for though there is no fireless smoke, there is smokeless fire. Similarly here: the fifth may be a sātvata or a vaiśya vrātya, but being the fifth does not make the sātvata a vaiśya vrātya.

256. In the Manu quotation supra § 15.

257. explained below, § 130.

258. Hari has apparently a meaning 'lion.' Or did Yāmuna think of Nṛsimha?

259. gauḥ can mean 'cow' and 'word.'

260. supra § 15.


262. 'conventionally' the two words are synonymous, 'etymologically' they have different meanings.

263. Pāṇiṇī.

264. quoted supra.

265. supra note.

266. supra § 15.

267. not identified.

268. For the word means etymologically "maker of chariots, carts."

269. not identified.

270. By refusing to accept a rūdhī meaning the authority of the Vedic statements concerning all the features of the sacrifice made by the now disqualified chariot-maker would be lost, and the authority of the statement that caste names may designate more than one caste would also be lost.

271. cf. Amarakośa, 10.4.

272. not verified.
which is the prerogative only of the three varṇas.

KMS.

supra § 15.

not identified.

not identified.

supra § 16.

cf. Manu, 11.40.

AitBr., 3.46.

not identified.

supra § 16.

This and the following quotations could not be identified.

supra § 16.

a Brahman erudite in the Veda and following its observances.

If he does not believe that God is present in the effigie, the offerings are obviously not used and cannot be characterized as left-overs. The priest's avoidance of them would simply amount to sinful waste.

He must make his prohibition specific, in order not to prohibit the priest from using food that is otherwise wasted. But he cannot determine the specification on his own terms.

used flowers and used food offerings.

without divine utilisation.

The pañcagavya is a substance in which the 5 products of the cow are mingled.

one nāḍikā is a half muhūrta.

cake used at Vedic offerings.

namely, in the above statement on the 10 nāḍikās.

Viśvaksena, to whom pūja is performed after the main pūjā.

as quoted supra § 16.
295. Mahābhārata quotations not verifiable.
297. The ritual taking of food is considered a performance of the prāṇāgniḥotra.
298. The hotar is the principal reciting priest at the soma sacrifice, the adhvaryu the main executive
299. supra § 17.
300. namely, at the upanayana ceremony.
301. aindrāgneya, name of a śrauta ritual.
302. Name of a work of Yāmuna.
303. Predecessor of Yāmuna at Śrīranga.
304. Nāthamuni compiled the sayings of the Vaiṣṇava saints, the Āḻvārs.