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1996-09

Refocusing NATO's intelligence outlook towards biological warfare

Villareal, Claro William.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://ndl.handle.net/10945/8900

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

REFOCUSING NATO’s INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK TOWARDS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

by Claro William Villareal

September, 1996

Thesis Advisor: Rodney Kennedy-Minott Second Reader: Robert E. Looney

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Thesis V682

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September 1996 Master’s Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Refocusing NATO's Intelligence Outlook Towards Biological Warfare

6. AUTHOR Claro William Villareal PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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13. ABSTRACT (naximum 200 words)

Today, we are attempting to manage chaos. With the end of the Cold War, a number of troubling developments in the world have been unleashed, especially the proliferation of WMD. Biological weapons are an increasing threat to ‘world security. Nations and non-state actors are willing to sell or buy the necessary technologies for the production of | biological weapons which can have disastrous effects on a military, an economy, and the environment. Despite major efforts in reducing, worldwide nuclear and chemical capable threats, biological weapons require the same amount of

attention if not more from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO must highlight the threat of biological warfare in current policies in order to educate political, military, and civilian leaders on biological warfare issues, dete the employment of biological weapons, and increase a sense of security within the Alliance. For far too long, the intelligence communities within the Alliance have definitely underestimated the biological programs of other nations

| and non-state actors.

_ Refocusing the intelligence communities towards biological warfare will be of an enormous advantage for the

Alliance. Intelligence stems from the policies and directives set forth by worldwide governments. New policies will

| enhance the efforts of intelligence agencies and increase the awareness of the ominously growing biological warfare

| threat. Hopefull,, if policies change, then intelligence communities will refocus their efforts towards the new change: the increasing threat of biological warfare.

PERFORMING

15. NUMBER OF PAGES 137

[Ogee ClEGODE

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- {| 20. LIMITATION OF

14. SUBJECT TERMS NATO, Intelligence, Biological Warfare, and WMD

ie SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 118. SECURITY CLASSIFF TION OF REPORT CATION OF THIS PAGE TION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UE

NSN 7540-0 1-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REFOCUSING NATO's INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK TOWARDS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Claro William peried Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 1996

DUDLEY KNOX LiSRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

ABSTRACT

Today, we are attempting to manage chaos. With the end of the Cold War, a number of troubling developments in the world have been unleashed, especially with the proliferation of WMD. Biological weapons are an increasing threat to world security. Nations and non-state actors are willing to buy or sell necessary technologies for the production of biological weapons which can have disastrous effects on a military, an economy, and the environment. Despite major efforts in reducing worldwide nuclear and chemical capable threats, biological weapons require the same amount of attention if not more from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO must highlight the threat of biological warfare in current policies in order to educate political, military, and civilian leaders on biological warfare issues, deter the employment of biological weapons, and increase a sense of security within the Alliance. For far too long, the intelligence communities within the Alliance have definitely underestimated the biological programs of other nations and non-state actors.

Refocusing the intelligence communities towards biological warfare will be of an enormous advantage for the Alliance. Intelligence stems from the policies and directives set forth by worldwide governments. New policies will enhance the efforts of intelligence agencies and increase the awareness of the ominously growing biological warfare threat. Hopefully, if policies change, then intelligence communities will refocus their efforts towards the new change: the increasing threat

of biological warfare.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION’ .....ccoeeeee eee cee eee l II. NATO's POLICIES TOWARDS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE .........0.00000.... 9 A. CURRENT POLICIES REGARDING THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE TRA To ccenc eco ec ccc ee ee 10 BeCHALLENGES FACINGINAT OC een: 19

].. Deterrence of Biological W canons... eee... 19

2. strengthening? the BT WiGaee........... eee tres ...c. eee Jig.

Il. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AS WARFARE THREATS ....... 29 A. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND CAPABILITIES ................0cccccceccceceeeeees 32

B. DEVELOPING BIOLOGICAL AGENTS & WEAPONS .................... 39

C. ACCESSIBILITY OF BIOLOGICAL A GENUS icc eee 43

D. POSSIBLE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS ...... 45

E. PROBLEMS WITH BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DETECTION .......... 47

IV. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TERRORISM. ......ccccceceeerteeeeeeeeeees 49 A. BIOLOGICAL WEAPON ATTRACTION TO TERRORIST GROUPS . 52

B. TRENDS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INVOLVING BW ................ 53

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL GROUPS USING BW. ........... Si

V. INTELLIGENCE INVOLVING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE .................... A INTELLIGENCE UNDERES@INMATES ©. ...:.0f2 ccs... eee 61 legiragi.... ..... SOR: «ee as 62 IS ee ee cn 64

B. ROLE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) ..............cceeeeeeeeeeees 68

C. INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS. ................ccccceceeeeeeee. 71

ir me COIN JEU SIN eerste ate sat ase ee ee qe

APPENDIX A. CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENTS, PRODUCTION, AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR JES TIRMUS IOUS Pees oe en ee ee rE re epee 77

APPENDIX C. PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BY JF SIMTEINIIDS EIN oo consene ce 6 e060 eee 2s

APPENDIX D. WORLDWIDE MANUFACTURERS OF FERMENTERS ..... zl

APPENDIX E. WORLDWIDE MANUFACTURERS OF CENTRIFUGAL Ses eRe nur eee, Pee oreememrettrs, OTe, UPPET.. 00%... avaieas els cceenes 103

APPENDIX F. WORLDWIDE MANUFACTURERS OF FREEZE DRYERS 107

APPENDIX G. POSSIBLE STEPS TO ACQUIRE A MILITARY BIOLOGICAL OR

Me aN HE APON! CAPA BUY rere oc. --scketaancsacecodeenedeecesecateeeeeseceseseeesinseeuunaes 111 APPENDIX H. RANGES OF IRANIAN, IRAQL LIBYAN, and NORTH KOREAN BATS TIC MaLS SIMS SWRI eee cscs... c 000 - Ma nsec ves vencnsbvsceocccteosececamuaes came 113 SEL EC TERS IB OGRA tigers... ees sere tie: gS: os na c4va po dessin endo gete rac ss ae 117 MONSIEUR MeO Se... -- --veninves.->-seeauees--+>rsugesdeadeccaee-o---r+ venue 125

Vili

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In April 1949, the North Atlantic treaty created a dynamic Alliance of independent states for the purpose of maintaining security and peace of its members. The Alliance was an unqualified success, but with the end of the Cold War, the Alliance is facing numerous challenges, especially from the rising proliferation of WMD and the specific knowledge of how to produce them. Too many sovereign states and individual groups are now willing to buy or sell the technologies necessary to produce biological weapons which could have disastrous effects on military institutions, a nation’s economy, and the environment. WMD, along with the delivery systems, create an enormous risk for the member states and their forces and constitute a threat to international security. To provide the member states a stable security environment, NATO must face this dreadful challenge head on.

Despite major efforts in reducing nuclear and chemical capable threats throughout the world, biological weapons require the same amount of attention, if not more, from the Alliance. Nuclear and chemical weapons seem to receive most of the attention judging by publications and governmental policies while biological weapons are just "mentioned" in passing. The Alliance’s intelligence communities have definitely underestimated the biological programs of other states and adversaries. Two primary examples are the miscalculated Iraqi biological weapons program and the Russian Biopreparat program.

When the Biological Weapons Convention was opened for signature in 1972, four nations were suspected of developing offensive biological weapons. In 1992, there were ten such nations. Now, there are 12 suspected nations actively involved in the development of offensive biological weapons.

One reason why NATO should expand all efforts against biological warfare 1s

the potential hazards associated with biological agents. The world is battling against

1X

the rise of infectious diseases and the biological agents seem to be winning. As nations or non-state actors observe the increasing problems created by biological agents, they will realize that such agents are an outstanding weapon of choice. The possession of biological agents for the use in biological weapons will have a direct impact on worldwide operations. Nations and non-state actors have accessibility to the necessary equipment for producing these agents and to the biological agents themselves. NATO cannot underestimate any nation or non-state actor’s ability to develop biological weapons.

The second reason why NATO should expand all efforts against biological warfare is the threat of terrorist group activities involving biological weapons. As these dual use technologies spread throughout the world, the probability of biological terrorism will only increase. The threat of biological terrorism is increasing. These groups have illustrated their interest in all areas of biological agents, sophisticated biological equipment, and delivery systems over the past three decades.

Challenging the proliferation of biological weapons requires an enormous amount of attention from the Alliance. Many NATO platforms and forces could easily be targeted or attacked with biological weapons during peacetime or wartime operations. Refocusing the intelligence community towards biological warfare will be a great advantage for the Alliance. Intelligence exists because of the policies and directives established by worldwide governments. NATO must change its policies towards biological warfare. Will it take an offensive employment of a biological agent to include biological warfare in key documents? Or will it take mass casualties from a biological attack? New policies would enhance the efforts of intelligence agencies and increase the awareness of the biological warfare threat. If policies change, then intelligence will refocus their efforts towards the new change: the

increasing threat of biological warfare.

I. INTRODUCTION

In April 1949, the North Atlantic treaty created a dynamic Alliance of independent states for the purpose of maintaining security and peace of its members. With the end of the Cold War, the Alliance will face numerous challenges, especially from the rising proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the specific knowledge of how to manufacture them. When states and individual groups are willing to purchase or sell the technologies necessary to manufacture biological weapons, devastating effects are placed upon a military, an economy, and the environment. Proliferating states only need a starter culture of an agent to begin an offensive biological weapons program. WMD, along with the delivery systems, creates an enormous risk for the member states and their forces and constitutes a threat to international security. To provide the member states a stable security environment, NATO will have to confront this dreadful challenge head on.

Despite major efforts in reducing nuclear and chemical capable threats throughout the world, biological weapons require the same amount of attention if not more from the Alliance. Nuclear and chemical weapons seem to receive most of the attention with publications while biological weapons

are just "mentioned" concerns. The intelligence communities

within the Alliance have definitely underestimated the biological programs of other states and adversaries. Two primary examples include the miscalculated Iraqi biological weapons programs and the Russian Biopreparat program. Biological technologies have legitimate military or civilian applications separate from WMD. As these dual use technologies spread throughout the world, the probability of preo@esical terrorism wren ly macrease. Since bio lemme. weapons do not require infrastructures as costly as those necessary to manufacture and maintain nuclear or even chemical weapons, they become very attractive to other states, terrorist groups, or even religious cults. A recent example involves the Aum Shinrikyo Cult. In March 1995, the attack on the Tokyo subway station by the Japanese cult proved that WMD have extended the "battlefield" to the Ghaelianmeseecron. This particular group has links with 10,000 members in Japan and 20,000 members in Russia and North Korea.! Both Russia and North Korea are suspected nations of developing offensive biological weapons. It has also been reported that the Aum Shinrikyo cult has attempted

to obtain the Ebola virus as well as aircraft and drones as

‘Douglas Jr., Joseph D. "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked", Wall Street Journal. November 2, 1995.

the delivery systems.* An incident like this one represents a new dimension of terrorism and complicates the problem with the proliferation of such terrifying weapons. Nations have a hard enough time trying to control the increasing cases of infectious diseases that have recently resurfaced: TB, Menangitis, Cholera, sasea=Ebollae

Challenging the proliferation of WMD requires enormous attention from the Alliance, especially pertaining to biological weapons. Many NATO platforms and forces could easily be targeted or attacked with WMD during any peacetime or wartime operations. The major concerns for the Alliance are the increasing possibilities that surrounding states, including the non-state actors, are trying to acquire or develop WMD, the increasing worldwide trade of WMD systems, and the increasing "human capital" investments for technical expertise.°

When the Biological Weapons Convention was opened for

Signature in 1972, four countries were suspected of

“Douglas Jr., Joseph D. "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked", Wall Street Journal. November 2, 1995.

°*"Human capital" investment refers to a national investment in education in order to increase the productivity of biological weapons. This includes sending students to other countries, such as the United States, to study the biological sciences and genetic engineering or acquiring highly trained graduates in the sciences from leading universities.

“> Re

developing offensive biological weapons.‘ In 1992, there were ten such countries.° Now, there are approximately 12 suspected countries actively involved in the development of offensive biological weapons.® Some of these countries are alseommenbers Of thesGonvention on thes Proh@bition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Baeomogical) and Toxin®Weapons and on Their Destrmction (BTWC). Russia, a member of the BTWC and the Partnership for Peace program, is one of two countries, the other being the United States, that is directed by the United Nations Health Agency to eradicate the remaining stocks of smallpox by June 30, 1999.’ Will the Russians try to smuggle smallpox samples out of their country or will they act as directed?

NATO's current policies regarding WMD do not highlight the increasing threat of biological weapons. NATO must recognize changes of the environment in order to offer new

ideas, enforce their views against the proliferation of

*GAO Report. Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological Weapons. (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992), 16.

>GAO Report. Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological Weapons. (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992), 16.

°Tucker, Jonathan B. "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", Arms Control Today. Vol. 25, No. 3. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, April 1995), 9.

‘Associated Press. "Health Agency Agrees to Eradicate Smallpox", Monterey Co. Herald. May 25, 1996.

biological weapoms within thes@Neae publications, and take the lead in strengthening the BTWC: NATO's strategic concept provides guidance for its members and their forces. Nuclear and chemical weapons have had the spotlight in recent policies. Now, NATO must enlarge concepts pertaining to biological weapons. Will it take an offensive employment of a biological agent to include biological weapons in important documents? Or will it take mass casualties from a biological attack? There are many challenges facing NATO regarding the employment of biological weapons to include the threat of proliferation of WMD and advanced conventional weapons to deter the employment of biological weapons. NATO must establish a proactive stand against the proliferation of such weapons. Preventing the proliferation of WMD must remain a primary goal for NATO, but biological weapons have to be specifically highlighted as well.

Current intelligence assets and non-proliferation regimes are mainly focused on nuclear and chemical weapons pPeoliterabion-. NATO must Publicly haghltone views concerning biological warfare in order to educate the community on biological weapons issues, deter the employment of biological weapons, and imerease a sense of Security within the Alliance. Biological warfare issues create

policy and security concerns on a global scale. When

policies indicate a higher concern towards biological weapons, intelligence agencies will increase their efforts in this particular area as well.

This thesis will prove that NATO members must refocus their policy efforts regarding biological warfare. NATO, a Ccomeeeecdastribution point of a multinational organization, has the opportunity to educate the world in the challenge against biological warfare. To accomplish this task, the thesis will: (1) examine current NATO policies and explore the challenges NATO will encounter regarding WMD, (2) examine the potential threats of biological agents, (3) explore the possibility of terrorist or religious organizations that may employ biological weapons in support of their activities, and (4) .determine the implications and analysis of biological warfare to the intelligence community to include an unclassified data base of biological events which can provide indications and warnings of future biological weapon events.

Biological weapons are an increasing threat to world security. These weapons of mass destruction can have devastating effects on military and civilian communities as well as the environment. If a nation or terrorist group has the knowledge to produce the agent, the facility to develop

the agent, and the delivery system to transfer the agent,

then that nation or terrorist group has the ability and capability to produce biological weapons. When a nation or terrorist group illustrates the willingness and capability to use biological weapons, then that nation or terrorist group is a world security threat. Intelligence exists because of policies set forth by our government and foreign governments. If policies change, then intelligence organizations will refocus their efforts towards the new areas of concern. NATO can set the example and lead the

fight against biological warfare.

II. NATO's POLICIES TOWARD BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Although the Alliance faces significant international changes, the purpose of maintaining the security and peace of its members must remain intact. With the end of the Cold War, the Alliance encounters numerous challenges, especially from the rising proliferation of WMD and the specific knowledge of producing them. According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO has a vital responsibility to “deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of a NATO member state”.® WMD, along with the delivery systems, create an enormous risk for the member states and their forces and constitute a threat to international security. Nations and various other groups with WMD can easily generate political or humanitarian disasters. As President Clinton stated in his speech to the

United Nations on September 27, 1993:

“Schulte, Gregory L. “Responding to Proliferation: NATO’s Role”, NATO Review. July | SNe ae tee

For, as we all know so painfully, the end of the

eee am sCmemmoOr Oring us to the millennium of

peace. Indeed, it simply removed the lid from

many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and

territorial animosity...Thus, as we marvel at

this era’s promise of new peace, we must also

recognize that serious threats remain...As WMD

fares more hands, evenwsmall conflicts can

threaten to take on murderous proportions.’ The world is now more complicated, less predictable, and more dangerous than the days of the Cold War. The Alliance must magnify all efforts against the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. To provide the member states a

stable security environment in Europe and North America,

NATO will have to face this horrifying challenge.

A. CURRENT POLICIES REGARDING THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT

To challenge the proliferation of WMD while preserving a sense of security for the Alliance, NATO has developed Peaceupolrvecres. 611) Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, (2) Alliance’s Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and (3) NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Although these policies ecemess: ENMe pGoliieration Of WMD, they only highlight nuclear and chemical weapons as the primary elements of

iMECEMaAbLITOhal Stabvlity and cooperative Security.

°Clinton cited in Pearson, Graham S. “Forging An Effective Biological Weapons Regime”, Arms Control Today. Vol. 24, No. 5. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, June 1994), 14.

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Biological weapons seem to be hidden within the WMD phrase. Since WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, biological weapons cannot be viewed as “mentioned” concerns. The threat of biological weapons 1s increasing. NATO’s policies must expand concepts pertaining to biological weapons to reflect the current changes in the proliferation arena.

The Chinese have a saying that ‘change is a dragon.’ There are ways to respond to that dragon. You can ignore him and hope he goes away, but no matter how many times you tell yourself that he is not there or how much you wish he would leave, the dragon that is change remains. If you continue to ignonewhingshe will eat voles Youscanmi uy mee Control the dragon of "ehande, ELEY Eom score] em eliee a. path of your ch@eesing. (Push himesane ou lia. But the dragon is powerful and will not go where you want him to go. He will ultimately knock you down and eat you. But if you ride the dragon of change, you can avoid his lethal powers. You can Survive; you can even prosper. Accept change; constantly anticipate and adapt to it; and always take advantage of the opportunities it brings. This is the strategy we must embrace.’

NATO represents more than a central distribution point for the development of policies that preserve the sense of security of the Alliance. NATO’s policies extend well beyond the Alliance’s boundaries. The changing environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance. The threats of

biological warfare require the same amount of attention that

'°General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, cited in Sparling, Steven C. "Riding the Dragon of Change", Surface Warfare. Vol. 21, No. 4. (United States: Harmony Printing & Development Company, July/August 1996), 4.

1]

nuclear and chemical warfare receives within NATO policies.

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept takes a broad approach to security based on three concepts: (1) dialogue EnrOuGgHW errr Gaplomatic Liarstn, (27 CoopeératTon with all members regarding pertinent fields of security, and (3) collective defense through the preservation of appropriate military capabilities. It illustrates the concern for reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons, increasing the MieESGLabileon Or nite nererema: mimmPrary forces Mecorrtrolling conventional forces, and banning against chemical weapons. The policy portrays the functions of the Alliance and validates the significance of the Alliance within the changing environment.

The major problem with the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept is that it does not include the threat of biological weapons. WMD within the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept seem to involve only nuclear and chemical weapons. Not once does this particular document mention biological weapons.

It only “hides” this type of warfare within the WMD phrase. This is totally unsatisfactory, especially when the document clearly separates nuclear and chemical warfare. Will it take an offensive employment of a biological agent to include biological weapons in important documents such as

this one? Or will it take mass casualties from a biological

Me

attack? These questions might be simplistic in nature, but NATO must establish a proactive stand against the proliferation of such wWeapomeweee =e emcing the proliferation of WMD must remain a primary goal for NATO, but biological weapons have to be specifically highlighted as well and not jJUuststakenstemgqranted,

Knowing the threat of WMD creates a sense of instability in international security, the Alliance has established a Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and NATO’s Response to Proliferation of WMD. These policies recognize that the proliferation of WMD is an international security threat, acknowledge the fact that other nations are striving to acquire the technologies to produce WMD, and realize that the Alliance must increase political atid defensive efforts against the proliferarivonmor WMD. The major problem with the Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the NATO’s Response to Proliferation of WMD is that they seem to focus upon the proliferation of ballistic type weapons as delivery systems. Ballistic weapons are not the only delivery systems for biological agents. Biological agents can be delivered by various aerosol sprayers, artillery, and Jimena ath wsmpolicy Cannot focussupon@ene type oF

delivery system. There are many other delivery systems

nations can use towards the employment of biological weapons.

Porivicaimee the goal is to “prevent proliferation from Cccliaaigeememsaould 1 OCCU SeEO reverse,it through diplomatic means”.!! This means regular consultations on WMD and sharing of information between all countries associated with the Alliance. Dialogue will - it is hoped - establish a sense of obligation needed to fight against the proliferation of WMD. Biological weapons create problems with verification, but with regular consultations and information sharing, the Alliance will come closer to verification capabilities leading to a more comprehensive dwn eclLive nen proliteration effort.

The problem with the political dimension of the Alliance is that not all members voluntarily share information.’* All members of NATO must share information on their various advances in the biological arena in order to pursue the necessary knowledge of biological warfare and to support the safe and secure dismantlement of biological

weapon facilities. Since there are members of the Alliance

"NATO Press Release, “Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction”. (Brussels: NATO Press Service, June 9, 1994), 3-4.

'*Statement is based upon Dr. Marcel Leroy's lecture, "European Security and Defense

Identity: NATO, the WEU, and the European Union", on January 24, 1996 at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Leroy has been the Head, Multilateral and Regional Affairs Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters: Brussels, Belgium since January 1991.

14

that do not have@ihe politicaimecti1tude to share this valuable biological information, the Alliance should make it a mandatory action. If members withhold information, those members should be "politically embarrassed". To challenge the dreadful threat of biological warfare, all members of the Alliance must make a major effort. Exchanges of all types of information elevates the educational awareness for the entire organization. When the Alliance collectively contributes information towards biological warfare, a commonality of thinking towards biological warfare will be created. A lackadaisical effort towards biological warfare will haunt every member of the Alliance, not just the members who do not offer information.

Although all NATO members have signed and ratified the BTWC, not all of the Partnership for Peace (pfp) members are listed as countries who have signed and ratified this particular document.'* The seven countries not listed include: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova.’* The Partnership for Peace program was created to increase the confidence and

cooperation efforts to reinforce security, build concrete

‘See Appendix A for a copy of the BTWC.

‘These countries are not listed within the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Reader Fact Sheet. March 1996.

15

Cooperation activities designed to achieve objectives, and Stremecthen relations with NATO.’? This cannot be achieved if there are members of the pfp who have not signed and ratifiaeduiehic BIWC .

If the aforementioned countries wish to become NATO “partners”, they should also sign and ratify the BTWC for Pies sUppemt ef nom-prodiferation of swch WMD and for worked security. Countries with previous ties with the Soviet Union might have had extensive biological warfare experience. Inspections of these countries or assessments of the their biological weapons knowledge could improve current policies.

Defensively, NATO seeks military capabilities to deter the use or proliferation of WMD and defend the Alliance's territory and forces. A problem with NATO's defensive measure is that it needs more emphasis on protecting the tkreoes fremea biologicalyattack. This includes protective equipment, detection devices, decontamination procedures, and biological warfare training.

Weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological,

and chemical - along with their associated

delivery systems, pose a major threat to our

security and that of our allies and other friendly

Heetons. SemGuSs,..a key part Of our Strategy 1s to

seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal

"NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 50.

16

with these threats.’® Improving these capabilities, from a collective aspect, will increase the understanding of biological warfare and establish a more protective environment for the troops against a biological threat.

Similar to NATO's policies towards biological warfare, the defensive measures focus upon the maintenance of nuclear and conventional warfare. Higher priorities need to be associated with biological warfare. Since the threat of biological warfare is not highlighted within NATO's policies, NATO's leaders and military commanders will not place adequate biological warfare training for the troops.

The Persian Gulf War clearly illustrates the inadequate defenses, lack of training, and medical imperfections towards a biological attack within the first six months of the conflict.!’ These troops were highly susceptible to any biological attack from the Iragi troops. These insufficient defenses against biological attacks during the Persian Gulf

War were results of an "inconsistent and lower priority"

‘The White House was cited in A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington, D.C.: White House Press, February 1995), 13.

‘GAO Report. Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems. (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office,

March 12, 1996), 1.

17

assignments towards biological defenses.!*® The troops are extensions of NATO policies. The leaders of the Alliance Cannot attevadmme allow biological warfare take the lives of military personnel who are providing the security and freedom for other members of NATO.

Major efforts to reduce nuclear and chemical threats throughout the world have been undertaken. Jointly pursued political and defensive measures will heighten awareness of the need to take action against the proliferation of WMD. Biological weapons require the same amount of attention, if ioewienes Eromegeee Alliance, . NAZO cannot afford to be complacent with the increasing threat of biological weapons. The use of biological weapons dates back to over two thousand years ago when contaminated bodies were used against their adversaries.’? If certain countries express a willingness to incorporate biological weapons in their military operations, NATO’s defensive military operations may be directly affected. NATO must be able to protect its forces and destroy biological facilities to defend against

any biological attacks. The number of countries capable of

'5GAO Report. Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to esolve Continuing Problems. (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office,

March 12, 1996), 1.

‘’Kupperman, Robert H. And David M. Smith. “Coping With Biological Terrorism”,

Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future ? Vol. 15, No. 1. (Washington, D.C.: The Center For Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 37.

18

using biological weapons 1s im@measang. When nations signed the BTWC in 1972, there were only four countries with biological weapons programs.*° In 1992, there were ten countries.*’ Now, there at least 12 countries suspected of having offensive biological weapons programs.*? NATO must install the realistic threat of biological weapons to the members of the Alliance in order to refocus intelligence

efforts towards biological warfare.

B. CHALLENGES FACING NATO

1. Deterrence of Biological Weapons

The deterrence of biological weapons use creates a problem for the Alliance. To deter another nation from using such weapons, the defending nation must establish the capability and the willingness to utilize its own weapon systems against the enemy forces. The defending nation must develop and use highly effective defensive or offensive weapon systems that would make biological weapons ineffective. Some possible deterrent strategies include:

(1) threatening to use biological weapons to deter the

*°GAO Report. Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological Weapons. (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992), 16.

"bid.

~Tucker, Jonathan B. "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", Arms Control Today. Vol. 25, No. 3. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, April 1995), 9.

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employment of biological weapons, (2) threatening to use advanced conventional weapons to deter the employment of biological weapons, (3) threatening with a large scale ConvenemememmmattLack fo deter the employment of*biological weapons, and (4) threatening to use nuclear weapons to deter the employment of biological weapons. Neighboring states of the Alliance could use deterrence strategies not supported by the Alliance.

Prior to 1972 when President Nixon decided to abolish all U.S. biological and toxin weapons, the United States developed biological agents to deter the employment of biological agents by other countries.*? Although the United States eliminated all biological and toxin weapons from its arsenals, other nations will continue to develop biological weapons. Since nations have noticed the difficulties of accurately pinpointing violations of the BTWC, the biological weapon is a perfect weapon for those who have or have not signed and ratified the BTWC. Although potential hazards associated with biological weapons exist, technological advances in biological warfare are increasing

which enable other countries to “maximize storability,

Bailey, Kathleen. “Deterrence of Biological Weapons”, Draft. (California: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 1.

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lethality, and slirvivability @ommeiological agents:

Another method of deterrence is increasing the amount of conventional weapons. If countries can produce and threaten with a substantial amount of advanced conventional weapons, they might be able to deter others from employing biological weapons.*°? Extensive manpower capabilities with advanced conventional weapons could present an overwhelming picture towards the enemy with biological weapons. Although the increase of advanced conventional weapon systems is a costly investment and could place more lives in danger, this is an option for countries that do not want to take chances with biological agents, especially countries that have Signed and ratified the BTWC. But other nations might not be able to afford large amounts of troops or do not have the technological expertise required for such weapon systems which results in possibly choosing another weapon: the biological weapon.

Establishing»a threat withea muclear*edpaebi lieyate deter the employment of biological weapons is a costly

investment, but has proven to be very effective - at least

*Bailey, Kathleen. “Deterrence of Biological Weapons”, Draft. (California: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 1.

Ibid. p. 2.

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in some cases.*° The Persian Gulf War is a perfect example. Irag admitted to preparing biological weapons for employment agai Sem ommememmcoalition forces, but decided not to use these weapons for “fear of U.S. nuclear retaliation”.?’ One of NATO's defensive measures involves maintaining minimum levels of nuclear weapons to "preserve peace and prevent war or any kind of coersion".*?® This defensive measure only encourages other nations to establish nuclear capabilities. To deter biological weapon attacks while avoiding any Viewer fons ore rene bre, naclons could decide “to invest im nuclear weapons.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons to deter the employment of biological weapons has downfalls. First, proliferation of nuclear weapons causes a weakening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). From fear of increasing biological weapon capabilities, countries currently without nuclear weapons may not want to rely on the security commitments of the Alliance and may want to initiate their own nuclear weapon capabilities for the sake

of defending themselves. Future scenarios could easily

*°Bailey, Kathleen. “Deterrence of Biological Weapons”, Draft. (California: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 2.

zy,

Arms Control Today. “Iraq Provides IAEA With Significant New Information”. Vol. 25, No. 7. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, September 1995), 27.

*-NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 41-42.

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involve executive decisions on utilizing nuclear weapons against nations without nuclear weapons which would initiate strong opposing views. Second, the proliferation of nuclear weapons could also cause an increase demand for nuclear weapons with smaller yield ratios. For example, the U.S. arsenal is comprised mostly of weapons with yields of 5KT designed for massive destruction of the former Soviet Union.-° These weapons are not necessary against smaller nations.

Deterrence is a complex subject that every nation must face. With the threat of biological weapons, nations will develop weapon systems to protect themselves. The non-state actors» on ehe othem hands deenet signeor ratify treaties so they will acquire whatever means possible to protect their interests.

2. Strengthening the BTWC

Nations have supported the BTWC based upon three assumptions: (1) biological weapons were not perceived to be aeviable weapon option, (Z) production of large ™etantuewes in a relatively short time was assumed to be technologically difficult and beyond the capabilities of many states, and

(3) developed states that could produce such weapons already

"Bailey, Kathleen. “Deterrence of Biological Weapons”, Draft. (California: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 5.

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have access to nuclear systems to deter the nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.°° The world changes constantly and these past assumptions are no longer valid. Iraq as well as non-state actors, such as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, view biological weapons as viable weapons. Some nations seek a biological weapon capability as a strategic WMD - "poor man's atomic bomb" and as an equalizer against major powers like the United States.*! Non-state actors are acquiring the technological requirements for bremeqtveal™eapabrlites’ —And the increasing biological weapons threat could encourage nations to develop other than nuclear weapons systems to deter the employment of biological weapons. The increasing advances in the biological sciences and the potential applications for these advantages illustrate the need to strengthen the BTWC to reflect current scenarios. NATO must commit themselves in strengthening the BTWC as a critical element of the global non-proliferation regime covering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The changed environment offers new opportunities for

Latter, Dr. Richard. "The Increased Danger of Biological Weapons Proliferation", Jane's Intelligence Review. (United Kingdom: Huntcard Litho, February 1994), 93.

*'Tucker, Jonathan B. "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", Arms Control Today. Vol. 25, No. 3. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, April 1995), 9- 1:

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NATO to strengthen the BTWC. There are nine areas that can assist nations in improving the BTIWC:

(a) With new technological advances in biological sciences, nations must reaffirm that the creation of biological agents or toxins, by any means, for weapons is not justified under the BIWC fom military PpurpOSesue@meeeseeeerlon from possible enemy employment of biological agents. Nations must have a definition on the amounts of biological agents allowed for "porophylatic, protective, or other peaceful purposes".

(bob) As nations destroy biological weapon facilities or shift to peaceful purposes, nations should conduct these processes through a standardized list of actions which is constantly reviewed after each case in order to provide the necessary protection of the local population and environment. This will also encourage nations to work more closely inemitemerologireal treld:

(c) All members of the BTWC need to enforce domestic hegislation making it a crime for their citizens co deveterc, produce, stackpawlte, or acqwire bicologacal or Cosminmwagents or weapons. This could deter non-state actors from acquiring biological agents or weapons.

(d) Nations should submit a semi-annual report that includes updates of all domestic facilities (government, commercial, or private) as well as inputs from experts on strengthening measures for the BTWC.

(e) If nations have questions concerning a particular facility or program, then these nations should have the migqnt CTO indutree (abour the tacililties osmereqramser

ao Nations sshouladr gl vewadvaneed moOrice On. maeertaay, training exercises in biologicial warfare defenses. This would encourage joint operations in preparations for possible threats to military forces.

(g) Routine inspection team training exercises must be Seomcmiered 1m @rder CO ineslinvence iImprevyemenres In Inspection techniques. This would also enhance research in developing improved detection devices for small quantities of agents.

(h) In order to assist inspection teams, all facilities must be required to keep updated records (names,